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Abstract 
Challenging Robot Morality: An Ethical Debate on Humanoid Companions, 
Dataveillance, and Algorithms  
By Eugenia Stamboliev 
In this thesis, I reflect on ethical, moral, and agenthood debates around social and 
humanoid robots in two ways. I focus on how the technological agency of social robots 
is understood in ethical canons by shifting from moral concerns in Robot Ethics to data-
related ethical concerns in Media and Surveillance Studies. I then move to wider 
debates on morality, agenthood, and agencies in Machine and Computer Ethics 
research, so as to highlight that social robots, other robots, machines, and algorithmic 
structures are often moralised but not understood ethically. In that vein, I distinguish 
between these two terms to point to a wider critique on the anthropocentric and 
anthropomorphic tendency in ethical streams, so as to view technology from a morality-
aligned standpoint. 
I undertake a critical survey of current ethical streams and, by doing so, I establish a 
transdisciplinary ethical discussion around social robots and algorithmic agencies.  
I undertake this research in two steps. First, I look at the use of humanoid social robots 
in elderly care, as discussed in Robot Ethics, and expand it with a view from Media and 
Surveillance Studies on data concern around robots. I hereby examine the social robot 
and the allocation of its ethical and moral agency as an anthropomorphised and 
humanoid companion, data tracking device, and Posthumanist ethical network of 
agencies. This is done to amplify the ethical concerns around its pseudo-agenthood and 
its potential position as dataveillance. Next, I move on to streams in the Philosophy of 
Technology (POT) and Machine/Computer Ethics. Here, I discuss concepts on machinic 
moral agency in digital systems. As I pass from the social robot as a humanoid pseudo-
agent towards moralised algorithmic structures, I lay out wider conflicts in morality 
research streams. Specifically, I address their epistemological simplification and 
reduction of moral norms to digital code, as well as the increasing dissolvement of 
accountable agenthood within algorithmic systems.  
 
By creating a transdisciplinary investigation on techno-ethical and techno-moral canons 
and their agency models, I urge for a holistic ethics that, first, gives a greater focus to 
human agent accountability and moral concerns in the application of robots and, second, 
negotiates new moral or social norms around the use of robots or digital media 
structures. This is aligned with increasing concerns around the growing 
commodification of health data and the lack of transparency on data ownership and 
privacy infringement. 
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Key Terms and Themes 
Algorithm 
I refer to algorithms and algorithmic structures when more broadly explaining the 
computational architecture, tracking, and ethical structures of social robots in digital 
information systems. I do not dwell on this term in detail and need it only to distinguish 
computational agency from anthropomorphic agency. Hence, the definition found in the 
Encyclopaedia of Mathematics is sufficient for this thesis: ‘A computational algorithm 
is realised in the form of a computational process (i.e. as a finite sequence of states of a 
real computer, discretely distributed in time).’1 Introna & Wood’s (2004) definition is 
equally useful, of algorithms as a ‘mathematical, or logical, term for a set of 
instructions’ (180).  
 
Algorithmic Surveillance  
According to Introna & Woods (2004), the term ‘algorithmic surveillance’ was coined 
by Norris and Armstrong (1999) in their pioneering book, The Maximum Surveillance 
Society. They write that surveillance uses automatic step-by-step instructions and 
specifically refer to surveillance technologies  
‘that make use of computer systems to provide more than the raw data 
observed. This can range from systems that classify and store simple 
data, through more complex systems that compare the captured data to 
other data and provide matches to systems that attempt to predict events 
based on the captured data’ (Introna & Woods, 2004: 181). 
Anthropocentrism 
This thesis operates with two similar terms, anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. 
The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines anthropocentrism as ‘considering human 
beings as the most significant entity of the universe’ and as ‘interpreting or regarding 
the world in terms of human values and experiences’.2 This concept creates problems 
when discussing morality and ethics around robots and machines on various levels. This 
dynamic unfolds as problematic in wider POT (see Philosophy of Technology) 
                                                
1 Available at https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Computational_algorithm (Accessed 
22.05.2018). 
2 Available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anthropocentric (Accessed 15.05.2018). 
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discussions, since their ontological views on technology mix with the focus on human 
consequences and expectations around technology. What the robot is capable of and 
what it is supposed to understand or intend, then fuses with the ambition to recreate 
human agency. Floridi (2014) describes the issues around anthropocentric ambitions as 
linked to thinking agenthood as a singular entity. He denies individual views on 
technology, but holds on to moralising its capacities. For Posthumanists, 
anthropocentric views are inherently flawed when thinking or talking about 
technological agency, not only because agency is not a separate entity, but because 
some agencies are not human. This theme is discussed in Chapter Four and Seven, and 
is picked up with the labels of (2) Reductionist Morality and (3) Distributed Morality. 
 
Anthropomorphism  
Anthropomorphism implies ‘the tendency to attribute human characteristics to inanimate 
objects, animals or others with a view to helping us rationalise their actions’ (Duffy, 
2003: 180), and is derived from the Greek words anthopos, which means human, and 
morphe meaning form/design. Duffy points out that anthropomorphism favours the 
observer’s perspective in the interaction between robot and human. Social robots afford 
an anthropomorphic projection as much as automata3 did in the 18th century (Reilly, 
2011).  
However, this projection process becomes problematic if moral abilities or 
responsibility are projected into robots, even though these do not embed any human 
agenthood, human agency or any moral understanding. Posthumanists like Braidotti 
(2006) do not support an anthropomorphic ethics or agency of anything, but she 
acknowledges that anthropomorphising technology is an automatised, biological 
response of human agents and, hence, cannot simply be switched off. 
 
The difference between the anthropomorphic and the anthropocentric - both morality 
led - approaches is that the anthropomorphic camp is concerned with how the robot is 
perceived as an agent or tool, while the anthropocentric camp aims to embed moral 
                                                
3 ‘The word automaton comes from the Greek automatos, meaning ‘acting of itself’, referring to 
automated moving figures of animals or human beings. While automata look like dolls or toys, it is their 
animation that signifies life. This life-like movement means that automata are often perceived as if 
they’re alive. As a result, automata are central to debates about mimesis or the representation of reality in 
the historical period in which they exist’ (Reilly, 2011: 1). 
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abilities and rules into robots. Both concepts think agenthood, agency or decision-
making are dependent on human evaluation and reference systems, which are rarely 
specified. Anthropomorphism dominates Part One and the discussion on social robots, 
as well as the (1) Apparent Morality and Agenthood discussion. It is discussed in detail 
in Chapter Six. 
 
Computational Interaction / Computational Architecture  
Computational (or algorithmic) interaction refers to how the software level of robots 
influences their interactivity and responsiveness. Computational interaction can be 
understood from various disciplines, but plays a big part in research on the Human-
Robot-Interaction (HRI). In this thesis, I explore this theme as aligned to discussions on 
algorithmic architectures (Rossini, 2012), tracking (Haritaoglu et al., 2000), and 
algorithmic autonomy (Floridi, 2014; Wallach & Allen, 2009). This theme is debated in 
Chapter Six in detail. 
This theme is important to understand for the agency debate, since social robots are not 
only humanoid bodies and companions, but embed and operate computational 
‘capabilities of conducting a wide range of social functions [e.g., speech recognition, 
speech generation, visual recognition, affective responses, turn-taking (interactivity), 
and artificial intelligence]’ (Lee et al., 2005: 540). Their computational interactivity 
allows me to move from a discussion on social robots as perceived human-like pseudo-
agents, to them as computational systems and algorithmic agencies. Furthermore, it 
allows me to argue that the ethical concerns can be situated in their ‘inner shell’ (Read, 
2014), not only in their appearance.  
 
Dataveillance 
Dataveillance is the ‘systematic use of personal data systems in the monitoring or 
investigation of the actions or communications of one or more persons’ (Clarke, 1988). 
Dataveillance marks a shift from strategic surveillance to the appropriating of data 
collections, on the grounds of an increase in collected data sets and the expansion of 
digital information structures (Püschel, 2014; Andrejevic, 2012). I align this concept to 
social robots, since I fear that the ignorance of Robot Ethics towards data-related 
concerns (which are masked by having an anthropomorphic discussion on why robots 
are good or bad companions) neglects their ability to track and collect data, which is 
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problematic in practical terms. Dataveillance links with the computational interaction of 
robots and their tracking capacities, but refers to the implementation and expansion of 
technology into environments such as elderly care, from which data can be appropriated 
and commodified (Püschel, 2014). This theme is explored in Chapter Three. 
 
Ethical Gestures According to Agamben (2000) 
Agamben’s (2000, 2014) work offers an ethical angle on technology, one that does not 
moralise but is concerned with understanding the reciprocity of human-technology 
agencies. For Agamben, early cinema is a gestural remediation of socio-cultural and 
technological discourses. His conceptualisation of early cinema as an ‘ethical gesture’ 
(2000) allows me to undertake a speculative investigation, which looks at technology as 
a network of relational agencies of human and technological origins.  
I use this concept to support my view on tracking as the robot’s means of remediating 
human and technological agencies; of making its expression ethical; and allowing for a 
perspective on tracking, which is not moralising but reflects on the complexity of new 
agency models that are neither stable nor hierarchical. Agamben looks at how cinema 
technology has embodied and transformed human gestures within a philosophically and 
historically complex visitation of what he calls the ‘crises of representation’ in the early 
20th century, which I believe can also be traced in the social robot’s anthropomorphic 
agency projection. This theme is explored in Chapter Three and is picked up again in 
Chapter Six. 
 
Ethics as Aligned to Philosophy of Technology (POT) and Moral Philosophy  
Ethics can be understood as the structure or a vessel of moral norms; it can also be 
referred to the discipline in which morality is discussed. In most traditional moral 
philosophies (such as Kantian, Humean, Utilitarianism, etc.), there is no distinction 
between ethical and moral norms. For Luhmann, ethics can be understood as a 
‘reflective theory of morality’ (Luhmann, 1989: 360). I sympathise with Ward’s media-
theoretical view (2015), which sees ethics as a set of principles that can be a singular or 
plural concept and can refer to a language or a set of norms. But, he argues that ethics 
must be something truly dynamic, and can never become dogmatic, since it is a ‘human 
activity’ (6). He argues that ethics is not just the disposition to adhere to rules, but also 
the disposition to critique and improve these rules, since ethics is a process of a ‘lived 
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experience of ethical doubt and plurality of values, and then seeks integration and 
theoretical understanding’ (2015: 7). He explains the difference between meta-ethics 
and applied ethics with: 
‘Meta-ethics asks three big questions about the nature of ethics: What are 
we saying when we make an ethical claim? How do we know that what 
we say is justified? Why does ethics exist in the first place? There are 
plenty of ethical theories, from descriptivism and intuitionism to realism 
and relativism. Applied ethics, on the other hand, asks not what we mean 
by ethical concepts like good or right but what is good or right, and how 
to do what is good or right in certain situations’ (2015: 6,7). 
Ward’s view offers a useful link between moral philosophy and POT, but is not useful 
to understand robot ethical concerns. I consider it a general definition on ethics worth 
keeping in mind. However, I do not commit to one ethical school on technology, due to 
the comparative character of this thesis’ investigation, since I highlight the inclusion of 
Posthumanist ethics, together with Agamben’s view on the ethical gesture, as exclusive 
ethical views on technology, so as to question the moral concerns of Robot Ethics to 
critique traditional POT discussions. Ethical POT streams are increasingly becoming 
meta-ethical, and do not deal sufficiently with practical questions on the use of robots. 
 
Ethics as Aligned to Posthumanism 
I make use of Posthumanist ethics (mainly through Braidotti, 2006 and Barad, 2003) to 
counter the view from Robot Ethics on social robots as anthropomorphic companions, 
and Machine and Computer Ethics’ computers and algorithms as moral systems. 
Anthropocentric ethical streams in Machine and Computer Ethics and POT, which refer 
to the moral qualities of algorithmic structures, as much as anthropomorphic views on 
social robots as companions, would be rejected by Posthumanists. Braidotti (2006) is 
critical towards anthropomorphism, but sees it as an imbedded human response; she 
rejects anthropocentric views on technology as being epistemologically mistaken.  
The Posthumanist thinking allows for a better understanding of robots as an 
entanglement of various human and technological agencies. In particular, the view from 
Braidotti on ethics as an intertwining of agencies, and on the ‘ethical complexities’ in 
socio-technological relations (Braidotti, 2006: 16), contributes to a holistic view on 
robots as bodies, computational machines, and data collections, which also embed 
tracking capacities and are much more than moralised companion devices or single 
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bodies. I align the (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies framework with the Posthumanist 
perspective on robots to understand data and tracking as ethical networks. I further 
share the ambition of Braidotti (2006) and Zylinska (2014) towards overcoming 
moralist universalism and reductionism, as much as the concept of a stable, single or 
rational subject owning certain moral intentions. Equally, I acknowledge that the 
Posthumanist ethical views are insufficient to practically debate robot or 
developer/programmer accountability.  
 
Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI)  
Human-Robot-Interaction is a research stream in HR that explores how human agencies 
interact with robots, or how to equip robots so they can interact with humans. This area 
has two angles; the human and the robotic angle – both requiring different cues to 
interact. The human or anthropomorphic perspective asks for social robots to appear 
natural, believable, and responsive, so as to gain a wider human acceptance. From a 
robotic perspective, the robot needs to be able to read its environment or human 
movement through the sensors and modules embedded in its computational system. The 
better the social robot can interact with its environment, the more meaningful and social 
it is considered, but this requires an operational autonomy in managing and 
synchronising data-processing and locomotion. My concern is that HRI research 
underestimates the ethical dimension of the data management it enables, since it lacks 
the insights from Media and Surveillance Studies. This theme is debated in Chapter 
Three briefly and in Chapter Six with greater detail. 
 
Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS) 
A new branch of Media Studies, aligned with Social Sciences and Surveillance Studies, 
has fused into a research area referred to as Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS) 
(Kammerer & Waitz, 2015). What MSS enables in this thesis is to amplify the ethical 
structure of data collection as an ethically problematic one and as inherent to the use of 
social robots. MSS is an emerging transdisciplinary research area, in which social 
structures and institutions, surveillance, and data-production merge with historical and 
cultural media studies and media theory. Inspired by media theorists like Kittler, 
contemporary researchers in this area address topics on new aesthetics, digital 
convergences, new and emerging forms of data-production, and their influence on not 
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only socio-cultural structures, but also on privacy structures. Some of the prominent 
voices in the field are Andrejevic (2012), Galloway (2012), Gates (2011), Gitelman 
(2013) and Magnet (2011). This framework guides Chapter Three. 
 
Moral Agency in Machine and Computer Ethics (Philosophy of Technology/POT) 
I specifically survey moral agency models in POT to understand the computerisation 
and algorithmisation of moral agency into algorithmic code. This process leads to 
reductionist, distributed, and simplified morality concepts that become too abstract to 
answer for any accountability questions in applied ethics, but that are well suited to 
explain the network of agencies constituting digital technology. Moral agency models in 
Machine and Computer Ethics (Wallach & Allen, 2010; Floridi, 2014; Kroes & 
Verbeek, 2014) often support an anthropocentric view on robotic or computation 
systems, which aligns technological autonomy and agency to moral reasoning and 
moral actions. However, these canons often reject anthropomorphic projections and 
individual agenthood models (like Floridi does), since they instead align to a collective 
ethics, as opposed to the companion position in Robot Ethics, which looks at the robot 
as an (pseudo) individual agent.  
Some theories come close to the Posthumanist views on socio-material agency (Brey, 
2014). The difference between these techno-philosophical views and Posthumanist 
ethics is that the distribution of moral agency still moralises technological agency, 
instead of understanding the intersection of agencies as networks without evaluative 
intentions. An example is the labelling of algorithms as being ‘good’ or ‘evil’ agents 
(Floridi, 2014); which is something I find problematic.  
Further, this moralising process supports an implied but undiscussed value system. 
These streams make use of evaluative implications and traditional morality concepts, 
but are not clear on their reference points. Some discussions align with individual ethics 
(compared to ethical structures); others refer to Kantian ethics or Utilitarianism (Miori 
& Herschel, 2017). Kantian ethics would focus on the duty of the individual to act 
morally, whereby the actions become expressive for moral agency. However, a 
Utilitarian ethical view ‘examines right or wrong based on the consequences of an act or 
a rule’ (33). The Utilitarian perspective applies the principle of utility to individual 
moral actions and the Utilitarian rule applies the principle of utility to moral rules’ (33). 
Appropriating philosophical backdrops from moral philosophies to suit the 
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technological complexity is, in my view, flawed and too simplified to be a legitimate 
and holistically ethical approach. 
 
Moral Agency in Robot Ethics 
Moral agency is assigned to social robots in Robot Ethics through an anthropomorphic 
projection of values and intentions, which comes from their humanoid shape. In the 
framework of Robot Ethics, I only make use of the anthropomorphic view on social 
robots and the ethical position of social robots in human environments, such as elderly 
care. I explore this through researchers such as Royakkers & van Est (2016), Lin et al. 
(2012), Sharkey & Sharkey (2010), and Turkle (2005, 2011). 
The moral agency model of social robots makes use of an anthropomorphic fallacy that 
social robots are companions, and it projects agency onto the robot on the grounds of its 
humanoid features. The limited understanding of robots ethically, in my view, denies 
the Posthumanist position that robots could be a network of other, non-human agencies, 
which lead to different ethical concerns, such as data or privacy issues. It also denies the 
view on social robots simply being an ethical technology without first having to be 
involved in moral concerns. The view on social robots as companions and the drawing 
of moral agency from their humanoid shape is also critiqued by other POT theorists as 
being too anthropomorphic and superficial.  
I make use of the view from Robot Ethics to discuss the anthropomorphic companion 
agency first. I then shift to the anthropocentric discussions on machine morality and 
intelligence, and morality in POT streams, which move from a humanoid entity agency 
to a computational system agency, but both still refer to robots. Robot Ethics is not 
clearly separated from wider POT discussions and, as a conglomerate between 
philosophical streams, certain discussions do overlap.  
 
Philosophy of Technology (POT)  
I survey wider Philosophy of Technology canons (Kroes & Verbeek, 2014) with a focus 
on anthropocentric streams in (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics, which I argue as a 
sub-division in POT. I enter (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics to offer a more holistic 
ethical view on robots as machines and not only as companions, and on robotic 
capacities beyond robotic appearance. I establish this two-fold framework to survey 
how morality/moral agency is debated in contemporary discussions on technological 
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and artefactual agency (Johnson & Noorman, 2014), robotic machines (Wallach & 
Allen, 2009) or algorithmic systems (Floridi, 2014). In a wider sense, I distinguish 
between morality-led Robot Ethics, morality-led POT streams, and ethical views in 
Posthumanism and, further, between the anthropomorphic tendencies in Robot Ethics 
and anthropocentric ones in POT.  
My wider critique of the morality-led POT streams is on the reductionist conceptuality 
of morality and the inability to resolve accountability questions. This shows in a 
superficial and simplified translation of human-based moral philosophical views on 
agency to technology and in an increased theoretical disconnection between 
technological agency or autonomy from accountability. The consequences are that most 
streams divert from practical questions when applying technology such as robots 
although these are set out to respond to them.  
 
Social and Humanoid Robotics (HR)  
HR and Robot Ethics commonly reinforce the anthropomorphic view on social robots. 
This view comes from social robots mostly being designed as humanoids and positioned 
as companions on the grounds of their human-like shape. This is concerning in my 
view, because it allows to discuss them ethically as if they are human agents, while they 
are not. While the social robot is, technically speaking, a complex machine, the social 
attribute attached to this kind of robot can mean different things; from referring to its 
humanoid appearance to reinforcing its humanoid shape. But, it can also mean a robot 
that is interactive and embeds computational responsiveness in a human environment.  
 
HR is a conglomerate of research from Robotics, Psychology, Mechanics, Engineering 
and Computer Science, which explores the social robot by studying, developing and 
realising these socially capable machines, equipping them with a very rich variety of 
capabilities that allow them to interact with people in natural and intuitive ways. This 
ranges from the use of natural language, body language, and facial gestures, to more 
unique ways, such as expression through colours and abstract sounds (Read, 2014: i). 
HR does not always specify the environments in which robots are used, while Lin et al. 
(2010) and Royakkers & van Est (2016) discuss the use of robots in professional elderly 
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care as important applications.4 What makes social robots special is their humanoid 
shape, aligned with their highly developed computational interactivity. Hence, the social 
robot is distinguished, for instance, from assembly or war robots (Royakkers & van Est, 
2016) due to their different functions and appearances. Consequently, this leads to 
different ethical debates on these robots. Chapter Six will discuss the HR framework 
and social robots in detail.  
 
Tracking / Data Tracking  
To track means to locate, to trace, to contextualise a position of oneself or oneself 
within the environment. The visual tracking capacity of social robots is used in this 
thesis to illustrate that the alignment between computational and moral autonomy is not 
sufficient to understand how a process like tracking transforms into an ethical network.  
Tracking is used as a cumulative term for the application of tracking modules, or the 
tracking process in social robots. Tracking is a computational process (Lee et al., 2005; 
Fong et al., 2002; Brèthes et al., 2004) that is ontologically bound to collect, manage, 
and process data. Therefore, it allows for a discussion on dataveillance to emerge in 
relation to social robots. Tracking modules are used for the Human-Robot-Interaction 
(HRI) to enable the robot to detect, process, and respond to the human movement. HR 
and Robot Ethics would understand the tracking process as an operational and neutral 
undertaking, but I urge to reconsider this simplicity, and to acknowledge that tracking is 
not only a multidimensional process, but also an ethical one. By focusing on 
understanding this process, this thesis addresses the complexity of tracking technology 
as an ethical structure, which reflects on the human values and concepts that shaped it, 
and defines what concepts such as emotion, interaction, and care mean for a robot. 
Tracking is further explored in Chapter Two, Three, and Six, but, indirectly, its 
definition is affected by every discussion on the computational capacities of robots and 
these having ethical or moral intentionality.  
                                                
4 This thesis specifically looks at care robots, which Lin et al. (2010) describe as: ‘Personal care and 
companions: Robots are increasingly used to care for the elderly and children, such as RI-MAN, PaPeRo, 
and CareBot. PALRO, QRIO, and other edutainment robots mentioned above can also provide 
companionship’ (944).  
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Introduction  
The implementation and use of digital technology, such as social robots, raises moral 
and ethical concerns (Luppicini, 2009; Bunge, 1997; Royakkers & van Est, 2016), as 
the growing operational autonomy of digital systems complicates questions on what 
actions or decisions these devices are accountable for. Particularly problematic are 
social robots when applied into sensitive environments, such as elderly care. I examine 
how specific agency models on social robots influence and intersect with wider ethical 
concerns on digital technology, and how a disciplinary segmentation, ultimately, allows 
for a neglect of practical consequences in the use of robots in elderly care.  
I enter this ethical exploration on moral agency of social robots with the objective to 
understand the connection between humanoid and material agency models, and between 
the moral and ethical view on digital technology; not by attempting an ethical techno-
materialist view on robots, but instead, by exposing various ethical blind spots or 
neglects around robots, which disregard practical consequences on the grounds of 
theoretical narrowness. Without advocating for one correct agency or ethical canon in 
which to situate social robots, I aim towards a new transdisciplinary ethical discussion 
on social robots that aligns various agency models to allow for a better view on 
accountability questions. 
One blind spot with which I am concerned is around social robots as data tracking5 
devices. My hypothesis is that this connection is not sufficiently explored nor as fully 
                                                
5 Tracking is an interactive and complex process of collecting and managing data, and is implemented 
into the robot to interact with its environment. It is explained in the Key Terms section. Tracking is 
negatively connotated in the context of website and online application since it is associated with 
surveillance or unasked detection of online user behaviour or movement. Robot Ethics does not discuss 
this association, which I consider neglectful. 
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understood in Robot Ethics (nor in POT streams). I derive this hypothesis from my 
early focal point of exploration, the dramatic play, Spillkin. A Love Story (2017), which 
led me to identify an unexplored entanglement between ethics, social robots, elderly 
care, and social robots being tracking devices (Stamboliev, 2017, 2018). The play 
exposes and reflects upon the relationship between a social (humanoid) robot named 
Spillikin that ‘assists’ a woman called Sally, who is about to lose her memory due to 
Alzheimer’s disease. The robot is positioned as her counterpart, friend, and companion 
(what Robot Ethics and Humanoid Robotics would want it to be) and is meant to be a 
humanoid substitute for Sally’s deceased husband, who designed it. Despite presenting 
a future-led and hypothetical scenario, the play illustrates an important disconnection in 
how social robots are presented by HR and Robot Ethics, and in how I suggest 
discussing them; between companion and tracking device.6  
Social robots might be promoted as social devices by HR (or by theatrical plays) 
because they are shaped as humanoids and resemble human bodies, but, in fact, they are 
interactive, computational technologies that can visually recognise, manage data, 
synchronise locomotion, and process instructions (Royakkers & van Est, 2016; 
Breazeal, 2002). What the play exhibits, by accident rather than by design, is not only 
why robot companionship presents a development of ethical concern, but that there is a 
conflict between perceived ethical concerns and ontological ethical concerns.  
The dominance in promoting robots as perceived companions mirrors the ethical 
concerns on social robots in Robot Ethics, which focus on how and why social robots 
                                                
6 I highlight that at this moment, considering the technological development of robotic systems, social 
robots are far from being autonomous, responsive or fully interactive technologies. Hence, this topic is 
still future-oriented. However, the tracking and data concerns are likelier to manifest than the 
implementation and acceptance of social robots as companions. This thesis is an exploration of the 
accompanying ethical discussions on robots and less on their actual practical applicability. 
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are good or bad companions. However, this focus allows for an anthropomorphic 
fallacy to drive the ethical concerns in the field, one that mistakenly expects robots to be 
caring companions and to have human-like attributes or judgement. This then creates a 
limited view on social robots, which are only debated as caring companions7 or as 
deceptive pseudo-agents (discussed in Chapter Six). Supposedly, this perceived 
companion position does make it easier to promote them in environments such as 
elderly care, where their presence needs to be seen as friendly and caring company, not 
as a bulky and indifferent device (Chapter Two will elaborate on this).  
As I suggested already, there is more to be concerned with around this bulky device 
ethically, which goes beyond the perceptive or promoted position even if this 
companion position, as limited as it might be, is reflected upon critically by Robot 
Ethics (Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010; Royakkers & van Est, 2016). Even if the field does 
not simply endorse the potential, but instead presents various concerns around this 
position - as does the play - the way in which this is done ratifies the anthropomorphic 
fallacy as the dominant ethical focus on robots, while masking another one: their 
tracking abilities. I assume that the companion position is unable to cover the ethical 
spectrum of other concerns raised by robots beyond how they are perceived.  
This leads to Robot Ethics neglecting the second angle I therefore highlighted initially 
as a blind spot: social robots as a digital data collector in a humanoid body. As digital 
devices equipped with cameras, these technologies are interactive or responsive devices 
that collect data. What I suggest further is that the companion position is not only 
                                                
7 The Merriam Webster Dictionary refers to ‘care’ as a form of ‘strict attentiveness to what one is doing’ 
or as ‘attention accompanied by protectiveness and responsibility’. Available https://www.merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/care (Accessed 20.04.2017). The simulation of human care through technology 
focusses mainly on the simulation of emotions and gestures in humanoid robots. 
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limited, but also limiting. It might be problematic, since it masks an ethical discussion 
on the digital capacities of robots due to their invisibility and complexity, but does not 
change the fact that these exist or are ethically problematic, and that a vulnerable group 
of people is exposed to the complexity of a digital device.  
As I mentioned, one reason for this masking neglect could reside in the agency model 
with which HR and Robot Ethics operate. Here, the machinic or computational side of 
robots is seen as an ethically irrelevant space, and is discussed as instrumental and 
functional, but not as a relevant ethical network. In this sense, I advocate that 
understanding the agency angle attributed to the social robot is crucial to comprehend 
the associated ethical or moral norms, and vice versa.  
This forms the starting point of my thesis, which focusses on these two conflicts that I 
derive from the previous insights. The first conflict lies in the ethical disconnections 
around social robots as hybrid agents. The already identified twofold position, between 
being a companion pseudo-agent and a tracking device, makes it hard to assign them to 
only one ethical canon (be it in Robot Ethics, applied ethical streams, Machine and 
Computer Ethics, Posthumanism, or Data Ethics). Depending on what ethical view is 
taken, the ethical concerns and the agency models form differently, but as these 
concerns change theoretically, the practical capacities of social robots do not. I will 
elaborate on how social robots, as companions or as tracking devices, are always ethical 
technologies that are inherently associated to data concerns, while I trace the neglect of 
this realisation throughout the thesis. 
In my view, the first conflict originates from a two-fold position that social robots 
embody as a technology. On one hand, social robots are designed as humanoid bodies 
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and are promoted as companions or assistants for professional care (Royakkers & van 
Est, 2016). This encourages Robot Ethics to focus on human-centred questions, such as: 
robots potentially harming, deceiving, not responding to, or isolating patients when used 
in elderly care (Chapter Six will discuss this further). On the other hand, social robots 
are interactive and responsive devices that manage and produce data (Royakkers & Van 
Est, 2016; Lee et al., 2005; Fong et al., 2002) and, therefore, I think they present huge 
challenges for data ethics, patient privacy, and data infringement (Knoppers & 
Thorogood, 2017; Floridi, 2016; Andrejevic, 2012; Ball et al., 2012). This doesn’t seem 
to concern Robot Ethics as much, given their misconception that robots can be seen as 
companions exclusively. In addition to this two-fold divide, the very application of 
social robots into elderly care disrupts the traditional work environment and caring 
norms of professional care – which can also be argued as an ethical process worth 
discussing, but this intrusive process does not find much ethical relevance within Robot 
Ethics either. 
Agency discussions on robots are co-shaped by their ethical discussions, but I identify a 
second conflict in the conflation of moral and ethical concerns of social robots, and in 
the wider moralisation of technology. Robot Ethics and wider Philosophy of 
Technology (POT) streams do not necessarily distinguish between these two terms, nor 
do most traditional morality streams.  
Furthermore, to the theoretical conflation between ethics and morality in traditional 
moral philosophy, the concept of morality seems loaded with implied associations of 
good or bad virtues, actions or decisions of robots, while it remains often unclear from 
which specific moral philosophical school these references are taken. My hypothesis in 
this context is that what POT then attempts – by aligning morality to robots or digital 
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technology – is to associate (non-existing) human values to the operational autonomy of 
robots. Yet, what they end up with is the reproduction of old moral concerns8, which are 
not agreed on in human moral philosophies either. Even less are these translatable into 
robot technology without facing huge difficulties.  
Ethics, on the other side, is a term widely used as a structural vessel, discourse or 
dynamic in which to discuss moral evaluations and agent positions, while also used to 
name disciplines like Robot Ethics. While morality is always ethical, ethics does not 
have to be morally bound, since ethical canons can be completely detached from 
morality as an evaluative concept (see Posthumanist ethics). As I suggest incorporating 
Posthumanist ethics to understand data concerns of robots better, I identify that the 
conflation between moral and ethical concerns could become problematic, given that 
the ethical view from Posthumanism rejects the moralisation of technology (Braidotti, 
2006). Posthumanists would, in fact, argue that moral evaluations hinder certain ethical 
perspectives.  
What I attempt is using Posthumanist ethics is to offer a counter concept (aligned with 
Media and Surveillance Studies) that tackles the moral streams around robots in Robot 
Ethics and is able to address data concerns more appropriately and holistically. I will 
incorporate Posthumanist views into my ethical investigation to point out that there are 
different ethical and conceptual ways to discuss techno-human agencies without 
requiring a moral evaluation or labelling, and that data concerns are better understood 
through an inherently ethical discussion on robots, data, and tracking processes. 
However, this suggestion might prove less suited to resolve or address the practical 
                                                
8 For instance, questions on the origins of moral reasoning, or the balance between individual or 
collective morality or the necessity of individual moral duty in Kantian ethics. 
 26 
concerns when technological autonomy conflicts with human accountability, and when 
responsibilities around social robots must be negotiated. 
As I advocate to distinguish between ethics and morality, I do not necessarily advocate 
for one specific moral or ethical canon to be the correct one in which to position robots. 
Instead, I will outline the advantages and disadvantages across anthropomorphic, 
anthropocentric, and ethical views by reflecting on their agency models of either robots 
or digital technology, as I move increasingly into POT discussions that leave Robot 
Ethics behind. In detangling the companion view from the tracking device angle, and in 
separating moral from ethical concerns, I am sustaining the practical value of this thesis. 
This value grounds in social robots embedding computational systems that own, collect, 
and produce data, which is something that the play analysis pointed out to me; for 
robots to be sociable, this requires them to track movement or emotional expressions 
and to process data (Stamboliev, 2017). Yet, Robot Ethics does not fully address data 
issues, even if it incorporates discussions on social robots as monitoring devices that 
can track data. However, the field has a different approach to agency than, for instance, 
MSS has, since it does not consider that the very collection of data is always ethical 
and, often unintendedly, unethical. I will show that the moralisation of robots often 
creates a hindrance to understand data concerns fully on the grounds on how their or 
their developer’s agency is understood. 
There are specific reasons for taking data concerns seriously, which are linked to the 
increasing value and commodification of health data (Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017) 
and the lacking or insufficient media literacy of the elderly - which, in this case, would 
equip them with the necessary knowledge to understand wider conflicts around data 
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ownership and privacy. These two concerns cannot be ignored in any research or ethical 
field, especially since robots are interactive technologies and data-collecting devices 
from their very moment of being placed into an environment. Stressing this practical 
consequence is essential, because elderly care is a specifically problematic and sensitive 
environment in which to place robots, especially before having fully understood or 
explained their practical application. Hence, the neglect around data-related concerns on 
social robots makes Robot Ethics unethical.  
Another motivator to stress data concerns is to start a wider discussion around 
accountability as crucial to understanding robotic agency and autonomy, as much as 
human agency is in designing robots and digital systems. My extensive reflection 
around thinking moral agency in robots will lead me to discussing moral agency in 
algorithmic systems, raising even more concern around morality and technology beyond 
social robots as a focal point. One new concern I see relates to morality being an 
evaluation concept, but, as such, it needs an agent to be assigned as moral. For most 
moral philosophies, moral agency, and agenthood overlap in the human subject. 
However, as this thesis evolves and new techno-moral streams emerge, the stable 
human agenthood position dissolves into numeric rules and algorithmic intentionality as 
it becomes an increasingly abstract entanglement.  
This new agency entanglement challenges the alignment of moral agency to robots and 
algorithms, since what most traditional morality models have in common is: they are 
supposed to address accountability or responsibility in human-technology interactions. 
Still, newer canons struggle to do this. Especially, the growing autonomy of robots and 
algorithmic systems has complicated discussions on accountability, and considering that 
social robots step into an interactive relationship with humans, more clarity on this 
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encounter is key. This implies that the operational autonomy of robotic actions, 
allowing for robots to respond or move, has complicated their ethical position. But has 
this made them more or less moral devices? And how has this shifted their ethical 
dimension? My wider concern is that a lack of theoretical agreement on what actions or 
behaviours social robots are accountable for means that we cannot justify their 
application in sensitive contexts, such as elderly care.  
To tackle this concern, I offer a theoretical and ethical investigation on agency, 
agenthood, autonomy, and accountability of robots as humanoid companions, machines 
and information structures. I will survey, examine, and critique various agency models 
by outlining their individual strengths and limiting perspectives in accordance to their 
theoretical and practically relevance. Ultimately, I aim for a transdisciplinary ethics on 
digital technology or robots; one that urges for a better foundation that does justice to 
diverse formats of ethics, and also to the agency models on digital technology, 
recognising their new growing autonomy and ubiquitous applications. In such a new 
ethical framework, robots are inherently ethical (and social), even before raising moral 
questions on their use or capacities, which must be distinguished from being inherent 
and being projected upon.  
By outlining specific relations or disconnections in the literature, I start an ethical 
transformation through the very discussion I undertake – one that ideally concludes with 
a better understanding on emerging digital technology, such as robots, with the ability 
to reflect on their use and agency holistically.  
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Methodology 
I undertake a comparative and critical analysis of ethical discourses around social 
robots, robots as humanoid companions, robotic machines, and digital algorithms by 
surveying Robot Ethics, Media and Surveillance Studies, Humanoid Robotics, and 
Machine and Computer Ethics (as aligned to wider Philosophy of Technology, POT).  
First, I align ethical data concerns from MSS to morality-led Robot Ethics views, so as 
to reflect upon insufficient robot agency models in Robot Ethics and POT. Then, I 
highlight problematic tendencies in POT, on how morality is conceptualised into 
machines and algorithms, compromising moral agency in its relation to agent 
accountability. I outline the advantages and limitations in contemporary ethical streams 
to establish a new ethical discussion on robots, while keeping their companion position 
and their tracking agency as conflicting but equally important views. 
My methodology makes use of an intersection between themes, layers, and frameworks. 
One layer moves from social robots towards algorithmic systems, as it traverses from 
the superficial, perceptive view on social robots into a computational, structural view on 
robots as informational systems – or from the robot body into the robot system. The 
second layer develops horizontally and reciprocally from morality to ethics agency 
discussions, to untangle conflations between ethical and moral perspectives on robots 
and their aligned agency models. These layers overlap throughout the thesis as I move 
to different levels of technological structure or ethical canon. 
The themes are, for instance: the companion position of social robots; the robot’s 
position as a data tracking device; anthropomorphism in HR; the single/appearance 
driven moral agenthood model; instrumental agency models of technology; 
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Posthumanist ethical views on technology; distributed agency models; tracking as an 
ethical process; the morality and ethics conflation; algorithmic agency networks; the 
advantages and disadvantages of distributed agency or computational interaction in 
robots; and the new challenges of human accountability. 
These specific themes are used to explain exemplary frictions in the frameworks of (i) 
Robot Ethics, (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS) (both dominating in Part One), 
and (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics or POT (dominating in Part Two). These 
frameworks are the cornerstones of the investigation on agency models and ethics, but 
they incorporate further disciplinary views, which will offer more contextualisation of 
certain themes, as achieved through Humanoid Robotics and Posthumanism.  
The frameworks reflect on this distinction between moral and ethical concerns that I 
mentioned as a challenge in the introduction. Robot Ethics (i) and Machine and 
Computer Ethics (iii) are morality-led discussions (as first and third framework), which 
means that while (i) is anthropomorphic, (iii) is anthropocentric. MSS (ii) (the second 
framework) allows for an ethical discussion to evolve; one that is supported by 
Posthumanist ethics and film-ethical concepts. 
Within the framework of (i) Robot Ethics, I survey the ethical discussion on the use of 
social robots in elderly care as my case study. I claim that the morality-led focus in (i) 
Robot Ethics does not allow for ethical concerns of robots as a digital tracking 
technology to emerge, since this framework is highly anthropomorphic in its 
expectations towards robots. By surveying the literature in this segment, I aim to 
identify the anthropomorphic fallacy and to explore its dominance in the wider 
epistemological framework that Robot Ethics borrows from HR. This view favours 
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discussions on moral agency of robots as bound to their perceptive sociability, their 
humanoid design, and the expectations to act as companions rather than being only 
machines. 
Within the framework of (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies, I argue for an additional 
ethical discussion on the computational capacities and concerns, as I focus on the 
ethical importance of data outlined through (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS). 
The perspective from (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS) proposes an 
exclusively ethical view that does not specifically look at social robots, but at one of 
their most concerning capacities: to collect and process data. Aligned to this framework, 
I establish an ethical and Posthumanist view on the data infringement/collection issues 
attached to the use of social robots as digital devices. Such a view would suggest the 
social robot as a network of non-evaluating, non-accountable agencies, as 
Posthumanists might consider. However, this perspective will challenge the question on 
robots being accountable for anything they do, elaborating on a theoretical complexity 
around the relations involved to form and use this technology.  
The relevance of this investigation has severe practical implications for elderly care, as I 
briefly mentioned in the introduction. By linking (i) and (ii), I amplify the practical 
concerns robots present for elderly care as potentially immoral companions, but also as 
computer systems without immoral intentions, though with unethical capacities. As 
social robots primarily interact with the elderly, they not only manage data, but further 
collect it - with such data collection not critically reflected upon in Robot Ethics. What I 
am concerned with in this investigation is not only a theoretical neglect in Robot Ethics, 
but how newly formed issues around data infringement and health data ownership are 
overlooked; especially as I consider a non-consensual and opaque gathering of data for 
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potential commercialisation of such (Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017; Stahl & 
Coeckelbergh, 2016) to be fundamentally unethical. The introduction of more digital 
technology, in the amount, complexity, and in the form of robots into elderly care, has 
additional implications for the care profession, which are not ethically and fully 
explored. 
Within the framework of (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics, as part of wider POT, I 
increasingly leave the focal point on social robots as humanoid bodies, as I theoretically 
move into their algorithmic agencies. This will still be a discussion on social robots, but 
it transforms into one that looks at these devices and their agency model differently: as a 
network of computational agencies. The difference to Robot Ethics is that these 
morality discussions are anthropocentric and do not argue for any appearance-based 
agency of robots. Instead, they look at the technological capacities of robots as 
machines and algorithms.  
I explore themes such as artefactual and metaphorical agency, autonomy, 
accountability, moral decisions and computation decisions, single agenthood, 
distributed agency, and so on, to show how the second layer discussions between moral 
questions and ethical structures in POT seem to entangle and conflate, but differently to 
previous discussions. I investigate how newly conflated moral-ethical discussions 
become devoted to a Posthumanist ethical stream, but are not fully committed to 
questions on moral accountability and might contest both morality as a practical concept 
and its use for applied ethics. 
The relevance of this investigation expands on theory in POT and, in a wider sense, 
outlines a thematic shift from applied ethics to meta-ethics. As I highlight how morality 
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research fuses with algorithmic modelling, I reflect on advantages and disadvantages of 
these streams. I examine how single agency models become increasingly disconnected 
from practical questions on digital systems, such as applied concerns on the use of 
robots, as these also become increasingly autonomous and complex in their use. What I 
assume is that, as more operational decisions are outsourced into the robotic or 
computational systems (away from the developer’s decision), less concern is placed on 
asking simple questions, such as: why do we use robots? Who profits from their 
application? And who/what should be accountable for any potential undesired (to be 
defined) consequences? This part is concerned with a deeper understanding of how 
accountability and autonomy develop in the context of digital systems, and what new 
challenges await in this framework. 
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Chapter Structure 
Chapter One. On Morality and Ethics – What Are the Differences? 
In Chapter One, I offer insights from traditional moral philosophies/ethics (Blackburn, 
2001; Ward, 2015) on why morality is an evaluative or reasoning concept. I then 
continue with two exclusively ethical perspectives on understanding technological 
agencies. This functions as the theoretical base for chapters Two and Three to further 
illustrate the concerns. I argue, at this point only, for a difference between moral and 
ethical questions. What I point out is that questions on moral agency in technology are 
bound to either an anthropomorphic projection or an anthropocentric evaluation of 
technology, so as to appear or act morally bound to (universal) human values, but that 
this hinders a wider ethical understanding of technology as a distribution of agencies - 
as Posthumanist theories suggest (Barad, 2003, 2007; Braidotti, 2006).  
I also highlight that an ethical view of technology does not raise questions on practical 
accountability, which I consider essential for the discussion on social robots. However, 
since I believe that the network and intersection of technological and human agencies in 
robots are not fully understood in Robot Ethics, I include Agamben’s (2000) work on 
early cinema as an ethical gesture to allow for a non-moral perspective on technological 
agencies to emerge. This is revisited in the section on tracking in Chapter Six.  
Chapter Two: On the Anthropomorphic Fallacy and the Humanoid Companion in 
Elderly Care Seen Through (i) Robot Ethics 
Chapter Two surveys (i) Robot Ethics to reflect on the companionship position of social 
robots in elderly care and on its ethical concerns and limitations. I examine this 
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framework to find out how robots are perceived and positioned by Robot Ethics and 
how the field understands what agent role they are given, and the purpose of them. In 
this chapter, I offer a cumulative summary of the literature in Robot Ethics (Royakkers 
& van Est, 2016; Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010; Turkle, 2005, 2007, 2011).  
I amplify that Robot Ethics discusses social robots predominantly from an 
anthropomorphic angle, which means it derives concerns from their alikeness to the 
human body, not from their ability to judge or understand morality. I therefore consider 
their disciplinary ethical critique to be limited, because of its single anthropomorphic 
focus and because of its neglect of data-related issues that the robot creates by being a 
tracking device. Social robots are contextualised in this literature as problematic due to 
their companion position that allows them to deceive, harm, or spy on the elderly; what 
I consider to be a mostly anthropomorphic understanding of agency.  
While the ability of social robots to track and detect human movements, emotions, gaze, 
or gestures does not affect the ethical discussion of data-related infringements, unless 
applied to a privacy-related intrusion, the implication of Robot Ethics is that the social 
robot is morally problematic – the robot can monitor, survey, or intrude as an agent. 
Chapter Three: On Social Robots as Potential Dataveillance9 as Seen Through (ii) 
Media and Surveillance Studies 
I suggest in Chapter Three to look at the social robot as a digital device and align it to 
discussions on dataveillance from (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS). I justify 
this angle by viewing social robots as dataveillance, which I suggest discussing 
                                                
9 Dataveillance is the ‘systematic use of personal data systems in the monitoring or investigation of the 
actions or communications of one or more persons’ (Clarke, 1988). See Key Terms. 
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ethically through critical streams on digital technologies from MSS, reaching beyond 
the moral concerns raised in Robot Ethics (and their companionship view on humanoid 
robots). This chapter makes use of research by Gitelman (2013), Andrejevic (2012), 
Ball et al. (2012), and others, and amplifies why data-related privacy issues do not 
require a morally capable technology or an immoral agent, but are instead embedded in 
the making and emerging of tracking data in the first place, or in using robots for elderly 
care. This chapter is less concerned with social robots or elderly care, but with the data-
gathering process that affects the abilities of social robots as digital technologies.  
Chapter Three outlines that the collection of data is already an ethical and intentional 
process that affects Robot Ethics as much as any other digital, interactive device. 
Through this discussion, I show that ethical problems are embedded in the very 
collection of data, in designing tracking modules, and in the application of robots into 
elderly care. Finally, I show that these factors further create new problems for media 
literacy and data privacy in general. 
Chapter Four: Epistemological Context on Morality, Agenthood, and Agencies of 
Technology 
Chapter Four is a contextualising chapter in which I present wider techno-philosophical 
streams to offer insights into technological agency, human agenthood, and moral 
accountability.  
First, I make use of a brief media-theoretical angle joined by a Posthumanist input to 
introduce the chapter, and then move to the main techno-philosophical perspective of 
Johnson & Noorman (2014). What I highlight through their work illustrates the 
concerns I see in newer autonomy and accountability debates, which increasingly 
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complicate technological and robotic agency as much as morality research. Their work 
allows me to reflect on technological agency as a metaphoric and instrumental concept, 
which I disagree with but still utilise to raise a new critique on the position of social 
robots as companions. In Chapter Seven, Wallach & Allen (2009), Arkin (2009), Brey 
(2014), and Floridi (2014) will push this debate further by pointing to the conflation and 
operationalisation of autonomy, agency, and accountability. 
Chapter Five: Epistemological Context on the Apparent and Projection-Based 
Moral Agenthood of Social Robots 
Chapter Five is a contextualising chapter on the limitations of the anthropomorphic 
fallacy that drives the mistaking of robots as moral agents. In this chapter, I show why 
the anthropomorphic view on robots is not only limited, but limiting within its own POT 
canons. I refer to an unreflected appropriation of moral philosophies into POT and 
examine the superficial and appearance-based view on moral agency around social 
robots through existing critical research by Coeckelbergh (2010). His work offers a 
techno-philosophical perspective on the superficial moral projections by bringing up the 
‘psychopathic’ robot, a concept he develops on morally-appearing, yet unaware, robots. 
Through unpacking Kahn’s et al. (2012) experiment on moral appearance, I offer 
additional and concerning proof on why building moral agency in robots based on 
appearance is problematic and why the anthropomorphic companionship position does 
not offer a fundament for moral values or actions to be derived from. With this chapter, 
I deconstruct companionship view on humanoid and social robots further through 
presenting the wider critique within POT streams. 
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Chapter Six: From Humanoid Robotics and Anthropomorphism to Computational 
Interaction and Tracking. 
In Chapter Six, I situate the companionship and anthropomorphic fallacy by leaving the 
ethical and morality discussions on robots, and instead trace its origins in Humanoid 
Robotics (HR). At first, I consider the influence of HR on Robot Ethics a crucial 
hindrance for ethical discussions to emerge. This background indicates the (1) Moral 
Appearance and Agenthood limitation (which leads to robots being mistaken as 
humanoid companions, to be judged according to moral guidelines) emerges from the 
social paradigm that HR has established around social robots as companions and 
partners, aiming to leave their machinic side out of the discussion.  
What I present is how social robots embody a threshold between the desire for human-
like sociability and their status as sophisticated non-human machines. I do this by 
surveying the literature in HR, referring to authors such as Breazeal (2002, 2003), Fong 
et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2005), and Duffy (2003). I also explain that HR does not only 
discuss the anthropomorphic dimension of social robots as companions, but is also 
concerned with their computational sociability.  
To allow for a transition between Chapters Six and Seven, I change from discussing the 
perceived sociability of social robots as humanoids to reviewing their computational 
abilities, such as tracking. This integrated shift, from anthropomorphic interaction to 
computational interaction, is not only mirrored in the shift between Chapters Two and 
Three, but is utilised to establish an ethical view on tracking aligned with Agamben’s 
(2000) reflection on early cinema.  
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Chapter Six concludes with two additional side discussions. The first one presents a 
new and interesting anthropomorphic ethics on robots, named ‘Synthetic Ethics’ and 
suggested by Damiano & Dumouchel (2018). The second one is on a wider but very 
influential issue, which is around the rhetorical blurriness and imprecision in HR 
literature; this might further complicate agency discussions through rhetorical 
inconsistencies. 
Chapter Seven: From Moral Robot Agents Towards Ethical Algorithmic 
Structures in (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics/POT  
In Chapter Seven, I enter the discussions on machine morality research, as I 
demonstrate how POT streams steadily suggest new forms towards an algorithmisation 
of morality (moral decisions, actions, agency, etc.) at the cost of removing reflective 
and practical elements bound to applied ethics. I illustrate the tendency of machine or 
computer morality research to join and merge with the flattened, Posthumanist ethical 
streams that support a synthesis of the moral and the ethical discussions at first, but 
consequently seem to come with different issues. This chapter shows also that even if 
some ethical streams happen to relate to each other, these cannot be simply 
synchronised. Equally, the ethical disconnection between Chapter Two and Three 
amplifies a fundamental division in how technology, or robots, are understood in 
different areas; be it as a humanoid agency, moral entity or as an ethical network. 
Therefore, this chapter does not synchronise the previously pointed out, but leads to 
new consequences that harm the morality discussion, albeit differently than I expected. 
In Chapter Seven, I point to advantages and disadvantages in understanding how moral 
agenthood is translated into robotic or computational systems; then, I highlight two 
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more limitations when conceptualising moral agency within technology, which all 
favour a techno-operational structure but not a reflexive, or, as Ward (2015) suggested, 
‘dynamic’ (7) one. 
The first, on a superficial apparent morality model, was mentioned in Chapter Five. The 
next two are not discussed in literature, yet these emerge from my own critical reading. 
I identify a second limitation through parameters supplied by Wallach & Allen’s (2009) 
work that favours the conflation of moral autonomy and computational autonomy 
leading to a (2) Reductionist Morality. Then, by thinking (3) Distributed Morality, I use 
the work of Brey (2014) on ‘structural ethics’ and Floridi’s (2014) work on ‘mindless’ 
morality to illustrate to what a distributed and flattered view on moral agencies into 
algorithms. Even if I speak of limitations in thinking morality and moral agency, I 
acknowledge as much that each of these discussions leads to both positive and 
problematic developments. The conclusive concerns I raise from this chapter revolve 
around accountability not being debated critically enough in POT. This position seems 
to be left unresolved in the context of moral agency, which affects wider applied ethics 
streams and, ultimately, influences practical and legal questions around robots. 
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Contribution 
I establish a new and concerning linkage between social robots in elderly care and their 
potential as dataveillance by connecting Robot Ethics with Media and Surveillance 
Studies, so as to present a holistic and ethical reflection on the practical consequences 
around data collection and privacy infringement in the use of robots. Through linking 
Posthumanism with Philosophy of Technology, I further contribute to the ethical and 
moral research around robots and algorithms by challenging: the anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric tendencies to discuss robot and algorithmic agencies; the reductionist 
appropriation of morality to code; and the increasing inability of techno-ethical streams 
to address accountability concerns when placing robots into real-life environments. 
In Part One, I contribute to Robot Ethics and Philosophy of Technology by forming a 
connection between dataveillance discussions in Media and Surveillance Studies and 
morality-led discussion on social robots in Robot Ethics. I contribute to two 
frameworks: (i) Robot Ethics, where I draw attention to data-related ethical issues 
situated in the use of social robots, and (ii) MSS, where I encourage the inclusion of 
social robots as data tracking devices in their critical canon. Linking these frameworks 
is crucial to address the practical consequences of social robots for elderly care and 
elderly patients on a new level of privacy and data infringement, which are not 
sufficiently addressed in existing morality-led streams.  
Especially, the growing concerns around the commercialisation of health data and the 
ubiquitous applications of digital technology into sensitive environments highlights the 
value of this thesis for various disciplines dealing with tracking and privacy, or for 
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contexts such as professional health care industry concern of how and if to apply robots 
in care. 
In Part Two, I contribute to a wider ethical discussion in Philosophy of Technology by 
formulating new concerns in the alignment of moral agency to digital systems. By 
pointing to the limiting anthropocentric discussions in the (iii) Machine and Computer 
Ethics and POT framework, I highlight conflations of operational and moral autonomy, 
perceived and inherent agency, and of functional responsibility and moral accountability 
in algorithmic systems.  
First, I detect new dangers in aiming for a reductionist and instrumentalist 
conceptualisation of morality as applied to algorithmic rules. Second, I amplify how 
moral reasoning and norming is increasingly detaching itself from accountability 
questions, which I see as a side effect of the alignment of morality to code. This 
development not only implies a problematic return to a techno-moral positivism, which 
might impact models on human morality, but also allows to conflate operational 
autonomy in digital technology with moral autonomy; the latter is always lacking in 
robots and algorithms.  
I identify that the avoidance to address uncomfortable questions in POT - on who 
accounts morally, ethically, and legally for robots or digital systems - shows in the 
dissolving of essential components when thinking of moral agency as a dynamic and 
critical discourse. I stress that this will have practical consequences for various fields, as 
much for elderly care as for environments in which robots or tracking systems are being 
trusted by their users.  
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I. ON MORAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS 
AROUND SOCIAL ROBOTS 
 
Part One summary: Part One surveys wider ethical and moral conversations on the 
potential misuse or misbehaviour of social robots as moral agents or as ethical structures 
in elderly care. By distinguishing between a morality-led and ethically-exclusive way to 
think of technology, I provide the reader with an initial understanding that these terms 
can lead to different epistemologies in comprehending technology. I will highlight that 
thinking of social robots through either a morally-led or ethically-led focus has 
advantages and disadvantages. After introducing what morality- and ethics-led 
discussions can look like, I will survey existing ethical discussions on social robots. 
First, I survey the ethical literature on humanoid companions in elderly care and (i) 
Robot Ethics. Second, I discuss their position as tracking devices from a (ii) MSS 
perspective on data gathering as ethically concerning. What I amplify is that a neglect of 
the ethical dimension of social robots as tracking machines, as witnessed in Robot 
Ethics, is problematic when it comes to data, privacy, and literacy of the elderly, but it 
also builds on the dominance of treating social robots like companions.  
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1. From Thinking Morality to Posthumanist Ethics 
Chapter summary: Chapter One reflects on the inadequate distinction between 
morality and ethics in traditional moral philosophy and as it presents new Posthumanist 
angles to think of technology ethically (Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 2006; Agamben, 2000). 
I hereby introduce my concerns with thinking technology through an exclusively moral 
lens. I make use of the differentiation between ethics as a structuring concept, and 
morality as an evaluative concept, to highlight that morality discussions on technology 
are problematically projecting concerns from questions around human agency into 
questions on technological agency. As I lay out critical views on moral reasoning 
(Luhmann, 1989) and the institutionalisation of morality (Laidlow, 2014), I also 
highlight the capacity of traditional moral philosophy to practically assign moral 
accountability; something that the ethical canons of Posthumanist ethics are not able to 
do in practical terms.  
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I would like to introduce certain distinctions between morality and ethics to amplify 
deficits in the discussion on social robots, which would otherwise not crystallise as 
such. I critique that the moralisation of technology allows for two things to happen: 
firstly, the anthropomorphising of moral qualities; and secondly, the anthropocentric 
expectations of computers or robots to decide or judge morally. My critique of 
anthropomorphism dominates Part One, and while anthropocentrism encapsulates Part 
Two. 
I differentiate in this thesis between ethical and moral agency, but this kind of 
delineation is barely undertaken in Philosophy of Technology or in Robot Ethics 
(Royakkers & van Est, 2016; Kroes & Verbeek, 2014). Mostly, ethics and morality are 
conflated. In principle, these are interchangeable terms in Philosophy (Kroes & 
Verbeek, 2014; Luppicini, 2009). By way of example, I want to mention Luppicini 
(2009), who writes that ethics ‘is the study of moral conduct, i.e., conduct regarded as 
right and wrong, good or evil, or as what ought or not ought to be done’ (19). However, 
for a Posthumanist philosopher, ethics is not the study of morality at all. Theoretically, 
the conflation of ethical and moral questions is not uncommon in philosophical streams 
per se (exceptions include Braidotti, Barad, or Introna), but it can become one in 
practical terms. As I will emphasise, a morality-led debate can take a different angle 
than one that is ethically-led. It makes sense to further distinguish between meta-ethics 
and applied ethics (Luppinci, 2009; Ward, 2015), since these have different goals.  
I want to first introduce wider philosophical differentiations between morality and 
ethics. As aforementioned, morality research is often referred to as ethics (see Robot 
Ethics), while the research can still be only morality-led, since these terms come 
together. Again, morality discussions are always ethical, but there are ethics that refuse 
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morality as a concept or model. What this shows is that ethics is the structural vessel in 
which moral relations, virtues, actions, or norms of individuals or societies (or 
technology, as in this thesis) are debated, but debating evaluations or projections of 
good or bad behaviour is not always relevant to understanding how ethical relations 
unfold. Hence, what makes this topic slightly confusing is that even when philosophers 
discuss ethical structures, they can still mean and reflect on moral questions; however, 
in technology, this conflation can be problematic and less useful ethically.  
Ward (2015), a media philosopher, approaches ethics from what he calls a radical 
media philosophy, by offering a semi-distinction on ethics and highlighting the 
evaluative process of ethical activities (what I perceive to be him talking about moral 
evaluation). He writes that: 
‘Ethics is the study and practice of what constitutes the best regulation of 
human conduct, individually and socially. Humans apply their notions of 
ethics by acting according to principles, norms, and aims. Ethics is the 
activity of constructing, critiquing, and enforcing norms, principles, and 
aims to guide individual and social conduct. The phrase “the best 
regulation” indicates a zone of critical and ever-evolving thought about 
the notions and norms of ethics. Existing norms may be inadequate, or 
even unethical’ (4). 
I agree with what Ward highlights, that ethics is a practice of regulation leading to 
norms, which can be potentially unethical/immoral. However, the practical side of 
ethics is important for him as well; ethics is a way to provide society with tools on how 
to live as a community and how to conduct oneself in society. Ward also conflates 
ethical and moral intentions, but what is important to him is also what I will keep 
highlighting; both terms are active and dynamic processes, not fixed schemata or strict 
rules. Hence, for Ward (2015): ‘Ethics is practical. Ethics is an activity, a process, and a 
dynamic practice. It is something we do. We do ethics when we weigh values to make a 
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decision’ (5). However, further, he states that ‘ethics at its best is reflective 
engagement’ (6). Ward’s definition offers a solid but not distinct orientation between 
ethics and morality, and I will return to his views multiple times to support my critical 
view upon the reductionist view on moral decisions around the algorithmisation of 
morality (see Key Terms section). 
Blackburn, on the other hand, clearly formulates differences between a moral and an 
ethical climate. In his book, A Little Introduction to Ethics (2001), he claims: 
‘An ethical climate is a different thing from a moralistic one. Indeed, 
one of the marks of an ethical climate may be hostility to moralizing, 
which is somehow out of place or bad form. Thinking that will itself be 
something that affects the way we live our lives. So, for instance, one 
peculiarity of our present climate is that we care much more about our 
rights than about our ‘good’. For previous thinkers about ethics, such as 
those who wrote the Upanishads, or Confucius, or Plato, or the founders 
of the Christian tradition, the central concern was the state of one’s soul, 
meaning some personal state of justice or harmony’ (3, 4). 
What Blackburn points to, and Ward does equally, is the structural element in ethics and 
the moral evaluation as ‘out of place or bad form’ (4). I consider that these two 
climates, to which he refers, address different levels of discussion, but do not exclude 
each other. Yet, conflating these two might only lead to an unnecessary moralisation of 
technology. Accordingly, as will be later argued, computational systems have further 
complicated what moral norms refer to in the context of technological autonomy.  
It is important to note that neither Blackburn (2001), nor I, imply that a differentiation is 
necessary because either morality or ethical questions are superior to one another. The 
terms are dependent on the discussions, which often treat them as interchangeable 
because it does not make a difference. My argument is not that holding on to anything 
related to morality has become obsolete in the context of technological agency. 
 48 
However, I am concerned with how certain theories are instrumenting morality; I stress 
that the concept must be renewed and taken out of the instrumental and reductionist 
corner - otherwise, as is happening, Philosophy of Technology (POT) discussions are in 
danger of relapsing into already questioned and overcome dualistic and simplifying 
morality camps. What I encourage is a view beyond moral agency or reasoning, to 
recognise that there is an amoral but still ethical dimension of social robots; one that 
can be accessed only through sidestepping the moralisation of technological intention or 
autonomy; one that shows there are inherent ethical structures and consequences in 
place prior to human immoral intentions. One reason for distinguishing ethics from 
morality is that the evaluation process Blackburn talks about asks for reasons and for 
accountable agents.  
However, morality presents other concerns even before being aligned to technology. 
According to the sociologist Luhmann (1989), it can be problematic to hold on to 
morality as an evaluating system, because we cannot agree on why humans should be 
moral. He reviews the concept of morality as ‘deficiency-oriented’. For him, the search 
for moral reasoning or justification remains an indicative search for something 
inherently good or bad in human agents. In Luhmann’s view, whenever the catchword 
morality appears, the experiences Europe has had with morality since the Middle Ages 
emerge as examples; religiously adorned upheavals and suppressions; the horrors of 
inquisition; and wars about morally-binding truths and revolts arising in indignation 
(1989: 370). 
Luhmann (1989) views ethics and morality from a sociological and systematic 
perspective, defining ethics as a ‘reflective theory of morality’ (360); as a structure in 
which morality develops, which relates to Blackburn. However, Luhmann does not 
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intend to provide guidelines for a practical morality or to be useful in exploring robots 
ethically. Ethics is, for him, a reflective theory of morality, able to address a responsible 
and accountable interaction beyond imperatives of good and bad. The enquiry towards 
answering and understanding moral reasoning is, for Luhmann, an:  
‘“[E]thical” task – and ethics for him means: reflection on morality (as a 
phenomenon of communication). Luhmann’s view on ethics is not about 
the formulation of some basic moral rules or “imperatives”, or judging 
morality as morally “good” or “bad”’ (Moeller, 2006: 112).  
Most importantly, Luhmann concludes that the ethical debate around finding acumen for 
moral reasoning has never produced any answers and no actual reasons for morality in 
the first place. ‘Ethics can’t provide reasons for morality. It finds morality to be there, 
and then it is confronted with the problems that result from this finding’ (1989: 360). 
Luhmann’s grasp of the error of looking for a moral reason for an agent helps to explain 
why moral behaviour/reasons and ethical structures are not the same discussions.  
This comes close to the aim of my thesis, which is on the constitution of moral norms 
and ethics within techno-ethical streams, by also offering a critique on a superficial or 
projective moralisation of technology. I see Luhmann’s resistance towards morality and 
moral reasoning in his denial of universal and institutionalised moral norms; hence, I 
agree with this distrust. I also acknowledge that Luhmann, in being a Structuralist, is 
highly concerned about the relations and codes in which systems operate, so his view on 
human relationship is not interested in evaluations, but in structures. 
Similarly oriented towards understanding ethical structures, Foucault differentiates 
between ethics and morality (cited in Laidlow, 2014) to amplify the institutionalisation 
of morality as an important aspect. For Foucault, the moral codes are, as much as for 
Eshleman, not simply individual judgements that are made by a human deciding for 
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themselves on what is good or bad, but institutionalised rules that mesh with the 
accountability of the agent. Laidlow (2014) writes:  
‘Foucault distinguishes between what he calls moral codes—rules and 
regulations enforced by institutions such as schools, temples, families 
and so on, and which individuals might variously obey or resist—and 
ethics, which consists of the ways individuals might take themselves as 
the object of reflective action, adopting voluntary practices to shape and 
transform themselves in various ways [...]. Ethics, including these 
techniques of the self and projects of self-formation, are diagnostic of the 
moral domain’ (29). 
Therefore, for Foucault, the ethical is bound to encompass ‘reflection’ and ‘self-
formation’, and can aid in understanding ethics as processuality or unfolding, and not as 
a stable regulation of codes, even if these might result as a consequence of this process. 
According to Foucault, ethics reflects on the moral codes by being the process of their 
negotiation. However, the difference would be in saying that the moral sphere is 
considered the institutionalising of norms, which might be physically installed into 
tracking as values and descriptions of behaviour. However, these values would not 
mirror the structure that, for instance, tracking, not technology in general, is establishing 
and unfolding.  
As pointed out by Levinas & Hand (1989), Levinas also does not support a single and 
stable agenthood ethics, but understands ethics as, in itself, a relationship that unfolds 
between two people. He emphasised that the entanglement between ‘I’ and ‘Other’ is an 
already ethical process10 without yet having to bring in the evaluation or reasoning. This 
relation is inherent in being human and the ‘primacy of relation explains why it is that 
                                                
10 ‘Ethics arises from the presence of infinity within the human situation, which from the beginning 
summons and puts me into question in a manner that recalls Descartes's remark in his third Meditation 
that 'in some way I have in me the notion of the infinite earlier than the infinite.' Consequently, to be 
oneself is to be for the other. Levinas has summarized this fundamental point in an article entitled 
'Beyond Intentionality'’ (Hand in Levinas & Hand, 1989: 5). 
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human beings are interested in the questions of ethics at all. But for that reason, Levinas 
has made interpretative choices’ (Bergo, 2011). An example by Van de Poel & 
Royakkers (2006) illustrates this as a difference between applied ethics and ethical 
theories, arguing why ethics needs to think beyond moral decision-making. They argue: 
‘[A]pplied ethics is essentially the application of general moral 
principles or theories to particular situations (…). Different theories 
might yield different judgments about a particular case. But even if there 
would be one generally accepted theory, framework or set of principles, 
it is doubtful whether they can be straightforwardly applied to a 
particular case. Take a principle such as fairness. In many concrete 
situations, it is not clear what fairness exactly amounts to’ (2). 
Kroes & Verbeek (2014) point to why we even consider technology or artefacts to 
embed moral agency in the first place. This idea can be traced back to the 
Enlightenment, when the theological views on morality were transferred from God to 
humans, which distributed the moral responsibility to the individual and away from the 
superior power. After the Enlightenment, God became less accountable for human 
misfortune. Yet, a new fear surfaced at the same time (Dumouchel & Damiano, 2017) 
that robots could form harmful intentions, even if this is the most unlikely scenario for 
now. Therefore, humans have pushed their acquired empowerment one step further, by 
transferring moral agency to material agencies, which they have built in a God-like 
manner. Kroes & Verbeek (2014) state:  
‘This ‘material turn’ in ethics raises many questions, though. Is the 
conclusion that material things influence human actions reason enough 
to actually attribute morality to materiality? Can material things be 
considered moral agents, and if so, to what extent? And to what extent 
can artificial moral agents be constructed with the help of information 
technology? The attribution of some form of moral agency to technical 
artefacts not only requires a rethinking of the notion of agency but also 
of morality’ (4). 
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This ambition might still be a hypothetical one, but it attracts lots of research and 
occupies various ethical streams in HR, POT, and Robot Ethics equally. From this 
attempt, new concerns emerge on how to think of morality in material and non-human 
terms. Major issues I see in morality-led conversations on technology are that these 
often favour an anthropomorphic and anthropocentric expectation of the human 
developer, designer, or programmer, but end up supporting universal or simplified 
views on what is the good or bad in the very technology. I will repeat these concerns a 
few times, since they occupy my whole investigation. If agreeing that morality is 
understood as a concept that evaluates good and bad action or behaviour, implying that 
something is moral or immoral suggests two things. Firstly, it implies an evaluative 
process and, secondly, it implies an agent taking responsibility for the behaviour. 
Therefore, what might be an important aspect in holding onto morality – in the context 
of technology – is to define new standards of agencies and accountabilities, as I would 
conclude. In principle, moral intention or action requires the allocation of an 
accountable agent, and, for most cases, this is a human agent (Eshlemann, 2016; Brey, 
2014). Considering the institutionalisation of morality is bound to agent accountability 
(as in religious or legal systems), only the (human) agent is held accountable for his or 
her actions or the consequences of such. Thus, immorality is not something that rests 
unnoticed in these systems; immorality has consequences, which are punishable (Brey, 
2014).  
If thinking about the Ten Commandments, these might be guidelines on how to behave 
correctly, but not only for the sake of being a nice person, but for sake of living in a 
peaceful society and in the context of a religious system, which knows sin and guilt to 
punish the disobedient agent with.  
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Brey (2014) considers the concept of moral responsibility as linked to accountability 
and agency. For him, moral behaviour and actions are related to and depend upon the 
ability to be blamed, punished, or rewarded for these – in short, to be held accountable. 
For him, ‘moral responsibility from our conception of moral agency is also 
unappealing’ (2014: 134). While Brey (2014) highlights the links between moral agency 
and moral responsibility, Eshleman (2014) points out the importance of the 
responsibility of the moral agent by writing: 
‘A person who is a morally responsible agent is not merely a person who 
is able to do moral right or wrong. Beyond this, she is accountable for 
her morally significant conduct. Hence, she is an apt target of moral 
praise or blame, as well as reward or punishment’. 
Thus, the questions on agenthood are closely aligned to these on moral accountability. 
However, the more that technological systems are understood as distributed systems, 
which question any agenthood position (as Posthumanist ethics but also the discussions 
in Chapter Seven will show), the more complicated Eshleman’s remark on 
accountability, blame, and punishment will be in practical terms. It becomes harder to 
discuss how morality cannot be assigned to any agent.  
Responsibility and accountability are hugely important drivers behind traditional 
morality models and cannot be simply removed as one major element in morality 
discussions. The issue when thinking that moral norms are rules is that these might 
seem perfectly transferable to computational codes, as Chapter Seven will show, but the 
robot, machine, or algorithm will nonetheless lack the relevant consciousness or 
awareness to understand punishment, the consequences of not executing these, and of 
immoral consequences. POT discussions challenge this agent position, but continue to 
be Universalist, so the question is; who is rewarded or punished? The increasing 
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autonomy of robots and digital systems is yet unable to link accountability to autonomy 
technically. For now, I see an agreement in POT and Robot Ethics, that no technology 
can be held practically accountable for its actions. Yet, in the context of applied ethical 
canons on robots, this is an uncomfortable truth that is hard to deal with practically. 
To conclude, I amplified that ethics often refers to a structural vessel of morality in 
which to be discussed, but, as I will show next, there is an amoral way to discuss ethics. 
Morality is not only an important concept for human moral philosophy; it is also a 
hugely critiqued one in ethical streams on non-human/human agency relationships. 
Some would argue that morality is such a difficult, inherently Universalist and 
institutionalising concept; it is not suited to fully understand human agency, and neither 
should it be aligned to technological agency (Braidotti, 2006). Since aligning norms and 
commands from traditional moral philosophy to human agency is already difficult, it is 
even more complex to decide on how to ‘computerize Kant’s categorical imperative’, as 
Wallach (2010: 247) points out.  
Next, I will bring up the ethical angle around technological agency, which is less 
evaluative as interested in the entanglement of human and non-human agency networks, 
allowing for a non-moralising view.  
Posthumanist Ethics: A Better Way to Understand Technological Agencies? 
Early on in this research, I expected to find much more Posthumanist views around 
robots in Robot Ethics, since this field deals with new shifting paradigms that affect and 
lead to new concepts of a human/non-human agency intersection. However, I could not 
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find any.11 This was a surprise, since in humanities-led discussions around techno-
material agencies, digital technology, and data, Posthumanist theories are encountered 
frequently. This is also true in fields such as Affect Studies (Massumi, 2002; Gregg & 
Seigworth, 2010), Performance (Philosophy) Studies (Ruprecht, 2017; Dimitrova, 
2017), and Cultural Studies (Ahmed, 2004; Parisi, 2013; Blackman, 2012).12 My 
expectation came from knowing that Posthumanist ethics – without really giving much 
importance to the social robot – also dispute material agencies of 
technology/human/environment as intertwined (Braidotti, 2006; Barad, 2003, 2007) and 
address ethical concerns, which do apply to robots and algorithms equally.  
From my initial survey of Posthumanist camps, I was aware that Posthumanist 
philosophers deny moral thoughts around agency debates (human- or technology-
related), since they disagree with the moralisation of technology or humans 
fundamentally. They critique anthropocentric views on human or non-human structures 
and universal moral guidelines, expectations, or projections, which would not say much 
about the actual capacities of an artefact, technology, or robot (Braidotti, 2006; 
Zylinska, 2014). Instead, in the case of robots or digital technology, Posthumanist 
camps would rather suggest looking at the complexities of a computational distribution 
of agencies, without thinking in clear hierarchies or charging agencies with moral 
expectations, nor with aligning these to human agency.  
The work of philosophers such as Rosi Braidotti and Karen Barad will be in the focus of 
my investigation on how to think of technology such as robots ethically. Braidotti 
                                                
11 I exclude AI discussion from its review. 
12 These disciplines have left their disciplinary grounds to join their research on common debates, such as 
affect and emotion, or gender and race. Therefore, researchers such as Blackman (2012), Ahmed (2004), 
or Barad (2003, 2007) are situated in multiple discourses. 
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(2006) and Barad (2003, 2007) present a non-anthropocentric angle on thinking 
technological agencies as one way to think about technology and human agency as 
equally important agencies in a non-evaluative way. However, there is one issue when 
following these theoretical camps; practical accountability is not debated to the extent 
that applied ethics would require. Posthumanists do not deal with the practical issues of 
why a social robot might or might not slap or push an elderly patient - not that Robot 
Ethics does sufficiently - but they are concerned with finding out what intention the 
robot might have or still lacks. Braidotti (2006), while not talking about robots per se, 
but about agents, is interested in shifting the agent position towards ‘a nomadic 
subjectivity that involves a materialistic approach to affectivity and a non-essentialist 
brand of vitalism’ (4). This relates to the metaphor discussion brought up with Johnson 
& Noorman (2014) in Chapter Five.13 
When one summarises carefully and amalgamates these debates, a common thread 
becomes evident; morality is not a reference point in Posthumanist discussions. 
Nevertheless, this absence is not an oversight or an encouragement to argue that 
technology is immoral or that morality is superseded as a value system. This is because 
these debates lean towards a discussion on ‘agential’ relations (Barad 2003) and cannot 
find the theoretical purpose of moral agency as a single reference point.14  
                                                
13 Through Johnson & Noorman’s (2014) work on technology being a metaphorical extension of the 
human, they consider that the humanoid design could be the wrong metaphor picked to define a social 
robot’s agency. This implies that the level of aliveness in the robot might not be situated where its 
humanness is; at the perceptive level of the robot appearing to be human-like. The human visual alikeness 
might be the most unhuman part of the robot, in the end. 
14 Barad (2003) has coined the term ‘agential realism’, which refers to looking at the materialization ‘of 
all bodies — “human” and “nonhuman”—and the material-discursive practices by which their differential 
constitutions are marked. This will require an understanding of the nature of the relationship between 
discursive practices and material phenomena, an accounting of “nonhuman” as well as “human” forms of 
agency, and an understanding of the precise causal nature of productive practices that takes account of the 
fullness of matter’s implication in its ongoing historicity’ (810). 
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Braidotti (2006) not only argues the limitations of a stable agenthood and morality, but 
also intentionality as a criterion in ethics. Braidotti’s book, Transpositions: On Nomadic 
Ethics (2006), offers an in-depth discussion on the shift towards ‘ethical complexities’ 
in the debate of intertwined technological and human agencies. Braidotti suggests 
thinking in ‘nomadic ethics’ (15) to reject morality as a concept that ‘highlights the 
relevance of a non-unitary vision of the subject’ (15). She claims that such has gained 
‘importance of the notion of individualism in moral philosophy’ (12), which is also 
critiqued by Zylinska (2014) as ‘anthropocentric moralism (where values are being laid 
out without questioning the process of their fabrication and the conflict in which they 
always exist with some other values)’ (72). Braidotti (2006) clarifies: 
‘The ethics of nomadic subjectivity rejects moral universalism and 
works towards a different idea of ethical accountability in the sense of a 
fundamental reconfiguration of our being in a world that is 
technologically and globally mediated’ (15). 
This must be done because ‘moral philosophy is of hindrance, not of assistance, in 
dealing with the ethical complexities of our times’ (15). This argument is crucial in this 
thesis, since it points to a provisional understanding of how the mediation within 
technology is an ethical process that forms accountability, in which the moral question 
could be a hindrance, not an endeavour. I consider it a huge problem, as I will point to 
in Chapter Two, that, on the contrary, Robot Ethics struggles to acknowledge the 
agency of the robot as a robot, but anthropomorphises its ethical issues from being a 
perceived agent (because of its humanoid shape) that is meant to act as a companion or 
friend to the elderly. On the other side, the robot is reduced to an instrument that can be 
misused by an immortal human agent. Both views, as I argue, are stuck in 
anthropocentric and moralising traps, as I will elaborate further in Chapter Two. 
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While Braidotti’s views are theoretically valuable to understand the value of non-human 
agencies, and functions as my antithesis to the morality-focused research in Robot 
Ethics, it remains unclear how she debates practical accountability. The question on 
accountability is not simply overlooked; it is not addressed in the very practical case of 
moral accountability, because morality is not a factor any longer. Braidotti (2006) sums 
this up with: 
‘Ethics in [P]oststructuralist philosophy is not confined to the realm of 
rights, distributive justice, or the law, but it rather bears close links with 
the notion of political agency and the management of power and of 
power-relations. Issues of responsibility are dealt with in terms of 
alterity or the relationship to others. This implies accountability, 
situated-ness and cartographic accuracy’ (12). 
However, she is surprisingly clear that it is the ‘awareness’ of the subject who fills the 
accountable position after all, by also amplifying that such position is ideally a critical 
one, as well as stating that ‘ethical accountability is closely related to the political 
awareness of one's positions and privileges’ (13). However, her views (and that of other 
Posthumanist researchers) present their own limitations, in being unclear on practical 
discussions around the use of robots or any other technology.15  
However, the newly attained theoretical complexity is worth highlighting, because this 
influences how to understand the practical consequences as much. Karen Barad’s work 
(2007) introduces the neologism of ‘ethico-onto-epistemology’ (409) as an inherent 
entanglement of technology, human, and other material agencies - and as ethical. She 
writes that her terms: 
                                                
15 It is important to point that the Posthumanists are not necessarily indifferent to questions on 
responsibility or accountability questions (Braidotti, 2006). But they do not enter an applied ethics canon, 
neither do they join canons around practical issues in the use of robots or on accountability questions 
emerging from such. This does not mean there could not be a Posthumanist view on robots (as agency 
network) that allows to theoretically debate for a holistic accountability concept. 
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‘"[O]ntoepistemological" marks the inseparability of ontology and 
epistemology. I also use "ethico-onto-epistemology" to mark the 
inseparability of ontology, epistemology, and ethics. The analytic 
philosophical tradition takes these fields to be entirely separate, but this 
presupposition depends on specific ways of figuring the nature of being, 
knowing, and valuing’ (409). 
While acknowledging that these three methods and disciplines are always intertwined, 
the entanglement of human, material, or technological agencies is understood as being 
performative16. Barad refers hereby to Butler’s concept on ‘gender performativity’ that 
puts the focus on the making of gender, not the being of gender. Applied to tracking, 
maybe this allows us to understand it as a making of ethics, not the being of moral 
codes.17  
To conclude this section, morality is never a reference point in the post-anthropocentric, 
or Posthumanist discussions on technology (or any other agencies - human, material, or 
environmental - since these are understood as intertwined), because of the awareness of 
how morality is shaped by other value systems around it, and how it ends up being 
instrumented or institutionalised. An ethical perspective not only removes the 
evaluation process from understanding the intersection of relations, but, as Barad 
suggests, Posthumanists focus on the link between ethics, epistemology, and ontology 
when thinking of agency.  
                                                
16 Barad (2003) proposes ‘a posthumanist notion of performativity—one that incorporates important 
material and discursive, social and scientific, human and nonhuman, and natural and cultural factors’ 
(809). She relates this to the work of Butler on performativity and materialisation of gender. 
17 ‘The notion of performativity has a distinguished career in philosophy that most of these multiple and 
various engagements acknowledge. (…) Butler elaborates Derrida’s notion of performativity through 
Foucault’s understanding of the productive effects of regulatory power in theorizing the notion of identity 
performatively. Butler introduces her notion of gender performativity in Gender Trouble, where she 
proposes that we understand gender not as a thing or a set of free-floating attributes, not as an essence—
but rather as a “doing”’ (Barad, 2003: 808). 
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What these streams highlight, and what I agree with fully, is that defining good or bad 
values is bound to the epistemes deciding, similar to when deciding on human 
agenthood or human subject as rational entities. My critique of Robot Ethics and POT 
streams, which I reflect on in Chapter Two and Three, will circle around the norming of 
morality and agency as implied evaluations and power structures, which are blindly 
reproduced or assumed to be universal. I view these aspects as strategic 
instrumentations of a valuable reference, such as morality, and removed from the 
interest to make morally justifiable robots.  
I consider the ethical view as more appropriate to understanding that responsibility and 
accountability are inherent in the forming of relationships, and that such do not operate 
in a top-down manner, neither with cleared stated values, which can be assigned or 
extended into the technology. If we instead acknowledge the wider network of agencies 
and reflect on their making, this might allow for better insights into what technological 
agencies are, then, the common fixation in POT on making a robot good or bad or 
human-like. Yet, I also acknowledge that without clear answers and stable points on 
accountability and responsibility when using technologies, especially, robots will lack 
the necessary control as much as an ethical understanding. 
The Posthumanist approach is not fully ignored in newer POT canons (Introna, for 
instance, works closely around Barad’s work). Chapter Seven will return to this point 
with Brey’s ‘ethical structure’ and Floridi’s ‘distributed moral agency’. However, there 
is no resonance on this ethical perspective in Robot Ethics, which might encourage 
further questions to emerge, for instance, on the influence of social robots for 
professional care, or its redefining of caring, company, or trust, or the effect it might 
have for the elderly and their self-worth, health, or sociability.  
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As I will discuss in Chapter Two, ethically seen, the use for social robots does lead to 
an implementation of a new data management structure into elderly care. I show in 
Chapter Six that the robot’s ability to track can be understood ethically and not morally 
to receive a full picture on the social robot as an ethical process of sociability.18 
On Agamben’s ‘Ethical Gesture’ as an Amoral View on Technology  
To further the discussion on how to understand tracking as an ethical process, I decided 
to include Giorgio Agamben’s (2010) work on ethical gesture in this debate. I do this, 
not to start a discussion on early cinema, but to suggest an example from film-
philosophy that thinks of the socio-material agencies of technology, on the grounds of 
them being ethical gestures. The specific reason for dedicating space for an ethical 
understanding of cinema through Agamben’s work is that it aligns the discussion on 
computational architecture and tracking in an ethical way in Chapter Six. This angle, 
even if it leaves the major discussion slightly, offers an alternative, even if speculative, 
take on the dominant moral debates. However, it will encounter limitations within 
practical questions in the use of robots beyond the human agent as the only accountable, 
and yet, undiscussed one. Chapter Six will explore this ethical view by outlining the 
making of tracking modules through Hariatoglu et al.’s (2000) work, and by expanding 
on a highly influential interdisciplinary concept on emotion detection, the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) by Ekman (2003). 
                                                
18 Barad argues: ‘Crucial to understanding the workings of power is an understanding of the nature of 
power in the fullness of its materiality. To restrict power’s productivity to the limited domain of the 
“social,” for example, or to figure matter as merely an end product rather than an active factor in further 
materializations, is to cheat matter out of the fullness of its capacity’ (Barad, 2003: 810). 
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Agamben’s work, less as a cinema expert but in a wider philosophical sense, supported 
my realisation that robots are not understood fully in their remediation capacities; in this 
sense, they are not different from cinema or other media technologies in my view. 
Again, I have one clear intention with this example: to offer an ethical view on how to 
understand the making and entangling of agencies outside an anthropocentric or 
anthropomorphic focus and to point out that moral questions are not inherent to 
comprehending technological agencies, and still, might be useful to understand their use 
and application in real-life scenarios. 
Agamben’s (2000, 2014) conceptualisation of early cinema19 as an ethical gesture 
allows for an understanding of technology as relational negotiations of agencies, and as 
a gestural remediation of socio-cultural and technological discourses. Understanding the 
emergence, development, and technology of early cinema as gestural and ethical has 
influenced multiple debates in film-historical research (Gronstad & Gustafsson, 2014), 
but it has also influenced Performance Studies and Performance Philosophy (Ruprecht, 
2017; Dimitrova, 2017).20 Interestingly, Agamben’s work has been selectively 
anthologised in edited collections dedicated to visual and media culture, as much as it 
has appeared in a Performance Studies context (Harbord, 2016: 8), but he is not aiming 
for a media- or technology-centred perspective on ethics.21 Instead, he is interested in a 
politico-ethical view on cinema by looking at how cinema technology has embodied 
                                                
19 Early cinema is used in this context to pinpoint a time frame during the early 20th century as important 
when technology, cultural, and other practices come together to form cinema as a technology. This 
moment is not understood as a singular one, and cinema is not seen as invented in one moment or as a 
concluded technology according to Punt (2000). Agamben is fluid between referring to cinema as a 
dispositif or as a technological apparatus.  
20 Performance Studies influenced this exploration as much by enabling a rethinking of dichotomies of 
appearance and qualities, agents and tools, bodily expression and virtues, and of ethics and morality. 
21 Agamben’s engagement with media and film theory can be traced in his text, Releasing the Image: 
From Literature to New Media (2011). 
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and transformed human gestures, within a philosophically and historically complex 
revisiting of what he calls the ‘crises of representation’ in the early 20th century.22 
In Notes on Gesture (2000), Agamben offers two crucial points on the contextualisation 
of early cinema as an ethical gesture. First, he states that the (bourgeois) gesture has 
been lost at the end of the 19th century, and, second, that early cinema restored it by 
becoming a gesture itself. For him, bourgeois gestures were based on the illusion of 
subjective identity and unity, on fixed and individual agents (ironically, a fallacy the 
social robot is trapped in as well, according to Dumouchel & Damiano, 2017).  
Agamben argues that the mediality of (early) cinema had positioned cinema as an 
ethical, not aesthetic or representational, practice.23 The ethical is, for Agamben, within 
the emergence of early cinema technology that unfolds as mediality and as a gesture of 
the discourses it incorporates - without being moralising in itself, but by being a 
biopolitical entanglement. His work contributes to this discussion by unravelling ethics 
as an intertwined negotiation of technological capacities, human aesthetics, and values. 
Agamben’s exploration reaches beyond moral outcomes or human intentions in the 
unfolding of socio-technological practices such as cinema, but he sees this loss of 
                                                
22 The media philosopher Flusser opens a different discussion on why and how human gestures and 
technology are intertwined ethically (Flusser & Roth, 2014). Flusser looks at human gestures in their 
phenomenological expressivity (but also as a process, not as an expression), pointing to the difficultly in 
tracing the meaning and intention in causality (3). For him, technological media practices such as 
photography (Flusser, 2000: 33-41), have themselves created new human gestures, fusing the 
technological functions of the apparatus and the human gesture of using it. 
23 ‘Gilles Deleuze has argued that cinema erases the fallacious psychological distinction between image 
as psychic reality and movement as physical reality. ‘Every image, in fact, is animated by an antinomic 
polarity: on the one hand, images are the reification and obliteration of a gesture (it is the imago as death 
mask or as symbol); on the other hand, they preserve the dynamis intact (as in Muybridge's snapshots or 
in any sports photograph)’ (Agamben, 2000: 54). 
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gesture in parallel to the decline of the bourgeois class and the gesticulations present in 
19th century mannerisms (Ruprecht 2010: 257).24 
Agamben’s theory then suggests that cinema is the recovery of the loss of the bourgeois 
gestures and that, as such, cinema is neither a neutral nor a stable technology, nor a 
technology only (whereby it remains unclear throughout this exploration how narrow 
Agamben defines cinema). Hence, the crisis of representation in the early 20th century 
has led the Western world into a crisis of human gesture, one that is restored through the 
gesturality of cinema that exhibits the conditions of cinematic montage as ‘a sphere of 
pure means, that is, of the absolute and complete gesturality of human beings’ (59). I 
will show in Chapter Six that tracking bears similarities to the montage process in 
cinema. 
What emerges for Agamben is the political and ethical dimension of cinema as a 
technology that is pure mediality and gesture.25 For him, ‘the element of cinema is 
gesture and not image (…) because cinema has its centre in the gesture and not in the 
image, it belongs essentially to the realm of ethics and politics (and not simply to that of 
aesthetics)’ (2000: 49; 54). Cinema is not about images, but about bringing what is 
made into static images back to life. This aliveness is the mediality that cinema montage 
embodies. According to Gronstad & Gustafsson (2014): 
                                                
24 According to this thesis, the development is noticeable in the entanglement of hypnosis, hysteria, and 
photography in the 19th century (Didi-Huberman, 2004). 
25 ‘Nothing is more misleading for an understanding of gesture, therefore, than representing, on the one 
hand, a sphere of means as addressing a goal (for example, marching seen as a means of moving the body 
from point A to point B) and, on the other hand, a separate and superior sphere of gesture as a movement 
that has its end in itself (for example, dance seen as an aesthetic dimension). (…) The gesture is the 
exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as such’ (Agamben, 2000: 57). 
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‘Agamben’s main concern, however, is montage and what he calls its 
“transcendental conditions,” which are repetition and stoppage. Drawing 
on philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Deleuze, 
he points out that repetition is not about the return of the same but rather 
the return of “the possibility of what was”’ (3). 
For Agamben, the capacities of cinema technology of repetition and montage are not 
instrumental or neutral (nor unethical); they also blur the individual components in their 
making (Agamben does not refer to human agenthood as stable or distinct). For him, the 
unfolding (what Barad might call the performative aspect) is what makes cinema 
ethical, because of its gestural relationality that ‘allows the emergence of the be-ing-in-
a-medium of human beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension for them [corporal 
movements]’ (57). This comes close to Nancy’s work on the cinema of evidence, 
according to Gronstad & Gustafsson (2014), who write that both theorists’ work does 
not orientate itself around appearance and aesthetics, but toward its unfolding. For both, 
this coming into presence of the world, its continuous disappearing and reappearing, 
holds a profound political importance. In Agamben’s words: ‘(…) the task of politics is 
to return appearance itself to appearance, to cause appearance itself to appear’ (5).  
Consequently, early cinema forms a dispositif26 in the transition of biopolitical relations, 
in which human communicability (as an openness to communicating with others) in the 
form of gestures is caught in the act of its own disappearance. Yet, if gesture is the site 
of a potential within cinema to operate historically, it is also the locus of a biopolitical 
process that manifested in the human body towards the end of the 19th century. Levitt 
(2011) explains the ethical and biopolitical as an 
                                                
26 In What is an Apparatus? (2009), Agamben reflects on Foucault’s term dispositif by writing that: ‘The 
term "apparatus" designates that in which and through which one realizes a pure activity of governance 
devoid of any foundation in being. This is the reason why apparatuses must always imply a process of 
subjectification. That is to say, they must produce their subject’ (11). (Apparatus is used as the English 
translation for his original term dispositivo from the original version in Italian) 
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‘[A]ppropriation of gestures as images, as forms of knowledge deployed 
in the discipline of bodies, is centrally implicated in the emergence, by 
the early twentieth century, of a distinctly modern variant of biopolitics – 
a situation that would reach its horrific apotheosis only a few years later’ 
(2011: 199). 
Agamben’s abstract and historically interwoven argumentation should not be 
misunderstood as a literal move beyond human gestures. He is interested in another 
form of gesture or gesturality as a process. Despite humans being still able to 
communicate in coded gestures, what Agamben wants to address is that the very 
process of gesture-making as a ‘the process of making a means visible as such’ (2000: 
57) is transformed through cinema. He draws our attention to the initial reading and 
expressing of gestures being a private matter of the bourgeois individual, which has 
moved into a public domain as being recovered within the new technology of cinema. 
This step, for him, has generated a reciprocity in which the public domain then 
penetrates and operates within the private body, by mediating its privateness back – but 
already transformed – into a public realm. Hence, human and technology, private and 
public, both are, in this case, intertwined agencies, but never separate entities within a 
reciprocal structure, without an end and/or a beginning and beyond fixed borders or 
bodies.27 
What I conclude from both ethical perspectives, the Posthumanist’s and Agamben’s, is 
that moral and ethical views on technology can differ substantially and produce, co-
shape, and influence different agency models, which then implicate their wider ethics. 
Furthermore, expressivity of human agency or its meaning is not a one-way street; it is 
formed by technology, and robots do challenge this formation in particular, by hinting 
                                                
27 Agamben’s work on ethics and early cinema is widely discussed by Gronstad & Gustafsson (2014), 
Väliaho (2010), Harbord (2016) and Ruprecht (2017). 
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to a literal and humanoid simulation of human agency, while also embodying another 
level of invisible and machinic agencies.  
It is important to keep in mind that morality is mostly used as an evaluative concept of 
technology or human agency, while ethics can be the structure of morality evaluations 
or a completely amoral concept to understand agency entanglement through technology. 
Discussions on morality and agenthood are continued and contextualised in more detail 
in Chapters Four and Seven. Especially, in Chapter Seven, new concerns and limitations 
on this term appear as I reflect on why accountability is removed from the agency of 
technology. Chapter Seven debates this deficit and highlights why the contemporary 
discussion on morality and accountable agents is drifting into a theoretical (and 
interesting) but increasingly impractical view on technology.  
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2. Social Robots Between Humanoid Companions and Monitoring Tools  
Chapter summary: Next, I enter the (i) Robot Ethics framework to discuss the ethical 
debates on the use of social robots in elderly care. I focus on the implications when 
looking at social robots as companions and how this creates a problematic and 
anthropomorphic view on their agency. Such anthropomorphic status is given to social 
robots on the grounds of their humanoid bodies suggesting agenthood due to 
resemblance, which leads to the anthropomorphic fallacy of expecting human-like 
behaviour and intentions from them. I specifically survey literature in Robot Ethics and 
point to the problematic position of the social robot as a companion (as pseudo-agent) 
or as a monitoring device (as a misused tool), while both emerge from a moralisation of 
the social robot as an agent-like device. This chapter looks at the work of Lin et al. 
(2012), Royakkers & van Est (2016), Turkle (2005, 2011), and Sharkey & Sharkey 
(2010).  
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The importance of this investigation grounds on the increasing use of social robots28 in 
elderly care (Royakkers & van Est, 2016; Lin et al., 2012; Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010; 
Wu et al., 2010).29 One concern I have is around the position with which social robots 
are mainly associated: as a companion, human-like (pseudo) agent, or caring partner, 
while their capacities as computational machines is often overlooked or neutralised and 
not fully examined ethically.  
This companionship position is accompanied by various fears and expectations, as Lin 
et al. (2011, 2012) point out, which means it is not endorsed necessarily. Especially, as 
some ethicists worry that the social robot is positioned increasingly as a partner-like 
agent, it hereby enters a new discussion on how much moral accountability and 
responsibility it should be expected to have. Yet, robots still lack any abilities required 
to be worthy of an agenthood position in the first place, so how can these attributes be 
thought together? Lin et al. (2011) ask, therefore: 
‘Is it ethically permissible to abrogate responsibility for our elderly and 
children to machines that seem to be a poor substitute for human 
companionship (but perhaps better than no—or abusive— 
companionship)? Will robotic companionship (that could replace human 
or animal companionship) for other purposes, such as drinking buddies, 
pets, other forms of entertainment, or sex, be morally problematic?’ 
(945). 
                                                
28 ‘Personal care and companions: Robots are increasingly used to care for the elderly and children, such 
as RI-MAN, PaPeRo, and CareBot. PALRO, QRIO, and other edutainment robots mentioned above can 
also provide companionship’ (Lin et al., 2011: 944). I am concerned in this thesis with the wider concept 
of social robots and less with one specific model. 
29 ‘According to the European Commission (2012), the proportion of those aged 65 years and over is 
projected to rise from 17% in 2010 to 30% in 2060, with the peak occurring around 2040. (…) In Japan, 
the country with the highest proportion of elderly citizens, the population is also rapidly aging; 23% of 
the population was already older than 65 years in 2010, predicted to rise to 31% by 2030, and in the 
United States, 13% were over the age of 65 in 2009, expected to rise to around 19% by 2030’ (Royakkers 
& van Est, 2016: 62). 
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These questions are critical; however, they are also anthropomorphic, anthropocentric, 
and moralising, since Lin et al. (2011) expect that robots should judge abusiveness or 
friendship like human agents supposedly can. They imply that the social robot could 
have a cognitive ability to be either a friend but, in a negative way, to also become a 
harming abuser. Still, these fears are projections of qualities that a robot does not yet 
own, and, thus, the status of robots as morally relevant agents is projective or even 
misunderstood. Further, only agents could take a position as a friend or as an ‘abuser’ 
and be morally accountable for their actions.  
Humanoid Robotics (HR) advocates for the use of social robots being an improvement 
on the life of the elderly, but Sparrow & Sparrow (2006) state that ‘the use of care 
robots is unethical’ (193) in principle. They critique the use of robots by saying:  
‘We see the idea that we can solve the ‘problem’ of caring for an ageing 
population, by employing robots to do it, as essentially continuous with a 
number of other attitudes and social practices which evidence a profound 
disrespect for older persons’ (143). 
What ‘disrespect’ means in this instance is not clear, but it could reflect on the various 
issues that I raise next. Compared to robot ethicists, roboticists developing and 
designing social robots are more optimistic about the use of social (or care) companions 
and are less concerned about ethical problems (as non-ethically motivated research 
around elderly care shows).  
For some, robotic technology will clearly improve the lives and care of elderly patients 
(Draper & Sorell, 2017; Roger et al., 2012; Chu et al., 2017). In the context of 
assistance and independence, Chu et al. (2017) believe that a robot can guarantee the 
medication scheduling of an elderly patient; support the memorising of tasks or even 
eating schedules of a demented patient, or client; and help with physically demanding 
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tasks, such as lifting of an elderly person (Draper & Sorell, 2017). In particular, the 
value of social robots for dementia patients is also positively discussed (Roger et al., 
2012; Chu et al., 2017). I do not argue against these positive aspects in this thesis, for it 
has a different focus of exploration.
Even if several robot ethicists observe social robots critically within elderly care, some 
are specifically critical of the robot’s position as a perceived agent and companion, but 
not in the way I am. Turkle (2005, 2011), for instance, focusses on the implications of 
the potential for deception of the elderly. Turkle points to the danger of 
anthropomorphic projection, which I critique as well.30 However, Turkle’s (2011) 
caution around the use of social robots is on them as deceptive devices, a view she 
developed out of her work as an anthropologist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) (ix). She objects to the use of robots for the elderly and for children 
by saying: ‘Roboticists make the case that the elderly need a companion robot because 
of a lack of human resources. Almost by definition, they say, robots will make things 
better’ (24). For her, the robotics industry is the major ethical problem, since it is the 
main driver behind promoting these devices.31  
Turkle (2005) grounds her criticism upon two important facets of social robots. The first 
is the extent to which they are ‘relational artefacts’, through which the 
anthropomorphising design of social robots encourages them to be seen as ’artefacts 
                                                
30 ‘Anthropomorphic projections do not require, nor necessarily imply, the belief that a non-human 
animal or object has mental states similar to ours. Nonetheless, in many cases, they will lead to the 
formation of such beliefs, which may or may not be true. Historically, the term ‘anthropomorphism’ has 
been reserved to refer to when the attribution fails, and the belief is false’ (Damiano & Dumouchel, 2018: 
6). 
31 ‘According to a survey from World Robotics (2012), sales of service robots for personal and domestic 
use increased by 19 % in 2011 to 2.5 million units, with projections for 2012-2015 showing increases in 
domestic, entertainment, leisure and handicap assistance robotics to 15.6 million units overall’ (Ford, 
2014: 28). 
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that have inner states of mind’ and to interact with them involves an ‘understanding 
these states of mind’ (Turkle, 2005: 62). Second, she refers to ethnographic studies in 
which children and the elderly bond with and care about these ‘evocative artefacts’ 
easily and, hence, enter deceptive relationships. The ‘illusion of relationship’ (Turkle, 
2011: 514), is the most damning part for her, since it exploits our ‘Darwinian buttons’, 
making us anthropomorphise objects by projecting human-like qualities onto them.  
Hence, for Turkle, the main ethical issues stem from social robots being a deceptive 
technology, one that is pretending to be what it is not; namely, a companion and agent. 
Even if I am careful in arguing that the bonding process with technologies or devices 
must be less real or authentic than relationships with humans and animals, the critique 
of a simulated companionship seems valid. 
‘Thus, Turkle sees in social robots a further step in the development of 
our “culture of simulation,” which threatens to turn people away from 
“real” social relationships – that is, from relationships with other humans 
– and reduce their social life to an illusion – to the feeling of being 
together with someone, when in fact one is alone’ (Damiano & 
Dumouchel, 2018: 4). 
Deceptive and masquerading companionship would be the opposite of what Sparrow 
(2015) claims to be the purpose of social robots in elderly care. For him, robotic design 
for elderly users should be geared towards promoting happiness rather than to achieve 
seemingly objective measures of welfare (Sparrow 2015). For Sparrow, this means 
finding a balance between autonomy, privacy, and independence that can guarantee 
welfare, even if it remains unclear how and who is negotiating these terms.
Sharkey & Sharkey (2010) raise concerns on social robots in elderly care as critically as 
Turkle does, but differently. They define three dimensions that, although problematic, 
are worth discussing: (1) Assistance, (2) Monitoring, and (3) Companionship. Whereas 
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I am more concerned with humanoid social robots, they also focus upon animal-like 
companionship robots, such as robot seals (Paro) and robotic cats, which are 
anthropomorphised as well. Sharkey & Sharkey (2010) agree only partially with 
Turkle’s work and how the elderly might be potentially deceived into believing that 
social robots are companions. ‘Essentially, our suggestion here is that to claim that 
robot companions are unethical because their effectiveness depends on deception (…) 
[and] oversimplifies the issue’ (36). Instead, Sharkey & Sharkey (2010) speak of… 
‘[…]two different bases for the associated ethical concerns: human 
rights, and shared human values. We shall outline these in turn. An 
emphasis on human rights provides support for the assumption that the 
physical and the psychological welfare of the elderly is as important as 
the welfare of others’ (2010: 27). 
They summarise further potential concerns around social robots as: 
‘(1) the potential reduction in the amount of human contact; (2) an 
increase in the feelings of objectification and loss of control; (3) a loss of 
privacy; (4) a loss of personal liberty; (5) deception and infantilisation; 
(6) the circumstances in which elderly people should be allowed to 
control robots’ (27). 
Sharkey & Sharkey’s biggest concern is, in my view, that the use of robots for care 
could violate the basic human rights of the person being cared for.32 Even if their 
reflection considers the wider consequences of using social robots, they do not assign 
any agent or moral agency to them. Sharkey & Sharkey position their critique on the 
opposite spectrum of Turkle’s, by viewing social robots rather as misused instruments 
and isolating machines, not as deceptive pseudo-agents. I only agree partially with their 
                                                
32 ‘Depriving senior citizens of social interaction with their fellow humans is an ethical issue that is not 
explicitly addressed by human rights legislation. Such a right is perhaps implied such as in Article 5 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’’, or Article 9, ‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile’’’ (Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010: 29). 
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critique, since I disagree with them not recognising that social robots have a complex 
agency nonetheless, despite not being human. What concerns Sharkey & Sharkey is the 
deprivation of human contact as the elderly become increasingly isolated, objectified, or 
lose control over their lives and environment. (29) ‘The worry is that the use of robots 
in elderly care for tasks such as lifting, carrying, or even cleaning, might result in a 
reduction in the amount of human social contact that an elderly person experiences’ 
(Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010: 29).  
Their critique denies the agenthood of robots in the first place, since the humanoid 
design is, for Sharkey & Sharkey, only a superficial and deceptive projection and cannot 
be taken seriously. For them, the elderly are exposed to a deceptive machine that cannot 
be considered a substitute for human company at all, which might be true, but it does 
not make it less influential or more neutral, as I argue. Even if I share their critical point 
on this exposure being potential isolating, I do not agree that a social robot’s major flaw 
is that it is not an actual human agent and, therefore, must be isolating. Nonetheless, I 
see a problem in the elderly mistaking the robot’s actions as being motivated by a moral 
goodwill or bad intention and their inability to distinguish between what the robot 
accounts for or is capable of. 
Amanda Sharkey’s more recent work (2014) emphasises another problem by expanding 
the ethical issues around agenthood in social robots. Her research addresses questions 
on dignity in elderly care. Sharkey (2014) refers to the concerns raised at the National 
Pensioners Convention in 2012. Alarmed by a report surfacing on how elderly patients 
were neglected by human caretakers (64), the convention members were urged for a 
new Dignity Code to protect the care conditions of the elderly patients. The report found 
out that professional human care staff struggle to keep up with the workload and that 
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this leads to an increasing neglect of elderly patients. To tackle this concern, the 
members decided to introduce ‘dignity ambassadors’ (64) in professional care, which 
shows a certain awareness around further challenges in the care profession. 
Preserving the dignity of the elderly is a goal that must be addressed holistically and 
beyond the question of dignity, but also as aligned to the exposure to robots as 
companions or isolating machines (remaining an important concern). Expecting that a 
robot would understand the concept of dignity is questionable, just as much as the 
question on how a ‘dignity ambassador’ could be able to intervene and identify a 
(human?) caretaker that treats the elderly without dignity. 
However, for Sharkey, there are two sides to this scenario. It might be that the 
introduction of robots could improve this worrying situation by providing support for 
tired and overworked care-givers. She argues, first, that it could. A robot might be 
(perceived as) ‘kinder’ (65) by a patient and, therefore, more positive than an inattentive 
or unkind human carer. A robot could be perceived as less judgmental when helping the 
elderly with their personal hygiene, for instance, and, as robots gain in verbal and 
interactional sophistication (one day), they might in the end become better companions 
than human caretakers. 
However, Sharkey (2014) clarifies that to counter such suggestions… 
‘[…]it should be pointed out that contemporary robots are poor 
substitutes for human company. Robots may not exhibit the worst sides 
of human behaviour, but neither are they capable of real compassion and 
empathy or understanding’ (64). 
For her, in the context of the current development of robotics, a preponderance of social 
robots taking care of older people would deprive these people of human companionship, 
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and this is what would make many peoples’ ‘lives (...) unacceptably impoverished’ (65). 
Sharkey (2014) explains that the social isolation following from this preponderance 
would also have health implications. 
‘For example, being single and living alone has been shown to be a risk 
factor for dementia (and a) decreased social engagement from midlife to 
late life was associated with an increased risk of dementia’ (65). 
What emerges from Sharkey’s research is that ethical consequences arise independently 
of the intention of the industry, or of the developer, be it potential isolation or even 
physical harm of the elderly due to the misuse or malfunction of the robot. 
There is an additional and important ethical facet to social robots leaving the companion 
perspective. Such refers to the social robot’s capacity to monitor the elderly with its 
embedded cameras or interactive sensory channels (Chapter Six will expand on the 
computational interaction further). As I am leaving the discussion on the companionship 
and a pseudo-agency position behind, the intrusion of people’s privacy emerges as a 
new concern in Robot Ethics.33 Such concern is underestimated in my view and is 
understood insufficiently, compared to the discussion I will offer in Chapter Three led 
by (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies.  
I want to remain with Robot Ethics for now to outline that this framework is aware of 
the concerning monitoring capacities of robots, but robots are rather viewed as spying 
tools used by immoral human agents. I argue that this is a projective concern, since the 
                                                
33 The REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THECOUNCIL 
of 27 April 2016 regulates: ‘(1) The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal 
data is a fundamental right.’ And further points to ‘(3) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (4) seeks to harmonise the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons in respect of processing activities (…).’ Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN (Accessed 15.05.2018). How the right on 
personal data will be harmonised with the processing activities is legally challenging in my view.  
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intention to survey – to be immoral – is lacking in the robot; hence, the ground for a 
moral agency is lacking too. However, I highlight next that the very ability to interact 
and monitor is still an ethical process in which various agencies align to become 
potentially problematic if they are not fully understood. The problem I see within Robot 
Ethics discussing monitoring as an issue is that it remains unclear if the monitoring and 
privacy intrusion is meant to be an immoral intention drawn from the robot’s 
(perceived) immoral agenthood, or from the intentional misuse of the robot by an 
immoral human agent that spies on the elderly.  
Monitoring leads to the concern of privacy intrusion, which is mentioned (even if 
rarely) by Royakkers & van Est (2016). They identify that the ability to monitor and 
survey the environment is an ethical concern when using robots. They state: 
‘Robotics can be applied in all sorts of ways to monitor certain 
situations, such as the patient’s state of health, a car driver’s focus of 
attention, and the safety situation in the street or on the battlefield. (…) 
The utilization of robotics calls for an explicit and careful consideration 
of various potential conflicting interests in various fields, for example, 
between health and privacy, (…). It should also be taken into account 
that the utilization of this kind of information technology may go hand in 
hand with more intensively keeping on the actions of caregivers, 
(professional) drivers, police officers, and/ or soldiers’ (310, 311). 
They dedicate a substantial part of their philosophical work to the use of social robots, 
and other robots such as ‘domotics’34, which are also used in elderly care. However, 
their critique on privacy intrusion is brief when it comes to elderly care and monitoring, 
since, for them, privacy intrusion through monitoring, is limited to long distance care 
services. 
                                                
34 Domotics are, for instance, supervised ‘devices and infrastructures in and around homes that provide 
electronic information for measuring, programming, and controlling functions for the benefit of residents 
and the providers of services’ (Royakkers & van Est, 2016: 95). 
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Although Royakkers & Van Est’s confrontation with these ethical concerns is, in my 
view, too brief and superficial, their research at least addresses privacy issues in the 
context of social robots as monitoring devices. As I just argued, to position the problem 
of monitoring as one of immoral intention, this requires for the robot to have, first, 
intention and, second, immorality; both attributes, which are anthropomorphised and 
projected into robots at this point.  
The second aspect is that the concern on privacy intrusion is often disconnected from 
social robots - it is mainly brought up as attached to the ethical discussions around 
drones (2016: 160-166). This suggests to me that Robot Ethics is not only limiting its 
ethical discussion through the focus on the humanoid shape of the robot, but also by the 
context of its use. I point to this deficit in Chapter Seven when arguing that social 
robots must be treated always as digital technologies with embedded capacities to track 
or collect data, despite their shape and use.  
Sharkey & Sharkey (2010) also raise a critical awareness on monitoring and privacy, 
even if not a sufficient one in my view. For them, the monitoring ability of the robot has 
positive and negative elements. 
‘Robotic surveillance devices have already been developed for warfare, 
for policing, and for home security (Sharkey 2009) and these could 
easily be adapted for monitoring the elderly. A robot that traverses the 
house, and relays information picked up by its sensors, is something that 
is well within the current technological limits’ (2010: 32). 
One advantage of monitoring systems is, for them, that it enables virtual doctor visits in 
cases in which the patients live far away from their medical support. ‘A monitoring 
robot could increase the safety of an elderly person in their own home, and make it 
possible for medical staff to virtually visit the elderly person and provide health checks’ 
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(2010: 32). However, this ability to monitor and do virtual examinations links to their 
initial fear of the elderly being isolated and having even less human contact (32). 
Two issues remain unresolved for Sharkey & Sharkey in the debate about monitoring: 
the elderly patients giving consent to be monitored, and the access to this information. 
They argue that this is specifically problematic if a patient with Alzheimer’s, for 
example, has been deemed as lacking capacity to consent, in which case, he or she 
would probably 
‘forget that the robot was monitoring them, and could perform acts or 
say things thinking that they are in the privacy of their own home. 
Moreover, who should have access to the information, and how long it 
should be kept for? With the massive memory hard drives available 
today, it would be possible to record the entire remainder of an elderly 
person’s life, but this is not something that they would necessarily 
consent to if they were able to’ (2010: 32). 
They point to another advantage of monitoring: allowing reach to demented people 
through the development of smart homes for the care of dementia sufferers, which then 
become useful technologies able to determine if an elderly person has fallen over or 
needs support (271). The concerns they have around the lack of consent relates to the 
critique I raise as well, which is on the lack of media literacy provided to the people 
affected by these new devices.  
Draper & Sorrell (2017) have studied how much autonomy or independence elderly 
patients accept or encourage in a robot. Therefore, in my view, achieving a holistic 
media literacy of those exposed to robots must be an essential driver for future research, 
especially as the increased ‘mediatisation’ of social structures (Hepp & Krotz 2014; 
Krotz, 2012; Lundby 2014) influences not only elderly care, but affects various 
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environments.35 Obviously, if the ethical discussion in Robot Ethics is limited or 
incomplete, the literacy on the technology in place will lack important aspects, as I am 
increasingly highlighting. Elderly care and Robotics are equally affected by the 
convergence of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) structures and the 
implementation of new digital technology.36 
Hence, the study by Wu et al. (2011) seems worth discussing, in which they surveyed 
the opinions of a group of elderly care clients on humanoid and social robots.37 What the 
researchers did was to engage the elderly with humanoid social robots, all of which 
exhibited a variety of human-like features, shapes, and likenesses, from very human-
like to less human-like. Most responses were not in favour of the robot exhibiting a 
perceived human visual alikeness. Wu et al. (2011) explain: 
‘Most of the participants expressed a strong reluctance (they often use 
the term ‘fear’) toward a robot conceived as a substitute of a human 
presence. They often evoked some social and political issues, such as 
dehumanisation of our society. ‘‘I cannot imagine a world ... with no 
contact, no one to speak to you’’, said a participant’ (124). 
It was not just fear (or a sense of uncanniness) towards a robot as a pseudo-human 
device that was brought up, but also, as Sharkey & Sharkey and Turkle said, the fear of 
isolation. Furthermore, what their findings indicate is that, although participants were 
                                                
35 ‘In a ‘media age’, mediatisation is the concept that would ‘acknowledge media as an irreducible 
dimension of all social processes. (…) This, further, refers to communication as part of all social 
processes, to how media shape communication processes’ (Couldry, 2012: 136, 137). 
36 Royakkers & van Est (2016) claim that ‘the modern robot is not usually a self-sufficient system. In 
order to understand the possibilities and impossibilities of the new robotics, it is important to realize that 
the service robot is usually supported by a network of information technologies, as is, for example, the 
Internet. Thus, this implies, in particular, networked robots’ (11). 
37 ‘A total of 15 older adults over the age of 65 (range from 66 to 89 years old) participated in three focus 
group sessions (4 in the first, 5 in the second and 6 in the third). Three participants were male and 12 
were female. Thirteen of them were recruited from the Memory Clinic of the Broca Hospital and two 
were recruited from an association for the elderly’ (Wu et al., 2011: 122). 
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hesitant toward some humanoid robots, they did show very positive attitudes toward 
smaller robots with human traits.  
‘Whether a robot has a high degree of human likeness did not matter for 
them, instead, they seemed to be attracted by the kind of humanoid 
robots which somehow look different from human-beings and which are 
creative’ (124).  
Interestingly, Wu et al. assess their own findings about humanoid appearances to be 
consistent with other studies, such as the one undertaken by Dario et al. (1999) who had 
shown previously that anthropomorphic robots were less socially acceptable when 
compared to machine-like robots. The final prototype was ‘anthropomorphised’, but 
‘also still looked like a machine’ (124).  
I suggest, however, that we should view these results with a certain amount of caution. 
What the elderly exhibited as reluctance could be due to their lack of familiarity with 
robots or new technology in general. This scepticism could disappear through time and 
use. Wu et al. (2011) do not address this angle. However, what they highlight further 
was that the elderly participants had an interest in the robotic capacities beyond their 
aesthetic shape. This group of elderly people was not naive or ignorant in asking about 
the robots’ qualities as machines. 
‘Beyond aesthetics, participants questioned in fact the values underlying 
the design of each type of robot, or in other terms: “what do roboticists 
have in mind when designing this type of robot?’’ Some 
anthropomorphic robots were challenged with this question: ‘‘is it ok to 
copy human beings?’’ For those who do not like the idea, some robots 
are appreciated simply because they do not pretend to look like human-
beings’ (125). 
The fact that social robots are tracking devices does not only raise a naïve interest, but it 
does complicate the discussion on their agency enormously, as I have hinted to various 
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times. It will prove that the association of monitoring to tracking here, and to 
dataveillance in the next chapter, goes beyond what Robot Ethics considers within their 
epistemological explorations of potential ethical issues. The problems on dataveillance 
escape the morality and agenthood framework, since these require a different angle on 
technology and a broader consideration of ethical structures. Bringing up monitoring 
superficially, as happens in Robot Ethics, stems from not fully understanding the 
dimensions of data concerns and tracking. Elderly people being denied more literacy on 
data and computational interaction of robots is, therefore, only a consequence of the 
initial misjudging by Robot Ethics.  
To address these deficits, I move to exploring the inherently ethical dimension in social 
robots by focussing on their ability to collect and process data, which I see as preceding 
monitoring discussions. The reason for doing this lies in the necessity to understand the 
increasing sophistication of tracking systems as ‘advancing biometrics capabilities and 
sensors, and database integrations’ (Lin et al., 2011: 946), which enable better 
monitoring, leading to an intrusion of the private lives of elderly clients or patients. 
To understand monitoring, tracking must be explained as a fundamental characteristic 
of a social robot’s interactivity. I refer to tracking as a multi-layered process that is 
embedded in the robot through algorithmic modules and software, and is part of what 
Read (2014) calls the ‘inner shell’. Most social robots (and other responsive robots) are 
fitted with tracking modules or systems and embedded camera systems that enable them 
to detect, as part of the Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI). The social robot must be 
understood beyond its humanoid shape as a complex of multiple networks and 
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technologies (Royakkers & van Est, 2016: 97-99)38, in which digital tracking modules 
are embedded as algorithmic patterns to process data. In fact, tracking is already data 
and data-processing. Data-processing and data-gathering create the ethical ground for 
this discussion, since, on the one hand, the robot cannot respond without data input and, 
on the other, what happens to this data is not made transparent or controllable.  
Tracking is extremely difficult to perform as a process; what is even harder is its 
synchronisation to locomotion and movement (Brèthes et al., 2004; Rossini, 2012). For 
all of these elements to come together, two things are needed. First, the robot’s tracking 
module requires clear instructions and accurate concepts of what to detect (human, 
gesture, emotion). These are programmed by a human developer into the tracking 
module. Secondly, it relies on the computational capacities of the robot to be highly 
autonomous and to process information in real-time; otherwise, no response or 
interaction with the human subject – no Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI) – is possible. 
The most common input channel is a visual camera system.  
As early as 2002, the research on social robots by Fong et al. (2002) pointed to tracking 
as an important social capacity of social robots. Interestingly, one of the first abilities 
embedded into robots, while still being used in factories, was vision. ‘Robot technology 
progressively masters more and more complex operations. This is made possible by 
improved visibility (via 3D vision systems), better navigation and mobility, better voice 
recognition, and smarter interaction with people’ (Royakkers & van Est, 2016: 3). 
                                                
38 I avoid limiting the exploration to one specific robot, since I offer a wider philosophical reflection on 
social robots as companions and why such view collides with the position of social robots as tracking 
devices. I consider robots like Pepper or NAO to be illustrative for a social robot. 
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What I emphasise is that, by introducing tracking, the question on data collection 
becomes ethically charged and structurally inherent to designing and using robots. This 
must therefore be raised much more vehemently by Robot Ethics than has been done so 
far. As such, it is not sufficient to address privacy intrusion as a potential ethical issue 
only in the case of data infringement or immoral monitoring being proven, since the 
latter is unlikely, considering no roboticist would admit doing this.  
To conclude, positioning the social robot as a companion creates projective and limited 
views on its agency by moralising its appearance (the anthropomorphic concern), but 
viewing it as a monitoring machine is moralising the tracking quality as misused 
function (the anthropocentric concern). Both concerns are ontologically flawed, since 
they require social robots to be as conscious as humans, or to understand morally bad 
decisions so they act as moral agents (in terms of them intentionally harming people) 
(Dodig Crnkovic & Cürüklü, 2012; Coeckelbergh, 2010). On the other hand, the robot 
might not be considered the spying agent itself (again, depending on how much agency 
is projected into it and by whom), but as being a misplaced and misused spying tool 
only by the human agent taking the immoral position instead. This presents the social 
robot as an immorally applied instrument without much agency either. 
Reviewing Robot Ethics literature showed that is it unlikely to identify obvious immoral 
or unethical behaviour in the robot or the developer. But nevertheless, it is concerning 
to place social robots with one use in mind (companionship) that might have several and 
underestimated side effects (data gathering), especially if the effects become a new 
goal. Since, there is no guarantee or clarity on what the data gathered by social robots is 
used for and who decided on this, social robots are affecting people’s privacy and, 
indeed, compromise their privacy.  
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The previous exploration strengthens my initial hypothesis: that Robot Ethics is 
morality-led in its understanding of robotic agency and that this view not only 
anthropomorphises robots, but does not look deep enough into their wider influence or 
consequential use, ethically. As I reflected on the companion (robot as friend and 
pseudo-agent) and the monitoring (robot as monitoring device intruding on privacy but 
not being an agent), their hybrid agency models are not clearly understood in this 
framework. Also, the ethical concerns commence too late as a discussion around misuse 
and harm, instead of supporting a discussion inherently built on the social robot’s 
capacities to interact. Consequently, the ethical dimension of data is worth discussing 
in-depth next. 
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3. On Ethical Issues Around Dataveillance and Social Robots 
Chapter summary: This chapter builds the antithesis to the previous concerns on 
social robots as companions or monitoring devices, and zooms into the robot’s ability to 
track and the wider ethical implication of this process. I avoid evaluating the human 
intention to misuse technology or to intrude upon someone’s privacy. Instead, I focus 
on an early intention; on the very gathering of data in sensitive contexts as an ethical 
concern. I make use of Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS) canons in order to 
illustrate that the ethical discussion in Chapter Two has given us a limited 
understanding on why monitoring is ethically problematic. Instead, I highlight how the 
ethical problems of social robots begin with their ability to gather data and their 
subsequent placement in elderly care, which is not a neutral placement of their human 
creators. I pick up the failure of Robot Ethics to look at the digital tracking ability from 
a data perspective and debate why and how dataveillance as a structure creates a new 
form of thinking about surveillance and monitoring. This discussion is driven data-
related MSS research from Gitelman (2013), Andrejevic (2012), and Ball et al. (2012). 
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For Royakkers & van Est (2016), Lin et al. (2011, 2012), and Sharkey & Sharkey 
(2010), the focus on ethical issues arising from the use of social robots is placed around 
perceiving the social robot as a companion, or on the misuse of the social robot by a 
human agent. These views are anthropomorphic and anthropocentric and do not 
consider the aspects of tracking or data gathering as inherent to the robot’s ability to 
interact. Robot Ethics also does not fully consider that the making and collection of data 
is an inherently non-neutral process and ethically problematic.39  
However, Robot Ethics does address tracking modules as an important function for the 
social robot. It acknowledges that this function is open to misuse because it enables the 
monitoring of people and this could potentially intrude upon their privacy (Royakkers & 
van Est, 2016). What Robot Ethics and HR do not acknowledge is that the ethical issues 
around digital tracking technology are intimately linked to social robots. Stahl & 
Coeckelbergh (2016) draw upon a techno-philosophical angle to identify this as a 
problematic area. They argue that the ethical issues of social robots must be re-thought 
when using what they call ‘healthcare robots’, while also claiming that the ‘a priori’ 
agenda in ethics is crucial (154).  
According to Stahl & Coeckelbergh’s (2016), Robot Ethics is an area that does not 
reach out enough to other fields or actors, such as to health care providers (154), to 
expand its ethical views around robots and care. The discussions that emerge in Robot 
Ethics are therefore, ‘located “in the head” of the philosopher-developer’ (154), not in 
the practical field. In my view, they correctly address the lack of inclusion of other 
                                                
39 The Federal Trade Commission Brokers Report (2014) states that ‘new forms of tracking and 
increasingly powerful analytic capabilities have emerged, such as mobile tracking and analytic services 
that enable tracking of users across devices’ (5). Such are enabled by social media websites and mobile 
applications and have ‘dramatically increased the availability, variety, and volume of consumer data’ (5). 
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shareholders in this debate, but neither do they include the Data Ethics angle from 
Floridi & Taddeo (2016).40 Neither do Stahl & Coeckelbergh address dataveillance as a 
concern. Further, Robot Ethics is not aware that its epistemological framework of 
discussing tracking is limited to the Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI) and movement 
detection, while the HRI framework only provides a partial definition of tracking, one 
that is non-ethical. I consider this a huge deficit and, hence, see my contribution in 
specifically linking between Robot Ethics, HR, social robots, tracking, and MSS.  
As I explore the inherent concerns with data (its gathering and management), I must 
leave (i) Robot Ethics to enter (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS) (Schermer, 
2007; Kroener & Neyland, 2012: 145), and to examine the non-robotic angles of POT 
streams so I can find answers on how to understand data collection holistically. Again, 
tracking in both frameworks is a synchronising process embedded as robots’ capacity 
on making, collecting, and managing data (Ball et al., 2012; Raley, 2013). I introduce 
the shift from intentional and strategic monitoring41 to dataveillance by giving an 
overview on how to understand data ethically. I will support a view on data as 
incorporating intentions already, aligned to Gitelman’s (2013) work. This does not 
mean that the social robot cannot still be used as a device spying purposefully on the 
                                                
40 For Floridi & Taddeo (2016), Data Ethics is an important field emerging from Information Ethics that 
deals with moral and ethical challenges related to the ‘extensive use of increasingly more data— often 
personal, if not sensitive (big data)—and the growing reliance on algorithms to analyse them in order to 
shape choices and to make decisions (including machine learning, artificial intelligence and robotics), as 
well as the gradual reduction of human involvement or even oversight over many automatic processes, 
pose pressing issues of fairness, responsibility and respect of human rights, among others’ (2). The 
association of Robot Ethics to Data Ethics is brought up on a side note and cannot be fully explored in 
this thesis. 
41 The terms monitoring and surveillance are used interchangeably in Robot Ethics, whereby, as I 
mentioned already on monitoring in Chapter One, surveillance as an ethical problem is brought up in the 
context of drones (Royakkers & van Est, 2016: 131 ff.), rather than around social robots. Sharkey & 
Sharkey (2010) claim that: ‘Robotic surveillance devices have already been developed for warfare, for 
policing and for home security (Sharkey 2009) and these could easily be adapted for monitoring the 
elderly’ (32). They mainly refer to monitoring being a problem, less than surveillance. 
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elderly, but it implies that such an intention is not required for the ethical issues to 
emerge.42 I will explain that intention and ethical relations surface when the decision on 
data gathering is made, when modules are programmed, and when the robot is placed 
into the care environment, which are three neglected moments in Robot Ethics.  
According to the media and MSS researcher Galloway, the term data originates from 
the Latin data, which means ‘the things having been given’ (Galloway, 2012: 82). The 
Merriam Webster dictionary has a much more pragmatic definition of data as ‘factual 
information (such as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning, 
discussion, or calculation’.43 The interesting aspect of data, which makes it so hard to 
grasp and imagine, is that it is abstract and produced in a non-image form; even if 
Galloway (2012) argues that it has a ‘phenomenological claim’ (82), it is not yet 
information.  
Gitelman (2013), on the other hand, looks at data slightly differently, in pointing to its 
potential of becoming information. Gitelman’s book “Raw Data” Is an Oxymoron 
(2013) exhibits her criticality immediately through its poignant and self-explicatory title 
appropriating Bowker’s statement: ‘“Raw data” is both an oxymoron and a bad idea’ 
(Gitelman, 2013: 1). As a collection of texts of various authors, the content ranges from 
the history of data to the idea of ‘data friction in the field of astronomy’ (8). Gitelman’s 
collection is not historical, but circles around the problematic dimensions of data and 
                                                
42 The social robot is considered as a tracking device only in the case that its tracking modules are 
actively used for the collection of data. This is differentiated from cases in which the social robot is used 
as a perceived agent, is remote-controlled, and does not gather data, but executes only pre- programmed 
movements. The reflection of Rossini (2012) on the difference between functional and responsive 
modules is helpful and is brought in Chapter Eight. 
43 Available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/data (Accessed 20.03.2018). 
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disciplinary boundaries around data science. Its holistic trajectory points to the illusion 
of data being ‘given’, ‘neutral’, or ‘objective’ (2, 3).  
The contributions collected in her book are equally concerned with the ‘ethics 
surrounding the collection and use of today’s ‘Big Data’ as their ‘particularly pressing 
concern” (11). Particularly consequential is her claim that the ‘phrase raw data – like 
jumbo shrimp – has understandable appeal’ (3), but is simply incorrect. It makes us 
believe that ‘data are transparent, that information is self-evident, the fundamental stuff 
of truth itself’ (3). She warns that our lack of criticality allows us to ignore the fact that 
data is always ‘“collected,” “entered,” “compiled,” “stored,” “processed,” “mined,” and 
“interpreted”’, hence, at ‘a certain level the collection and management of data may be 
said to presuppose interpretation’ (3).  
Gitelman’s biggest issue with scientific and engineering explorations is that they 
confound simplistic dichotomies like theory/practice and science/society in a rich, 
diverse body of work that, among other things, has explored the situated, material 
conditions of knowledge production. Looking at the ways scientific knowledge is 
‘produced – rather than innocently “discovered,” for instance – resembles our project of 
looking into data or, better, looking under data to consider their root assumptions’ (4). 
Her critique is not that the search for objectivity is a ‘bad’ (4) thing, although that is not 
possible, considering the epistemological frameworks through which data is managed. 
Therefore, the obsession for objectivity is an 
‘abnegation, neutrality, or irrelevance of the observing self, [and it] turns 
out to be of relatively recent vintage. Joanna Picciotto has recently 
suggested that “the question raised by objectivity is how innocence, 
traditionally understood to be a state of ignorance, ever came to be 
associated with epistemological privilege”’ (4). 
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However, the idea of the ‘innocent observer’ (4) that endorses the assumption similar to 
the existence of mechanical objectivity, led to objectivity emerging ‘as a dominant ideal 
in the sciences only in the middle of the nineteenth century’ (5), and was closely tied to 
the development of photography during those same years. According to Gitelman, the 
problem with the assumption that photography was essentially objective is that: 
‘[T]he presumptive objectivity of the photographic image, like the 
presumptive rawness of data, seems necessary somehow— resilient in 
common parlance, utile in common sense—but it is not sufficient to the 
epistemic conditions that attend the uses and potential uses of 
photography’ (5). 
The history of objectivity is, for her, not fully understood without the history of 
subjectivity and the creation ‘of the self’, which is often neglected as a central driver in 
thinking data. ‘Data require our participation. Data need us. Yet for the suggestive 
parallels, the history of objectivity is not the history of data’ (5). While this way of 
thinking is common for researchers like Gitelman and other authors in MSS, this aspect 
also has implications for research on machine morality and POT research. The idea of 
the engineer influencing and shaping the computer code with his or her values will be 
discussed through Wallach & Allen’s work (2009) in Chapter Seven, even if their focus 
will moralise technology problematically. 
Following Gitelman’s arguments further, I consider another important aspect worth 
highlighting, which is that ‘data are aggregative’ (5) and ‘plural’ (8). These aspects are 
interesting, but most importantly, they allow me to question the search for a single 
moral agenthood in social robots, which occupied Robot Ethics and the companion 
position. The shift from a single agenthood to plural agencies, as Floridi and Brey 
suggest in Chapter Seven, might not be directly linked to Gitelman or to MSS, but it 
undergoes a similar thought process on the plurality and complexity of data and 
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algorithms. Therefore, this early realisation on data as a plural concept is helpful in 
order to build further concepts around data as distributed agencies. The plurality of data 
is argued by Gitelman as an interesting rhetorical conflation of data between being a 
singular phenomenon and plural phenomena. According to Gitelman, data piles up and 
is accumulated into data sets; this aggregation, leading, in its extreme cases, to 
dataveillance, follows the principle: ‘more is better, isn’t it?’ (8). But what this suggests 
is in fact a structural shift, not just a growth of the quantity of data. Therefore, the 
blurriness of data as singular or as plural must be clarified, since the plural is not simply 
the addition of singular data. She declares that: 
‘[S]entences that include the phrase “data is . . .” are now roughly four 
times as common (on the web, at least, and according to Google) as 
those including “data are . . .” despite countless grammarians out there 
who will insist that data is a plural. [...] Data’s odd suspension between 
the singular and the plural reminds us of what aggregation means’ (8). 
Gitelman then also amplifies: 
‘The singular datum is not the particular in relation to any universal (the 
elected individual in representative democracy, for example) and the 
plural data is not universal, not generalizable from the singular; it is an 
aggregation. The power within aggregation is relational, based on 
potential connections: network, not hierarchy’ (8). 
This realisation that data are intentional and plural suggests that any technology 
operating with digital data does not allow to be understood as a single or stable agent, 
but should be seen beyond any singular agenthood; even if the humanoid body of the 
social robot encourages this anthropomorphic fallacy, it would be an incorrect analogy. 
Reflecting on data as I suggested here transforms the social robot into a relational 
network of data input and output, and this complicates the discussions in Chapter Two 
immensely. I do not only offer a different perspective through the data angle, but a 
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holistic one, while not suggesting to underestimate the perception of robots. I rather 
urge not to build their ethical agency upon their appearance exclusively.  
I argue that the aggregation process of data adds a new ethical dimension to the existing 
discussions on monitoring in Chapter Two.44 If ethical structures are understood as 
relational and reflective engagement and dynamic, as Ward (2015) stated, then the first 
ethical links between the social robot and the human subject already emerge prior to the 
application of tracking, at the stage when robots are designed with embedded human 
concepts and values making use of the algorithmic autonomy. 
Next, I would like to continue with the shift from a strategic misuse of technology to the 
redefinition of surveillance to dataveillance. This is an important step in understanding 
the ethical issues that digital technologies have introduced, which are very complex to 
oversee fully. In the Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (2012), Ball et al. 
offer an interdisciplinary collection of contemporary discussions on how surveillance – 
as a concept but also structure – moves towards the employment of already existing and 
omnipresent information structures, which allows the gathering of vast amounts of data 
that can be used in various ways after being collected.  
This shift has hugely transformed social structures, since it replaces the old-fashioned 
and anthropocentric fear of a ‘Big Brother’, or an invisible governmental agency as the 
                                                
44 The ethics relationship between humans and technology is, in this thesis, viewed as an entanglement of 
human concepts and technological capacities leading to ‘ethical complexities’ (Braidotti, 2006: 16). This 
also aligns with Luhmann’s view on ethics as a ‘reflective theory of morality’ (Luhmann, 1989: 360) that 
‘does not intend to provide guidelines for a practical morality’ (112). From their perspective, the 
moralisation of technology would be an insufficient angle to understand why data issues are ethically 
problematic. 
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spying agent.45 The new form of spying has now become a by-product of simply 
applying a digital and data gathering technology in new contexts, such as elderly care. 
Ball et al. (2012) emphasise this shift within surveillance structures as one, from a 
‘strategic surveillance’ to a distributed, non-strategic information structure (Ball et al., 
2012: xxv). What their publication stresses as well is that the moral intention in using or 
misusing technology is embedded in the making of digital technologies at their very 
inception, and not just in their actual use.  
This approach points to another factor worth bringing up: the difference between data 
and Big Data. Even if data has already proved to be ethically loaded with intentions, 
dataveillance is understood as the application of sophisticated digital techniques and 
technologies, which are used for the manipulation and processing of huge data 
aggregators (Püschel, 2014, 3; Andrejevic & Burden, 2014). Clarke (1988), who formed 
the term dataveillance in 1988, defined it as a ‘systematic use of personal data systems 
in the monitoring or investigation of the actions or communications of one or more 
persons’ (499). The fact that dataveillance derives from structures already in place 
(simultaneously expanded) transforms dataveillance to being an ‘algorithmic 
surveillance’ (Introna & Wood, 2014) because of its structural entanglement with the 
algorithmic and computational level from which it feeds.  
Raley (2013) is particularly interested in the implications of dataveillance that go 
beyond any intentions to actively survey. In Dataveillance and Countervailance (2013), 
she gives an insight into the increasing attention paid to how we, as human users or 
                                                
45 I have also considered similar tendencies in texts such as Elmer’s Panopticon—Discipline—Control 
(2012), in which he provides a valuable discussion on how to understand the surveying agent position. He 
does this by reflecting on Foucault’s and Bentham’s concepts of the ‘panopticon’ and opposes their work 
to Deleuze’s, which ’has tended to lend more weight to networked and immanent forms of surveillance’ 
(Elmer, 2012: 22). 
 95 
developers, are not only collecting data, but have become the ‘resource for data 
collection that vampirically feeds off of our identities’ (10). This destabilising process 
not only creates ethical issues, because of data gathering becoming inherently linked to 
how we establish and communicate our identities, but also questions the position of 
human agenthood as a stable one. This process is captured by Ravetto-Biagioli as the 
‘digital uncanny’ (2016: 3), which, for her, is a moment of uncanniness that humans 
experience when using (interactive) digital technologies.46 This process is uncanny 
because it reinforces an uncertainty and destabilisation of the human agent when 
encountering the autonomy and agencies of digital technologies (which she discusses 
through the work of artists such as Lozanno-Hemmer and Viola).  
She argues that digital technologies have completely destabilised the human position as 
an autonomous, independent agent, and that this can be experienced through the 
interactive processes like visual tracking. For her, these new (digital) forms of 
‘uncertainties’ (2) have shifted debates about where embodiment takes place and have 
blurred the line between human and technological agency. 
Dataveillance is similarly uncanny, since it detaches human agents from being able to 
control their data ownership or privacy, by transforming agent subjectivity into the new 
data sets. Compared to how the social robot is viewed in Robot Ethics, dataveillance is 
not seen as a single or separate technology or entity, but as an abstract, informational 
and processing structures as Kusnetzky (2010) points out. Instead to dataveillance, he 
                                                
46 Ravetto-Biagioli’s The digital uncanny and the ghost effects (2016) was an essential source for my  
understanding of the computational destabilisation that tracking might lead to. It also introduced a link 
between digital technology and uncanny humanoid robots, but does not relate these. Ravetto-Biagioli 
points to the history of uncanny automata herself, but does not examine how digital robots might be 
digitally uncanny as well. A publication and a seminar presentation emerged from this research 
(Stamboliev, 2018) in cooperation with Abigail Jackson and can be found in the Appendix. 
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refers to Big Data as ‘a bundle of new methods and technologies for the collection, 
storage and analysis of vast and randomly expandable amounts of data in volume and of 
different structures’ (Kusnetzky, as quoted in Horvath 2013: 1).47 Dataveillance or Big 
Data structures imply further processes as intentional surveillance shifts towards a 
systematic dataveillance as part of the information structure. Firstly, these indicate the 
overlap of intention, structure, and contexts in the use of technology. Secondly, they 
demand an expansion of information structures. And, thirdly, they enable an endless 
appropriation potential of data after its collection.  
The potential of dataveillance will increase, in my view, because of the infiltration of 
digital technologies into more newly discovered environments. Schermer (2007) states 
that ‘surveillance practice will become more efficient, more user friendly, and more 
complete through the use of agent technology’ (133). He further mentions that this is 
supported by ‘the rapid expansion of surveillance as a result of the use of information 
and communication technologies’ (133).  
This expansion is also mentioned by Floridi (2014) and explored by Van den Hoven 
(2010) as leading to more ethical consequences due to the increasing applications of 
ICT technology (60-62) in society.48 What they argue is that the omnipresence paired 
with the capacities of digital technologies will change the effectiveness, scale, and 
                                                
47 The original German quote is: ‘ein Bündel neu entwickelter Methoden und Technologien, die 
Erfassung, Speicherung und Analyse eines großen und beliebig erweiterbaren Volumens unterschiedlich 
strukturierter Daten’ (Horvath 2013: 1). 
48 Van den Hoven (2010) says for ICT that these are the ‘expression of prior choices, norms, values, and 
decisions ICT applications are not neutral, but contain the values and norms of those who have designed 
and engineered them’ (6). He further highlights that: ‘An abundance of research provides evidence of 
intentional or inadvertent incorporation of norms in software (…) Finally, ICTs revolve around new 
entities, such as digital computers, software and information goods, which give rise to new practices and 
experiences. This makes it sometimes difficult to account for them in terms of traditional moral and legal 
views’ (7). 
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characteristics of surveillance, which then shifts in both quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions respectively (Schermer, 2007: 133).  
Andrejevic (2012) refers to the dangers of digital technology as grounded on the 
ubiquity of information technology and locates the ethical problems in the ‘ubiquitous’ 
(90) structure of technology, by default becoming an ‘ubiquitous surveillance’ (90).
‘Broadly construed, then, the notion of ubiquitous surveillance refers to 
the prospect of a world in which it becomes increasingly difficult to 
escape the proliferating technologies for data collection, storage, and 
sorting—the fact that, as David Lyon puts it, “our whole way of life in 
the contemporary world is suffused with surveillance”’ (Andrejevic, 
2012: 90). 
This is enabled through the pervasion of communication technologies and the 
broadening of spatial infiltrations. What this means is that more and more environments 
are regulated by technologies under the umbrella of ‘networked interactivity’ (90), 
which allows these technologies to ‘recognize’ (90) human movements and actions 
more broadly, allowing for the technologies to ‘recognize us wherever we go, 
responding to our presence in ways that incorporate information about our histories, 
desires, needs, and wants’ (91). Andrejevic refers to cities and public environments 
rather than elderly care or social robots, but he illustrates how our daily lives are 
increasingly infiltrated and mapped through tracking (or sensor) technologies, which 
might at first create spaces of ‘convenience, assistance, and efficiency, but they are also 
spaces equipped with an unprecedented potential for repression’ (91). 
There is evidently a danger that elderly care might become another environment into 
which technology is embedded as an information structure, by expanding the contexts to 
collect data for commercial or surveillance purposes. Such infiltration of spaces and 
environments in which technologies permanently gather data as a form of ubiquitous 
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surveillance also relates to what Gitelman (2013) considers to be embedded in the 
plurality of data. The omnipresence of new technologies as a way to extend and mask 
surveillance is not a new development; two decades ago, it was Manovich (1996) who 
compared the operationality of the newly emerging internet with communist 
surveillance networks.  
Laney (2001) also picks up the aspect of ubiquity of digital technologies, in presenting 
the concept of the ‘three V’s’ of Big Data. He sums up what aspects must come together 
for dataveillance, or what he calls Big Data, to emerge and to be more than the sum of 
its parts or the simple accumulation of data. The first V, referring to Volume, means that 
the amounts of data collected are vast due to the variety of sources (all kinds of sensory 
inputs, including tracking sensory systems) and the variety of technologies. The 
increased volume of new data being gathered is linked to the omnipresence of 
technologies enabling it. Andrejevic (2012) refers to this process as data mining (as 
does Schermer, 2007), which emphasises the new possibility to systematically gather 
vast amounts of data by default. Andrejevic writes that: 
‘[I]f the imperative of data mining is to continue to gather more data 
about everything, its promise is to put this data to work, not necessarily 
to make sense of it. Indeed, the goal of both data mining and predictive 
analytics is to generate useful patterns that are far beyond the ability of 
the human mind to detect or even explain’ (74). 
The second V refers to Velocity, and the possibilities of real-time data streams and the 
increased processing speed in the gathering and collecting of data in real-time. This also 
links to the first V – Volume – by default, since this aspect enables the gathering of 
more data volume from more sources due to better processing. This proves specifically 
important for tracking modules, as I show in Chapter Seven.  
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The third V refers to Variability (and is aligned with Complexity later). Both variability 
and complexity refer to an additional and crucial difference to former strategic 
surveillance, since the variety of unstructured data collections is encouraged; the 
decision of what to make use of can be made afterwards. This aspect relates to the 
previous two Vs, but highlights the new possibilities in coordinating and structuring 
data input posteriori to its collection. Instead of surveying for a closed or restricted area 
for information, the useful or valuable information is drawn from a vast amount of data 
already collected and clustered according to the information needed. The informational 
level can be decided on the grounds of the patterns that are desired, since the amounts of 
data gathered (sometimes referred to as a full take approach) allow for endless data 
patterns to be created.  
For Kroener & Neyland (2012), this points to the struggle to retain the integrity of the 
obtained information, or ‘footage’ (145) (they discuss the context of CCTV cameras), 
since such footage, once owned, can be utilised and mobilised in multiple ways after its 
collection: 
‘In the latter case, this raises questions of who or what narrates 
surveillance camera images on behalf of whom or what, in what 
situations, and toward what kinds of consequences’ (145). 
What I conclude from this ethical exploration is that the use of data reaches far beyond 
the intention of the human agent collecting it (or how the social robot is perceived as), 
but goes back to the designing of the modules and systems that gather the data, and 
attached to a future re-use after being collected. This new perspective might be the 
strongest counterargument I offer to re-address the issues in Chapter One, in which the 
good or bad intentions of using social robots as potential monitoring devices was 
debated. I see the undertaken reflection as an ethical antithesis to Chapter One and as an 
 100 
essential critique of Robot Ethics, a field that operates while lacking these insights on 
data-related concerns. I further argue that social robots must be taken seriously as 
potential new information structures, even as dataveillance. Robot ethicists, in general, 
must highlight that the collection of health data (Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017) from 
sensitive environments is specifically protection-worthy, since this might be 
increasingly commodified, as I have mentioned various times.  
What I brought forward by aligning the MSS39 discussions on data to Robot Ethics was 
that not only must the human intention prior to the misuse of a technology be factored 
into ethical questions and frameworks, but that multiple intentions are already 
manifested in the data inherently; data is ethical from the very beginning on deciding to 
collect it. As Gitelman (2013) pointed out, data is defined with the intention to be 
gathered by a technology and the concepts that allows its gathering. Therefore, data 
does not gather or collect itself objectively, neutrally, nor accidently.  
Again, the very intention to collect data (and to standardise its collection) is embedded 
beforehand into the intention and establishment of what kind of data to collect and in 
what environments, and such data can be appropriated after it is collected. Therefore, 
data can be collected for one reason, and then be used for another, just as the quality and 
outcome of derived results can vary according to the context and pattern made from the 
data (Püschel, 2014: 3). Püschel, Andrejevic, and Laney point to the potential re-
appropriation of data for various purposes after it is collected, and this thesis suggests 
that this use is not limited to the discussion on tracking in the HRI and to gesture or  
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emotion recognition only49, since there is no guarantee that this will be the only use for 
this data.50  
What has emerged, by questioning intentional and strategic monitoring or surveying, is 
that the option to survey is embedded in the very structures of contemporary digital 
technologies. Hence, this allows us to situate the ethical problems early in the exposure 
or placing of technology. It has not become clear to me how to draw the line between 
the gathering of data for specific scientific or commercial purposes and the possibility 
that this very gathering might become ethically problematic dataveillance. An 
awareness of the possibility for increasing the data sets – in amount and appropriation – 
is missing as much from Robotics as from the Robot Ethics discussion.  
Even if Robot Ethics increasingly addresses the intrusion of privacy, data infringement 
problems, or the requirement of the robot to collect and process data, the possibility of 
increased data sets remains unaddressed. The lack to consider this new complexity only 
exhibits a lack in understanding of data in Robot Ethics and the inability to distinguish 
between capacities and projections of robots ethically. Considering obtained data gains 
in commercial value and sensitivity, due to it being gathered in private, yet commercial, 
health environments (Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017), these potential problems must be 
taken serious in Robot Ethics. Health care data is, therefore, not only specifically 
sensitive and protection-worthy, but the collecting of data as a process should be 
something the elderly patient consents to explicitly, since it is just as much an ethical 
                                                
49 The question on the longevity and on the materiality of data should be excluded at this point. It is also 
acknowledged that tracking or robotic interactions are still very complicated practical processes, which 
could lead to argument from HR that there is no need to worry about data collection, since, often, robots 
are not interactive. 
50 I cannot provide additional insights into Data Ethics at this stage (a research area that also moralises 
technology), but my exploration on data echoes in Floridi & Taddeo’s (2016) critique on the 
disconnection between Robot Ethics and Data Ethics.  
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concern51. Robot Ethics does not take any of these options into account: that monitoring 
can be problematical beyond a privacy intrusion, and that the developer’s intention to 
use data reaches beyond the context of application or intention.  
Data concerns are already troubling social robots and companies. The social robot 
Pepper (a popular and assisting research robot) already faces system breaches and was 
labelled as an ‘insecure’ and easy-to-hack technology.52 Additionally, companies in 
general – such as with the Facebook scandal53 – have lost in credibility recently. 
Therefore, data concerns are not to be taken lightly; neither is a shifting business model 
that might suddenly have much use of data being available. Just a few years ago, 
Facebook would have not admitted that their business model is to not only connect 
friends and families, but could be, in fact, to collect and commercialise the data on their 
users.  
Ultimately, Andrejevic is also correct when pleading in his talk, Towards a Program of 
Algorithmic Accountability (2017), that developers and programmers deliberate on how 
algorithms are made and to what extent these are used. The Facebook case appeared to 
be publically singling out one person as accountable – the CEO, Zuckerberg – yet many 
more are involved. However, it showed that there is an expectation that human agents 
must be held accountable or blamed if technology goes wrong.  
                                                
51 I assume that even the caretakers and human professionals have no idea what the use of robots implies 
when it comes to data infringement or losing control over this collected data. In the worst case, the 
roboticists might be naïve on that matter of what the consequences could be. 
52 This article exposes the already existing data and accessibility issues with Pepper, the social robot. 
Available at: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/05/29/softbank_pepper_robot_multiple_basic_security_flaws/ 
(Accessed 22.01.2019). 
53 More details to Facebook data scandal are available on http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
43649018 (Accessed 22.04.2018) and on https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-
analytica-facebook-influence-us-election (Accessed 23.05.2018). 
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As the structures of technology are becoming increasingly dominant in forming our 
information environments, these have also become ‘opaque and unaccountable’ for 
human agents to fully control - yet, who else is going to do that? Andrejevic advocates 
that ‘we’, the developer/user/university/researcher/journalists, need to create systems 
which are transparent and allow for more accountability and control. The human agent 
cannot leave these developments out of sight and unresolved, as they are the only one 
paying the price. It is important to urge for a multidisciplinary discussion on the status 
of the social robot as a digital device with an ability to collect data. To ask ‘why do we 
implement social robots in elderly care and who profits from this?’ would be a good 
starting point in making this ethical discussion more critical and of more practical use 
than current attempts show, which merely moralise the social robot as a perceived 
human-like agent or a neutral and harmless device.  
What I do not suggest is to have more prolific discussions on robots as potentially bad 
agents or spying machines without agency, since these debates are flawed on some 
levels. Instead, I urge for discussions on how the use of social robots is already an 
ethical process that implies its ethical problems stem from the implementation of 
technology. Robot Ethics must have a wider data debate as soon and as critically as 
possible. Even though there are already discussions on this topic, these debate data 
collection as a neutral process and the ownership of data as a fully controllable decision.  
In addition, I encourage MSS to pay much more attention to social robots as well. 
Momentarily, it seems to me that Robot Ethics is in a trap, since, not fully independent 
of HR, their discussion might reflect badly on robots as products and make them 
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unpopular. This is specifically counterproductive to debating new ethics for health care 
contexts in which more robots will be applied if the statistics are correct.54  
At the same time, there are already critical debates, even if the field divided robots into 
superficial categories when discussing their capacities. Another element, however, is 
that most patient information is being digitalised these days, so, potentially, if the area 
would be more open on this topic, this could potentially increase the trust from the 
patients or clients towards robots and the industry. For now, excluding the social 
aspects of robots from dataveillance debates suggests a negligence and 
misunderstanding of their ability to collect data and hints to a short-sighted view on 
digital technologies. In general, I urge for less naivety and much more commercial 
foresight in scientific and robotic theory, considering robots are commercial products, 
and, yet, the privacy of a vulnerable group like the elderly must be priceless. 
 
  
                                                
54 More on the UK Government declaration on the use of social robots in care can be found at 
https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/offices/bicameral/post/work-programme/social-
sciences/robotics-in-social-care/. (Accessed 12.01.2019) 
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II. FROM MORAL AGENTHOOD IN ROBOTS TO 
MORAL AGENCIES IN ALGORITHMS 
 
Part Two summary: Next, I discuss and reflect upon different philosophical positions 
of moral agency and agenthood in social robots, as discussed in (iii) Machine and 
Computer Ethics and supported by Humanoid Robotics (HR) and other insights from 
Philosophy of Technology (POT).  
After having contextualised the companion position in HR and the importance of 
anthropomorphism in this context, I shift to a discussion on computational architecture 
of robots and the process of tracking, to lay out how to think about such ethically. I then 
move to morality research in POT to address the ethical questions of computational 
agencies and their increasing inability to grasp questions on moral accountability. Part 
Two explores the adaptation of morality into technology – from apparent moral agency, 
to moral agenthood, moral agencies, moral rules, and moral factors – and the influence 
of computational autonomy in this process.  
I work through three limitations in morality streams and contemporary ethical debates 
in POT, which I label as; (1) Moral Appearance and Agenthood; (2) Reductionist 
Morality; and (3) Distributed Morality. The conclusion I draw from these three angles is 
that agenthood, accountability, and morality become conflated discourses that 
increasingly remove questions and concerns around moral accountability from applied 
ethics.  
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4. On Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Accountability  
Chapter summary: In Chapter Four, I continue the discussion from Chapter One, on 
how to debate moral agenthood in technology. What I illustrated in Chapters Two and 
Three was that the moral and ethical concerns around social robots in elderly care align 
to different agency models; either viewing them as companions or as tracking devices. 
Next, I revisit the theoretical discussions in POT on agenthood, morality, and 
technology (prefaced by a media-theoretical and Posthumanist angle) to examine the 
relationship between human agenthood, artefactual agency, and human moral agency 
from a techno-philosophical point of view. I make use of Johnson & Noorman’s (2014) 
work to guide this exploration, allowing me to comprehend how agency and morality 
are negotiated within the making and use of artefacts and why accountability is only 
assigned to human agents.  
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Before beginning this chapter, I would like to reflect on Chapter One’s discussions and 
suggest continuing with a slightly different discussion on how agenthood is established 
around the concepts of morality, accountability, and technology, given that the social 
robot has been scrutinised in Chapters Two and Three as companion, pseudo-agent or 
monitoring tool, and as a data-collecting device.  
Chapter One introduced the idea that moral and ethical questions can differ from each 
other, but that this is not necessarily the case in the majority of POT literature. While I 
suggest distinguishing between these to: 
1. Highlight how moral concerns anthropomorphise robots superficially and expect 
them to own capacities or to embed moral reasoning or intentions. This is not a 
critique on the anthropomorphising of robots in general, as I will discuss later in 
Chapter Six, but one on drawing ethical standards from this projection.  
2. Offer a greater width on agency networks in robots and their linkage to 
problematic and unaddressed blind spots, such as data collection.  
Next, I want to return to a wider theoretical context in thinking moral agency, 
independent of elderly care, allowing me to explore how morality transforms in POT – 
from thinking moral agenthood to moral actions, moral decisions, moral norms, moral 
outcomes, and moral agencies. In most philosophical traditions (moral philosophy and 
POT equally, but not in Posthumanism), the only agents who can be moral are humans.  
In the present context, where social robots are used in professional care, I question what 
and who is a responsible agent, and if it is possible to hold a non-human agent 
accountable for its actions. I argue that it is difficult to infer human-like morality from a 
humanoid body and its actions, and, further, that agenthood becomes increasingly hard 
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to locate due to the technological complexity of robots. Hence, a dilemma emerges: 
between the social robot not being human, but being anthropomorphised into one, while 
the robot owns a huge degree of technological agency and autonomy, which is 
overlooked.  
Arguing that there is a discrepancy between these two agencies is one of the most 
complex parts of this thesis, since it is this friction of not mistaking the robot as a 
human-like agent because of its shape, but instead taking it serious enough as 
technological agency network, that is my focus. This requires a complete rethinking of 
ethics in robotics, in my view, which might make the humanoid shape of robots less 
relevant in ethical terms. 
Agenthood (used as a singular, stable moment of allocated action in a human entity) is 
the most important factor when locating agent accountability and can be understood as a 
relationship between an accountable person and other people, linking performed actions 
to the accountable agent who is performing them. Noorman (2018) writes in the 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy section on Computing and Moral Responsibility:
‘Moral responsibility is about human action and its intentions and 
consequences (Fisher 1999, Eshleman 2016). Generally speaking a 
person or a group of people is morally responsible when their voluntary 
actions have morally significant outcomes that would make it 
appropriate to blame or praise them. (…) The person or group that 
performs the action and causes something to happen is often referred to 
as the agent’ (Noorman, 2018). 
But who or what is ‘often referred to as the agent’? And why is ‘agent’ written in 
italics? Does this mean that the agent is unknown? That it is still a person or that it is 
not a stable position any longer? These questions become even harder to discuss, 
considering there is a huge difference between perceiving the social robot as an 
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anthropomorphised agent, an autonomous computational agent, an instrument, or an 
ethical dispositif. 
I only touch upon two contradictory views on understanding agency of technology, 
which allow to rethink the morality-led discussions around anthropomorphic 
projection.55 One way would be from a media-theoretical angle, which aligns with the 
Posthumanist view (Pias, 2011; Zielinski, 2013; Parikka, 2015).56 The second 
perspective looks at technology as a neutral tool and instrument that, through human 
intention and implementation of values, can become an extension for human values and 
morality (Wallach & Allen, 2009). This second way of understanding the agency in 
technology is prominent in Robot Ethics and Machine Ethics. While I disapprove of this 
in general, I acknowledge its practical advantages. If the social robot is understood as a 
media technology, then the instrumental view would not hold up, since technology 
would not be understood as neutral in this context.  
The (material) media view would not allow for any moral accountability within 
technology, since this question would not even arise in this context. This does not imply 
                                                
55 ‘We have to understand technologies are always involved in a range of what we might term social, 
political, and technical relations which contribute to any experience of that technology. It is only through 
an understanding of these relations that we can generate a detailed sense of the nature of a technology, its 
history and so on’ (Kroner & Neyland, 2012: 148). 
56 When referring to a media theoretical view, this thesis follows Pias’ (2011) view on what he considers 
the discipline of Media Studies. Pias calls the field less a discipline but rather ‘a scholarly interrogation. It 
is concerned with the question as to how symbols, instruments, institutions and practices contribute to the 
constitution, circulation, processing and storage of knowledge. In this sense it investigates the media-
historical conditions pertaining to knowledge and cognition and therefore is more a kind of historical 
epistemology. This interrogative approach may not only be found in various academic disciplines; in the 
sense of »media theory« (Medientheorie) it is already to be found in almost every imaginable field of 
knowledge’ (2011: 1). 
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that the media-theoretical angle understands digital technology as inherently amoral, but 
media technology is understood as a practice that negotiates moral discourses.57 This 
angle does not deny that robots or other artefacts involve a delegated human work force, 
or are functional to some extent, but it would not support a causal or an instrumental 
neutrality of technology.58 Media-theoretical scholars are interested in ‘locating the 
materiality of cultural techniques in technological arrangement’ (Parikka, 2015) within 
technological artefacts and practices. According to this perspective, technological and 
human agencies are intertwined in one ethical structure, but this view is not represented 
in HR/Robot Ethics.59 
There is another way to contextualise technological agenthood, which comes from a 
Posthumanist acknowledgment of anthropomorphism, which is surprising, considering 
that Posthumanist ethics is against anthropomorphic and moral views in general. 
Braidotti (2014) identifies the importance of anthropomorphism in relation to concerns 
                                                
57 The thesis does not look at moral codes of human conduct, or journalistic practices as ethical 
exploration of media. In discussions, as Couldry et al. (2013) offer on the ethics in media, they do not 
take the inherent qualities of technology as already ethical into account. Hence, the human agent is the 
only morally responsible one in these media discussions. 
58 A different angle on ethics and new technologies comes from a different camp in Media Studies. Ethics 
of Media (Couldry et al., 2013), for instance, does not discuss media technologies as ethical structures, 
neither as moral ones, but focusses on their use by an ethical human agent. Hence, even Media Ethics, to 
broaden of the ethical view towards an ethical view on algorithms, would be very beneficial. Another 
publication worth mentioning in this context is Drushel & German’s (2011) The Ethics of Emerging 
Media, in which they discuss ethical challenges for the conduct of journalists online, or in social media 
practices and the effects online providers have on privacy issues. 
59 This media view on the material and ethical entanglements is not represented in Media Ethics, but 
partially found in Digital Ethics, in which the complexity of technology is acknowledged, but either 
robots are not addressed or the technology is not understood as inherently ethical (Couldry et al., 2013; 
Davisson & Booth, 2016). 
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around anthropocentrism in a discussion she undertakes with the media researcher 
Timotheus Vermeulen by saying: 
‘I agree with the distinction Katherine Hayles makes between 
anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism. You can be a post-humanist 
and post-anthropocentric thinker. In fact, in advanced capitalism, in 
which the human species is but one of the marketable species, we are all 
already post-anthropocentric. But I don’t think we can leap out of our 
anthropomorphism by will. We can’t. We always imagine from our own 
bodies – and why should we, considering that we still live on a planet 
populated by humanoids who think of themselves as humans, in different 
ways, with different points of reference? Our very embodiment is a limit, 
as well as a threshold; our flesh is framed by the morphology of the 
human body, it is also always already sexed and hence differentiated’ 
(Braidotti, 2014). 
Braidotti elaborates on how we (humans) understand agenthood as an anthropomorphic 
and anthropocentric reference point from which we look at the world (11). According to 
her, we cannot escape anthropomorphism fully. Chapter Six of this thesis will expand 
upon this point by tracing the exploitation of anthropomorphism back to HR and the 
research on social robots.  
Both anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism are essential and returning conflicts in 
my investigation, since these two projective processes represent the major issues I see in 
how social robots and robots are understood. Social robots are positioned by Robot 
Ethics either as anthropomorphised pseudo-agents, as robots with neutral tracking 
modules that could potentially develop the intention to spy, or as agency-less tools 
misused immorally for surveillance. I think this points to the conflict that social robots 
are exposing in their ethical field; that the moral standpoint is based on the projected 
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and perceived human-like qualities, while computational qualities of robots are 
underestimated to the extent that they are seen as ethically neutral and instrumental. 
However, Braidotti (2014) picks up the concern of anthropomorphism in a surprising 
way. She urges us to pay attention to the limitations of both angles – anthropomorphism 
and anthropocentrism – but she legitimates the anthropomorphic angle as a biological 
reflex, while she sees the anthropocentric intentions of POT ethics as concerning. While 
Chapter One already sketched out how Braidotti (2006), in fact, sees morality as being 
limiting for any ethical exploration (15), she does not ignore the human tendency to 
anthropomorphise. This indirectly supports my two-fold critical focus thesis; to explore 
why and how anthropomorphism is exploited and reflected in Robot Ethics, and to also 
question the anthropocentric moralisation of robots and algorithms (explored in Chapter 
Seven fully). However, in the wider questions related to accountability and agency, the 
Posthumanist or ethical media debates are not concerned with asking questions about 
human or agent accountability within technology.60 
In the ICT discourses on morality and technology, the agenthood focus on technology, 
paired with questions on moral agency, is still very much relevant (Kroes & Verbeek, 
2014). Here, discussions differ on how much the view of moral agency, computational 
agency, and computational autonomy are conflated. One concept that is suitable for my 
exploration is Johnson & Noorman’s (2014) overview of artefactual agency that, for 
                                                
60 The concerns with accountability are important for Posthumanist thoughts, but not in applied and 
practical questions on when does a robot behave badly or intend to harm someone. 
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them, is still clearly detached from a human moral agency and accountability. In their 
framework, a robot could be seen as either an artefact or an instrument.  
I consider both angles as insufficient to understand robot technology, but worth picking 
up to make use of certain valuable insights, even only as a reference point to reflect 
upon. For instance, I deny the instrumental view of technology (in general) as a 
theoretically holistic way to understand technology, since I reason (as supported by 
media theorists and Posthumanists) that a deterministic and instrumental view on 
technology does not consider the growing autonomy and complex agencies 
intertwining. However, as I have already highlighted many times when mentioning what 
a single moral agenthood allows for, thinking of technology as a tool offers the same 
huge advantage; it makes the allocation of accountability much easier. Gunkel (2016) 
writes that: 
‘[T]he instrumental theory of technology not only sounds reasonable, but 
also is obviously useful. It is, one might say, instrumental for figuring 
out questions of moral conduct and social responsibility in the age of 
increasingly complex technological systems. And it has a distinct 
advantage in that it locates accountability in a widely accepted and 
seemingly intuitive subject position: in human decision-making and 
action’ (238). 
The instrumental view cannot hold up to the increasing complexity of digital structures, 
since it has ‘significant theoretical and practical limitations, especially as it applies (or 
not) to recent technological innovations’ (237). It might be interesting to pick up what 
Clifford Christians states about the instrumentalist view of technology as being linked 
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to how descriptive ethics are understood in industrial countries. According to Christians 
(2011): 
‘[T]he focus here is on instrumentalism as the major challenge for doing 
descriptive ethics in technologically sophisticated countries. The 
prevailing worldview in industrial societies is instrumentalism – the 
view that technology is neutral and does not condition our thinking and 
social organization’ (16). 
Supporting an instrument view on technology would offer a simple answer on 
accountability in the debate. This would allow us to quickly resolve the accountability 
dilemma related to social robots as tracking devices. But, in order to do this, it would 
also require us to reduce the complexity of social robots to neutral tools without much 
computational agency, and to deny their companion position equally, since, as neutral 
tools, these cannot be mistaken for humanoid friends or agents either. Accountability 
would be much easier to locate in the human agent (only) using a technology (assuming 
social robots are a technology), but this also suggests neglecting what Johnson and 
Noorman see as the artefact’s agency and computational autonomy (2014: 144).  
Johnson & Noorman’s approach suggests distinguishing between what kind of agency 
the artefacts always own and what kind of additional agency they are given by humans 
to extend a human action. They are concerned with how an artefactual agency connects 
to the exhibition of a moral autonomy.61  
                                                
61 Johnson & Noorman (2014) do not differentiate between artefact or technology. This becomes clear 
when they include the examples of artefactual agency being in a CCTV camera or in software agents. 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that they see the artefact as different in this debate than, for instance, 
computational systems. 
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This approach relates to the recent discussions on digital materialism (Pötzsch, 2017) 
advocating for a distributive model of agency in media theoretical and Posthumanist 
work. The difference would be that the material and Posthumanist discussion would 
attribute inherent agency to every artefact, and would not agree with what Johnson & 
Noorman (2014) are about to argue, namely that technological agency is an extension of 
the human agency. For Johnson & Noorman, the agency within artefacts, as man-made 
devices rather than stones, for instance, can be understood in three different steps in 
which agency moves increasingly towards moral autonomy (without reaching it). First, 
the causal efficiency; second, the ‘acting for’ agency; and third, the moral autonomy 
(Johnson & Noorman, 2014: 144). 
The causal efficiency perspective relates to the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). In this 
theory ‘the causal efficacy of each node in a network is dependent on each other’ (149), 
whereby the nodes refer to how humans, technology, and environment co-shape each 
other. This view does not favour an anthropocentric agent position, but equally does not 
place any moral autonomy in artefacts. In the second step, the ‘acting for’ agency (149), 
the human agent decisively uses an artefact with an intention to achieve something or to 
replace another human agent through its use. This taps into the problem in which, for 
example, the robot as a caretaker could be bound up, because, on the one hand, these 
robotic devices are supposed to act as professional caretakers and fulfil even pragmatic 
jobs like monitoring medication or safety, but, on the other, they are supposed to be 
perceived as companions, as human-like agents (see Part One, Chapter One).  
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Johnson & Noorman argue that Latour’s work would support this suggestion in 
combination with the first position. The tasks of machines are hereby understood as a 
delegated human ‘program of action’ (Johnson & Noorman, 2014: 149); for example, in 
the case of automatic doors that open the door as a substitute for a human agent. But 
automatic doors have no moral autonomy and neither are they expected to have any. 
The important part here is that the door is given an ‘acting for’; as in, a metaphorical 
position for human agency (150). They write: ‘Here agency involves representation, 
though the representation involves the agent using his or her expertise to perform tasks 
for the client’ (149). This position is built on an agreement of the difference between 
agency and accountability. The automatic door has agency (and, to an extent, 
autonomy), so it can also have consequences when hurting someone, but at no point is it 
an agent, neither can it be held morally accountable due to its having a bad intention to 
hurt or trap someone by malfunctioning. 
The theory of the ‘acting for’ agency extends beyond the visible context of delegating 
perceived actions. Johnson & Noorman bring up the example of ‘software agents’ as an 
extension of human understanding of code (150). I do not agree with this statement, 
since I consider that it conflates defining an agent only metaphorically, and having an 
accountable agent to refer to. This view suggests seeing software as an extension of 
human tasks and for this process to be understood as neutral or causal in its unfolding. It 
is not possible, however, to identify a linear extension between human and software, 
despite software being linked to human language and semantic codes.  
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Also, this theory allows for every possible technology or artefact to be associated to a 
human origin and oriented towards it. This is a highly anthropocentric and problematic 
way to understand non-human entities – as robots are. Further, thinking about a 
software program as if it has a single agenthood is symbolic, but not practical. Would 
the data, the algorithm, one bit, or the program language be this agent? Most 
importantly, pinpointing software as an agent sounds impossible, since one is fluid and 
the other stable. However, Floridi (2014), who will be revisited in Chapter Seven, offers 
a similar concept on algorithms as ‘mindless agents’. 
According to Johnson & Noorman (2014), there is an important distinction worth 
making. Machines, as much as software, are understood as delegates for humans that 
substitute for human actors by drawing the attention to the role they perform in shaping 
human actions and morality. These are not understood to be actual agents, but only 
metaphorical agents. It is tempting to take complex technologies such as robots into this 
view since they look like humans, but this is a simple association that HR makes use of 
and encourages.  
I suggest a thought experiment at this point to clarify why this theory is included in my 
exploration, despite the problems of being simplifying and instrumental. What I 
advocate is to try and see social robots as if they were agency extensions of a human. 
This could, as I believe, reopen a new perspective on social robots and also on tracking; 
one that crystallises why the social robot is only a visual metaphor for a human body, 
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and ignores that to be human means more than just appearance – it could also refer to 
judgement, aliveness, and movement. 
In defining the social robot as a human-like machine, we are pulled up on a crucial 
point: what is the human program (as in ability) that robots are supposed to be ‘acting 
for’? In other words, what element of the human agency is it that they are extending 
(assuming that they extend human agency, which is a simplistic view, but that should be 
overlooked in this example)? Following Johnson & Noorman (2014), the social robot 
would contain a human program that mainly refers to a visual similarity to the human 
agent. It has the same body shape even if it is not similar enough to be mistaken for an 
actual human being. At least, this is the metaphor that HR is going for, as I will show in 
Chapter Six. This metaphor has consequences on various scales, since, if agreeing on it, 
then the social robot is designed to suggest some sort of humanness, aliveness, or 
intention, but cannot deliver on any human qualities beyond a human visual alikeness 
and a perceived agenthood.  
There is another side to this, however. The robot is in some ways alive or moving. Not 
organically, but technically. It does perform actions and processes; something is moving 
in its shell, to make the outside body move too. For instance, if I return to tracking and 
think it through the metaphor analogy, tracking could be seen as a metaphor for 
interaction or for surveillance equally. I argue in this thesis that these aspects reflect on 
the epistemological framework from which the definition of programs transfer into the 
ethical discussions. This means tracking can be metaphor loaded to symbolise 
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interaction and sociability as HR sees it. Or, if we go with the insights from MSS and 
data infringement, tracking can become a metaphor for dataveillance. In fact, it is both 
simultaneously, since intentions and action overlap in the plurality of data. The point is 
this: What we consider the robot to extend might not be human alikeness, but an equally 
important co-agency built on interactivity, one that must be thought beyond extension.62  
Another metaphor I want to emphasise is related to the previous one, but amplifies the 
ambitions that HR and Robot Ethics have for social robots. For elderly care, the social 
robot is a caring technology (not exclusively, but often). This can mislead the human 
interacting with robots, since the view on social robots as caring machines is purely 
drawn from the similarity of them performing human gestures and expressions (the 
theatrical play, Spillikin: A Love Story, that I mentioned in the introduction is a good 
example for this).  
However, what needs to be considered is that the metaphor of a technology and the 
actual functionality might not overlap. This way of thinking technology is also very 
anthropocentric. It can even be argued that the companionship metaphor does mask the 
robotic qualities with the human similitude of the social robot. Here, encouraging 
anthropomorphism creates a problematic analogy in which the metaphorical use of a 
technology overrides its actual computational ontology. Hence, to position social robots 
strategically as perceived companions and as caring technology means that the elderly 
should expect these robots to be empathetic, to engage, to listen, to be kind and 
                                                
62 Tracking and robots are also always an extension of human agencies, since these are made and 
programmed by human developers. 
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attentive. These expectations complicate the discussion on moral agenthood hugely, 
because these are built on a conflation between perceived metaphorical and invisible 
ontological qualities. Furthermore, because these lines are blurred, the discussion about 
what social robots are ‘acting for’ gets increasingly complicated. 
The importance of clarity and precision on the metaphors and their encouragement is 
crucial for various purposes. Not only do I emphasise this, but Johnson & Noorman 
(2014) also warn that these metaphors are not innocent concepts; they can sometimes 
even be dangerous. They draw attention to particular similarities between two things; 
using one that is presumably well understood to help understand the other, that is not. 
However, in thinking of robots metaphorically, we may be directed to think that the two 
things have more in common than they do (150, 151). I think this level is crucially 
problematic, as the aims of HR are feeding into Robot Ethics, allowing for 
anthropomorphism to encourage the position of social robots as human-like, or as 
companions, or as perceived agents in ethical discussions, but denying the invisible 
ethical level to be addressed.  
I argue that the first angle is insofar a limited, limiting, and wrong metaphor to draw. 
What I mean by wrong (a term Johnson & Noorman use) is not referring to it being a 
deceptive error, and it must not be mistaken with Turkle’s critique (2011) in Chapter 
Two. Instead, I am concerned with the deceptive element when drawing ethical 
accountability from the superficial alikeness, or to encourage the human agent to 
mistake the robot as actually having human similitude. Thinking that the social robot is 
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somehow human-like on the grounds of its appearance might be an aesthetically 
seductive fallacy only, but it leads to the potential neglect of the robot’s (in my view) 
more important capacities as a non-human artefact. This is what Johnson & Noorman 
warn of when relying on representational similarities, namely, to ignore the ‘important 
and relevant dissimilarities between the compared entities’, which ‘end up being pushed 
to the background by making a particular analogy between the two entities’ (151). 
Social robots cannot be fully understood with this model, however, though it was 
helpful to me in illustrating the metaphorical dilemma, which is found in the perceptive 
construction in agenthood and the companion position the robot is given in elderly care. 
However, this did not allow me to clarify any accountability questions, since the artefact 
is not given any accountability by Johnson & Noorman. The ‘acting for’ theory 
acknowledges that artefacts can always have ethical consequences beyond the questions 
of being extended human programs. The example of the mechanical door briefly 
addressed how a malfunction could hurt someone but not be held accountable for it. 
Hence, the ‘acting for’ model comes with ethical consequences even if not moral 
accountability (152).  
What Johnson & Noorman have outlined by discussing the difference between agency 
and moral autonomy is reconsidered and challenged by Wallach & Allen (2009) and 
Floridi (2014) in Chapter Seven, when the debate on computational autonomy of 
technologies is aligned with morality. Johnson & Noorman (2014) conclude, in terms of 
the different levels of artefactual agency, that none of them relates to the moral 
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accountability or autonomy in human agents. It is important for them to acknowledge 
that artefacts always have agency and that ‘artefacts make a moral difference’ (152), but 
these do not get elevated into owning moral accountability. They are clear in their 
opinions that accountability and responsibility are missing in artefacts; hence, they do 
not go beyond the ‘acting for’ step in their trifold agency concept. The third step in their 
model is not outlined in detail here, since it is the simplest one. For them, moral 
accountability is always assigned to the human agent as the only morally accountable 
agent independent of how much agency the artefact has been given. 
I address the confusion between ‘acting for’ and moral autonomy as a huge challenge 
within (i) Robot Ethics and in (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics. The reason could be 
that the metaphorical definition of a technology is not suitable to grasp the ethical 
dimension, since it follows an association chain that, again, is anthropocentrically 
thought and encouraged, but with no justice in understanding how certain technology 
operates. What I think that Robot Ethics and Machine and Computer Ethics do is to 
correlate computational autonomy with computational moral autonomy, because it is 
argued that human moral agency is linked to human moral autonomy (151). Therefore, 
computational autonomy could be something like a computational morality. This 
inference is a problem in my view, since even if these concepts all relate to each other, 
their implications do not derive from the same ethical discussions. Computational 
autonomy, for instance, can derive from a mathematical accuracy built on the ability to 
follow a set of rules. Still, the question about having an awareness of the set of rules or 
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their making is not sufficiently considered (debating consciousness is not discussed 
here).  
Johnson & Noorman (2014) point to the issues with debating autonomy in both entities. 
Their view on artefactual autonomy corresponds to an ‘independence of things from 
immediate control by humans’ (152). To an extent, this is what Broadbent (2017) asks 
robot autonomy to be able to do.63 The next chapter returns to the initial critique that 
begins Chapter Two, of how the social robot is only perceived as an agent, which 
supports a position I (and Coeckelbergh) argue to be the first limitation I draw on in (1) 
Apparent Morality and Agenthood, which I will discuss next.  
  
                                                
63 Christians supports what Johnson & Noorman (2014) argue as a dangerous step: to view technological 
autonomy and technological moral agency as correlating qualities. He writes: ‘Autonomous moral agents 
are presumed to apply rules consistently and self-consciously to every choice. Through rational processes, 
basic rules of morality are created that everyone is obliged to follow and against which all actions can be 
evaluated. In communication ethics, neutral principles operate by the conventions of impartiality and 
formality. This is an ethics of moral reasoning that arranges principles in hierarchical fashion and 
rigorously follows logic in coming to conclusions’ (Christians, 2011: 2). 
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5. On Moral Appearance, Agenthood, and Moral Philosophy 
Chapter summary: In this chapter, I survey wider robot agency models and make use 
of an existing critique from POT to also reflect on how agency and morality models 
from moral philosophy are applied simplified in POT. My major focus will be on the (1) 
Moral Appearance and Agenthood model to show that judging human morality as 
exhibited in action or appearance cannot be simply adapted to robots. I already offered 
insights on why that view is limited; now, I also expand on inner-disciplinary concerns 
in POT. As I brought up already, deriving moral agency from the humanoid shape of the 
robot and its visible actions limits the full ethical discussion in Chapter Two to seeing 
data concerns clearly, but it further supports what Coeckelbergh calls a ‘psychopathic 
robot’ (2010) model. I conclude this chapter with a study by Kahn et al. (2012) to 
highlight the dangers of superficially assigned morality, as this feeds back into drawing 
any moral accountability of robots from their appearance by projecting. 
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I focus next on the relation between the making of robot agenthood and the 
appropriation of traditional moral philosophical streams, which are either simplified or 
reduced to allow for a technological model of morality to emerge. I hereby return to 
social robots again, but not to elderly care. As argued various times, looking at social 
robots as companions only reduces their agency model to a perceived one. However, I 
identify that, within POT streams that leave Robot Ethics and elderly care, more critical 
voices can be found on what I label as the 1) Apparent Morality and Agenthood model, 
which conflates between the qualities that are apparently embedded in social robots and 
those which are owned. What becomes clear to me is that as traditional moral 
philosophical streams are being adapted to POT, so are their old concerns taken over as 
well; for instance, thinking in dichotomous pairs between appearance/essence of robot 
morality or intelligence. 
The robot ethicist and machine morality researcher Wendell Wallach (2010) brings to 
our attention the historic origins of the study of robot and machine morality. For 
Wallach, the different routes of morality concepts lead to the complexity and 
inconsistency of the field, and, as I remarked as well, the perspective through which 
morality is discussed creates different ethics of robots. It is not surprising that Wallach 
writes:  
‘The study of moral decision making is profoundly influenced by a long-
standing tension between moral philosophy and moral psychology. 
Moral philosophy and moral psychology developed hand-in-hand. 
However, throughout the 20th century two philosophical positions, the 
is-ought distinction and the ‘‘naturalistic fallacy’’, served to buttress a 
division between these fields of study’ (244). 
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What this quote further illustrates is not only a divide between ethics and morality, but 
between the conflicting perspectives in the philosophical or psychological paradigms on 
morality. According to Wallach (2010), this conflict is mirrored in the conflict between 
moral sentiments (as found in Hume’s and Smith’s work) and moral norms, as a gap 
between ‘ought’ morality and ‘is’ (244) morality, but also between values and actions. 
He explains that: 
‘[T]he is-ought distinction is broadly understood as a fundamental gap 
between all descriptive or factual statements and normative or 
prescriptive judgments. This can mean that understanding the 
psychology of how people make moral decisions does not inform us 
about what people ought to do’ (Wallach, 2010: 244). 
This connection between the psychology of moral actions and the inference to moral 
reasoning64 is crucial for robots to be understood as morally competent. Malle & 
Scheutz (2015) expand this to an inference between actions and values by asking: ‘What 
would it take for robots to be seen as morally competent?’ (2015: 486). They hereby 
highlight that the apparently good actions are sufficient for robots to be seen as good 
agents. In addition, POT streams on robots rarely point out specifically what moral 
philosophical school they assign their views to (Wallach is an exception). Hereby, 
Kantian, Utilitarian, and virtue ethics are popular backdrops that emerge often in the 
discussion on robotic morality and agency as entangled concepts, since some POT 
literature is not always clear in what traditional morality concept is translated into the 
                                                
64 I argue that Luhmann’s critique in Chapter One is, in fact, a critique on the psychology of morality and 
on the pathological view behind moral reasoning as a deficit oriented system without clear answers on 
what makes humans morally good or bad. 
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techno-morality discussion. However, these three traditional ethical models are the most 
valuable for POT and Robot Ethics for several reasons. Each of them is, in some way, 
either anthropocentric or anthropomorphic, but most are built on a single agenthood 
idea (Floridi and Brey will be exceptions)65. To recall, the anthropocentric agenthood 
(looks at structural and inherent capacities) is discussed later in Chapter Seven, 
whereas, for now, I am reflecting on the anthropomorphic agenthood (looks at 
perceptive and apparent qualities or actions). 
Briefly outlined, the Kantian view on morality is appropriated to create a mechanistic, 
rationalist action and rules-based robotic morality as aligned with the idea of duty66. As 
Christians (2011) argues, to focus on Kantian ethics allows us to infer robot moral 
agency from robot action and appearance on the grounds of being able to draw moral 
reason from visible actions in humans. 
‘For Kant, reason demands moral action. It is the nature of reason to will 
universal law, and it demands this not only in theories of science, but in 
practical thinking about what we do. Hence, we ought to base morality 
on reason. Reason is my authority for acting morally’ (3). 
While the ‘utilitarian perspective applies the principle of utility to individual moral 
actions and the rule utilitarian applies the principle of utility to moral rules. The right 
                                                
65 Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) raise issues with a single agenthood view as well. However, they join a 
robot ethical research from a crucial perspective, trying to establish a new ethics around social robots and 
anthropomorphism, but it is one I struggle with, due to its perception focus. However, they critically 
endorse that it would be a mistake to position the robot as an individual, or as a judging agent, instead of 
seeing it as ‘moments of a complex technological system’ (191). 
66 ‘Dutifulness reflects good will and the desire to do things right based upon rules that everyone ought to 
follow. That is, a dutiful person acts the way they do because of a moral rule. These rules are imperatives 
that are either hypothetical or categorical and they are the means by which reason commands our will and 
our actions’ (Herschel & Miori, 2017: 33).  
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act is one that produces the greatest happiness for a community or society’ (Herschel & 
Miori, 2017: 33). What I consider a problem is that, within various research papers on 
these discussions, the terminology around good and bad virtues is not questioned but 
considered as universal, which is also heavily critiqued by the Posthumanist Braidotti 
(2006). These two ethical perspectives, Kantian and Utilitarian ethics, further differ 
theoretically from Virtue ethics67, but both do support an alignment of actions to good 
virtues while encouraging an anthropomorphising of robots.  
This linkage between an apparent agenthood and qualities of the agent occupies wider 
robotics research as much as another theoretical camp that orients itself often around the 
dichotomy between perception/essence: Artificial Intelligence (AI) research.68 In my 
view, the conflict between ‘weak AI’ and ‘strong AI’ (Duffy, 2003) reinforces the 
distinction between apparent as if qualities and actual qualities of digital systems and 
robots69 even further. I consider this distinction in research as conceptually problematic, 
on the grounds of allowing for rhetorical imprecisions and the assumption that 
understanding robots or computers allows for any perception-based view on their 
qualities. The problem being that if the human perception relies on as if intelligence or 
                                                
67 ‘Virtue ethics’ consideration of individual character is undoubtedly an important starting point for 
developing ethical motivation and awareness but (…) the lack of a rational and systematic analysis might 
leave any number of publics or alternatives unconsidered in the decision’ (Tilley, 2011: 197). 
68 It is difficult for this thesis to distinguish between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ AI (Duffy, 2003), since the 
intelligence of a robot is not considered to be visible or perceptive; it can also be computational and non-
human. Furthermore, Damiano & Dumouchel (2017) have pointed out that the AI research canons do not 
fully agree on what AI is (x).  
69 This conflict goes back to Turing’s research (1950) from which he concluded that there is no actual 
artificial intelligence. In this example, computer systems are only as if intelligent, because they can only 
follow the rules, but not think autonomously (Johansson, 2011: 9). Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) 
challenge this dichotomy with their work on Internal Robotics.  
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as if morality, (encouraged by keeping the good virtues and the ability to act good), 
morality and intelligence are reduced to agenthood deprived concepts and are bound to 
what appears to be moral or intelligent reasoning. This reflects into the ethical theories 
on robotic morality that focus on a perceptive view of morality (and emotions) (Malle & 
Scheutz, 2015), as I exposed. 
The perceived or apparent agenthood position of robots is not simply accepted without 
certain critique within the fields researching it. The philosopher Mark Coeckelbergh 
(2010) warns of designing ‘psychopathic’ robots (235), which can execute perceivably 
morally correct actions and tasks by themselves (to a degree, autonomously), but still 
lack any awareness of what moral value is, which encourages the perception that they 
are detached from their technological capacities. Coeckelbergh specifically highlights 
that the ability of emotionality must also be linked to the ability of morality. The fact 
that both concepts are understood as perception-based and expression-based in robotics 
only support, for him, a highly problematic inference that keeps the moral qualities of 
the robot aligned to the perception of the human engaging with it. 
To build moral agency as aligned to visible action-based performance, which relies on 
an association chain between actions and moral values, is concerning to me, since 
robots are assigned agency without consciousness and this happens independent of what 
moral school has been chosen (differentiating between a Kantian or a Utilitarian model 
is hereby irrelevant). Hence, this morality model, as Coeckelbergh and I agree, does not 
account for the robot being able to reflect on the actions it performs. What moral 
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appearance encourages is a problematic and intertwined causal link between 
appearance, actions, and robot virtues to ground onto the perceptive moral agenthood of 
social robots. Coeckelbergh (2010) states: 
‘Consider discussions of psychopathy, it is suggested that psychopaths 
can follow rules but do not have the capacity to feel that something is 
morally wrong. Even though they may act in accordance with moral 
conventions’ (235). 
His research (2009, 2010) explores how the human-like appearance reflects 
problematically into morality and apparent morality. For him especially, the Kantian 
approach leads to new limitations (which also come from being appropriated 
instrumentally and simplified), because it does not consider the influence of emotions 
and imagination as, for instance, Humean ethics would (Coeckelbergh, 2010: 235).70 
Further, the human-like appearance of robot actions cannot be related to a moral 
responsibility. He writes: 
‘[W]e (will) interact with humanoid robots as if they are human. We 
need not know their ‘mental states’ for blaming them, for treating them 
as companions, or even for loving them. Both the ascription of agency 
and of responsibility are, in practice, independent of the real[ity]. I coin 
the terms virtual agency and virtual responsibility to refer to the 
responsibility humans ascribe to each other and to (some) non-humans 
on the basis of how the other is experienced and appears to them’ (2009: 
184). 
Even if moral agenthood cannot be derived from appearance ontologically, 
                                                
70 Coeckelbergh further argues that ‘if we want to build moral robots, they will have to be robots with 
emotions. But can such robots be built? In what follows, I first argue that it is not likely that in the 
foreseeable future we will be able to build such robots, because to do so these robots would have to be 
conscious, they would have to have mental states, and we would have to be able to prove that they have 
these things’ (Coeckelbergh, 2010: 23). 
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Coeckelbergh (2010) does not abandon this possibility fully. He instead suggests, in my 
view, an unpractical middle ground as a solution: to understand apparent morality of a 
robot only as being ‘virtual’. Even if he clearly argues why robotic morality cannot be 
simply a simulation of Kantian ethics and an application of action-led rules, he allows 
for a virtual model to substitute this view. He maintains that humans would not make a 
robot more accountable than a computer, and yet views them with a certain degree of 
agency nonetheless.  
Coeckelbergh (2009) develops the idea of a ‘virtual moral responsibility’ (183) that 
computers and robots can be assigned to, which would suggest a less accountable 
version than expecting their actual moral responsibility; a model I consider as a light 
version of morality. He advocates this model from the perspective of how we identify 
moral agency in human agents. Since, we (humans) never really know if other human 
agents have or commit to an internal moral responsibility or value system, we ascribe 
moral values to our actions and appearance. Hence, by assigning some form of morality 
to what we perceive as a moral action is normal. For him, every form of moral 
responsibility is, more or less, always virtual. While this might be true, I ask if he 
underestimates the idea of trust and the fact that we have learned to know what to 
expect from a computer, but not what to fully expect from a robot, especially if it smiles 
at us. Still, for him, since this is how we perceive computer or technology agency as 
well, it is a legitimate approach to understand robots. He states: 
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‘A different way of applying the label ‘moral’ to things is not to focus on 
the transfer of intention and responsibility from subjects (humans) to 
objects (artefacts), but on the transfer of value. We humans not only 
design artefacts, but also give value to objects, artefacts, and other non-
humans’ (183). 
I have huge reservations with this ‘virtual’ or light morality version, since it is highly 
anthropocentric and leaves the question open: with what is he concerned? With 
understanding robotic qualities and moral reasoning? Or with the distinction between 
moral actions as outcome-oriented or morality agency as built on agenthood? It remains 
unclear for me how the ‘psychopathic’ robot, that he initially critiqued as having no 
awareness of its actions, is transformed into a virtually moral agent to avoid inferring 
moral agenthood into its agent-like appearance. While theoretically interesting, I am not 
sure about the practical value of this approach, since I do not know how humans should 
identify the difference between apparent, virtual, and actual responsibility. 
Coeckelbergh’s (2009) own conclusion urges for a ‘proactive ethics that intervenes with 
its evaluation at the design stage rather than when the artefact is used, [so] we [can] 
better think about the ethical problems now’ (Coeckelbergh, 2009: 186). The hindrance 
in this discussion is, for me, still in the overestimation of the perception of humanoid 
robots when it comes to their ethical agency. Especially, since their design is kept 
specifically anthropomorphic to evoke an agenthood these devices do not have, what 
does this suggest to the human interacting with them? This allows, in my view, for a 
twofold mistake; that the robot owns agenthood, and that it owns a moral agenthood. 
This also leads to confusion about what kind of concept is taken into consideration 
when understanding moral agency; is it a duty, action, or is it virtue-based?  
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I hopefully provided, with Coeckelbergh’s support, more clarity on why morality and 
agenthood cannot be grounded in appearance, since accountability and responsibility – 
being important factors – drop out or must be aligned virtually and in a lighter version 
to then raise more confusion.  
I claim that agenthood can only be situated in a human subject (though, I doubt the 
singularity of such as being a linear or stable reflection point or entity), who can be held 
accountable for the actions they perform. This aspect is one major advantage in holding 
onto anthropocentric ethics; otherwise, the Posthumanist view on technologically fluid 
and intertwined agencies could be more appropriate to address the ethical problems 
around Robot Ethics. Problematically, neither Robot Ethics nor HR is interested in 
Posthumanist ethics, since both fields consider a model of human agenthood and 
morality as their core upon which social robots are built. However, on the other hand, if 
the modelling of agenthood is exclusively perception-based, my worry is – as supported 
by Malle & Scheutz (2015) saying that moral ‘decision-making’ in robots cannot go 
beyond a ‘quasi-moral’ process (487) - that this produces ‘psychopathic’ robots only as 
Coeckelbergh correctly assessed.  
I identify another issue emerging, which is aligned to the previous one: Not only can 
agenthood be aligned to a perception and appearance model of robot morality, but so 
can autonomy. Scheutz (2012) demonstrates this with a different path that further 
complicates the discussion. He points out that not only can moral agenthood be 
perceptive, but that autonomy can be as well. For Scheutz, a perceived autonomy is 
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essential to position the robot as a ‘social agent’ (2012: 216). This statement, in my 
perspective, only creates an oxymoron between having an autonomy but without 
agency, or vice versa – a conflict he does not resolve, by writing that ‘perceived 
autonomy is so critical because it implies capabilities for self-governed movement, 
understanding, and decision-making’ (216). How would non-perceived, computational 
autonomy be judged?  
What I find problematic in his quote is that autonomy is, again, caught up between a 
‘perceptive’ but also a ‘critical’ (216) capacity, which must not be aligned at all. It is 
not only Scheutz’s work that demonstrates conceptually confusing arguments; these are 
continued into morality research as outlined through the following research study that 
further exhibits what I label the limitations of thinking an (1) Apparent Morality and 
Agenthood. 
I want to conclude this chapter with a critical reference to research by Kahn et al. 
(2012), which drew my attention regarding their legitimising of an apparent morality in 
an experiment. In this study, the researchers made participants decide on moral 
accountability of a humanoid robot named Robovie71, based on their impressions of its 
actions and looks. The experiment that Kahn et al. undertook is on how much moral 
agency or awareness can be drawn from the robot’s behaviour and from the interaction 
with an interviewer, and on how moral a robot appears to be. For me, as a non-
roboticist, the information and outline given in the research paper on the experimental 
                                                
71 Kahn et al. (2012) use the term humanoid robots synonymously with social robots. 
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set-up was confusingly loose, in the sense that it remains unclear if the robot is meant to 
execute a pre-programmed and scripted dialogue and set of movements, or if it is 
supposed to be responsive to outside input (for instance, making use of its ability to 
track to the environment).  
This point is not irrelevant. In fact, it makes a difference if the study’s aim is to explore 
the computational autonomy of robots as being morally aligned, or if it set out to 
explore what visual clues the human participants require to be able to anthropomorphise 
a non-responsive robot, so as to understand it as a morally accountable agent (even if 
this robot is none in both cases). If I interpreted the experimental set-up correctly, then 
the use of two ‘integrated interaction’ (24) patterns within the robot’s programming 
indicates the use of a scripted and pre-recorded HRI scheme, and implies that the robot 
is not responsive to the input, but is remote-controlled, while the participants might not 
be aware of this lack.72 
In the experiment, the robot performs/acts out a dialogue (the so-called interaction) with 
a human interviewer who is meant to involve the robot in ‘morally challenging’ topics 
and conflicts (24). At this point, if accountability is highlighted, it would be already 
ontologically impossible to account any moral agenthood to the robot, since this robot 
becomes exemplary for the ‘acting for’ model, when recalling Johnson & Noorman 
(2014), and would be nothing but the extension of human agency. In the experiment, the 
human participants are required to judge whether this interaction is linked to moral 
                                                
72 This might be what Scheutz meant previously with ‘perceived autonomy’, which already troubled me 
then as oxymoronic ontology and as problematic. It does so again. 
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accountability, but what the researchers do not reflect on is that the perceived moral 
agenthood is detached completely from any agenthood and partially from acting 
autonomously (maybe not from a computational one, but this must be explained later). 
Therefore, the experiment is flawed in my view, but it exhibits the tendencies I keep 
bringing up: the superficial implications of good behaviour aligned with actual moral 
agency, robot technology agency, and anthropomorphised agenthood. These terms get 
conflated throughout. I think this kind of research does not say anything about the robot 
as a technology or as a potential moral agent, since this evaluation of morality remains 
an associated and superficial concept only. It almost appears as if the motivations for 
this experiment were to test human psychology, and are on the human abilities to 
anthropomorphise robots, rather than being interested in the establishing of robot moral 
agency, which, for most roboticists, is a rhetorical buzz word after all.  
The researchers’ conclusion only confirms what I believe robotics often relies on: the 
human inability to distinguish robot perception from robot capacities.73 This shows in 
the ranking of several associative categories with which the participants had to either 
agree or disagree. The participants are supposed to answer on, for instance, the robot 
appearing to have mental states (73 per cent agreed), or feelings (35 per cent agreed), or 
being a social other, a friend (70 per cent agreed), or being conscious (50 per cent 
agreed) (37). 65 per cent of participants answered that Robovie appeared to be morally 
                                                
73 This might be a concern in human psychology as well, since we can only read cues and expressions and 
not each other’s minds, but I do not support how robots are aligned to being in the same psychological 
framework. 
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accountable (the researchers correlate accountability of robots to that of a vending 
machine, which is on the other end of the morality scale in this scenario). Kahn et al. 
further conclude that because of these results (which seem predictable for them), 
humanoid social robots must be held at least ‘partly accountable’ in terms of their moral 
status (39). From this, they advocate for a new ontological hypothesis allowing for 
‘personified robots’ – as much as other ‘embodied personified computational systems’ 
(39) – to be defined on the grounds of these technologies becoming more pervasive.  
I strongly disagree with what Kahn et al. (2012) advocate for, since they have created a 
problematic ontology74 by aligning evaluative moral capacities and ability to judge to 
perception and to anthropomorphism. It simply cannot be enough to believe robots look 
nice if they do not understand niceness. However, this idea initially snuck into scientific 
thoughts and research, so it shows that the ethical or moral discussion is not taken 
seriously enough, since ethics, widely, and the consequences of unethical behaviour are 
not. Do People Hold a Humanoid Robot Morally Accountable for the Harm It Causes? 
– their paper’s title – is not only an innocent question but has severe consequences if the 
answer is ‘yes’. Conflation and confusion should not be encouraged but, conversely, the 
necessary distinctions must be made as precise as possible, stating that non-experts 
                                                
74 More on how to understand ontology in computational systems can be found in Man’s (2013) work 
Ontologies in Computer Science. She writes: ‘Research on ontology is becoming increasingly widespread 
in the computer science community, and its importance is being recognized in a multiplicity of research 
fields and application areas, including knowledge engineering, database design and integration, 
information retrieval and extraction’ (43). My major point is that computational qualities and 
programming capacities have to be considered when discussing the computational ontology of the robot’s 
being, not only of the robot’s appearing.  
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cannot guess these. Further, I doubt what value can be taken from a perceived moral 
agenthood for the ontological understanding of technological complexities. To align 
appearance with qualities or non-human systems with human organisms remains a very 
confusing approach towards progressive technology agency models, in my view.  
Hence, the unresolved question for me remains: What does the appearance of a 
computer/robot say about its moral or agent abilities (assuming it could develop some)? 
This experiment confirmed the perceptive dominance of the robot’s design, one that is 
detached from any understanding of computational complexities. I do not see how the 
participants’ anthropomorphic response could confirm what Kahn’s et al. (2012) 
suggest becoming a new ontology, but I notice the opposite happening; it confirms that 
no new ontology is established. While, in theory, they are correct about robots requiring 
a new ontological approach, their reasoning does not mirror what they in fact explored 
in their experiment.  
Rightly, Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) have suggested that we should rethink robots as 
a new ‘social species’ (xiii) to overcome the dichotomy between how a robot appears to 
be and what a robot can do as a computational system. As I have pointed out various 
times, the agency models influence ethical concerns; therefore, a rethinking of robot 
agency in POT and Robot Ethics is urgently needed. I will deepen this aspect in Chapter 
Six as I provide insights on how this humanoid perception fallacy has evolved around 
social robots and why it is still important and central in HR and Robot Ethics.  
In the next chapter, I leave the ethical canon behind for a while by entering HR 
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research, in which ethical issues around social robots play a minimal role. Chapter Six 
is an extensive and contextualising chapter on the background of the companion robot 
agency and on the value of anthropomorphism. It stands out as a chapter, since it looks 
at the social robot historically and epistemologically, by focussing on the importance of 
the humanoid robot design, the social context of using social robots, anthropomorphism 
as a strategy to increase the robot’s sociability, and the importance of computational 
interaction and tracking modules. I use it to outline how the social robot is, in fact, two 
things all along: the companion robot and the tracking device. This returns to the initial 
conflict I presented in the introduction. 
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6. Understanding Social Robots in Humanoid Robotics 
Chapter summary: I extensively contextualise and analyse the social robot as a 
companion in this chapter to point out that this position aims for a paradigm shift in 
how we perceive robots: from being only machines to becoming human companions. At 
this point, I have raised various concerns on the companion agency model, but now, I 
am explaining its origins and its purpose. First, I survey the literature on social robots 
within Humanoid Robotics (HR)75 to provide an overview on social robots in HR 
through research from pioneers such as Breazeal (2002, 2003), Lee et al. (2005), and 
Fong et al. (2002). The first section focusses on the importance of anthropomorphism as 
a projective induction using Duffy’s (2003) and Lemaignan’s et al. (2014) work. I then 
move to the importance of computational sociability and of the tracking ability, which I 
examine as an ethical process by reflecting on the FACS model by Ekman. I conclude 
with two interlude discussions on, firstly, a new way of thinking about 
anthropomorphism ethically (Damiano & Dumouchel, 2018), and, secondly, on the 
rhetorical concern in HR and AI, which intersect with robot agency discussions. 
  
                                                
75 Humanoid Robotics (HR), a conglomerate of research from Robotics, Psychology, Mechanics, 
Engineering, and Computer Science, explores this social robot by: ‘(…) studying, developing and 
realizing these socially capable machines, equipping them with a very rich variety of capabilities that 
allow them to interact with people in natural and intuitive ways, ranging from the use of natural language, 
body language and facial gestures, to more unique ways such as expression through colours and abstract 
sounds’ (Read, 2014: i). 
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The Social Robot – From Machine to Social Companion  
Summary: The first section in this chapter summarises an important paradigm shift in 
HR; from positioning robots as machines, to designing social robots that are perceived 
as human companions. I point to the differences between social robots and non-social 
robots, and examine the relevant attributes that social robots are given, such as natural 
or interactive, as I survey the research of Breazeal (2002, 2003), Lin et al. (2011, 2012), 
Royakkers & van Est (2016), and others. 
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The difference between robots and social robots is mostly based on the fact that social 
robots are designed to look and behave like human entities, and to be used in human 
environments that require interactivity and communicability. While robots are industrial 
machines, HR has the strong driver to position social robots as companions, partners, or 
assistants. As I see it, this backdrop dominates Robot Ethics and created the concerns 
behind the disconnections of Chapters Two and Three. I want to explore how and why 
the humanoid body of the social robot became the major reference point for its agency 
model, how this echoes into Robot Ethics, and why computational abilities of robots, 
such as tracking, are essential for the robot agency, but are still ethically neglected. 
The term robot originates from the Czech (Slavic) word robota, meaning ‘labour doing 
compulsory manual works without receiving any remuneration’ or ‘to make things 
manually’ (Xie, 2003: Intro). The Oxford dictionary defines robot as ‘a machine 
resembling a human being and able to replicate certain human movements and functions 
automatically’ (Intro). For Xie, the robot is increasingly living up to its name. The times 
in which the robot was ‘merely mechanism attached to controls’ (Intro) are over, due to 
the contemporary abilities of the robot to be manipulative, perceptive, communicative, 
and cognitive. Lin et al. (2011, 2012) qualify the robot as a ‘thinking’ machine and 
more than a complex of computer software. The ability to make ‘its own decisions to 
act upon the environment’ is therefore a critical aspect that separates the robot from, for 
example, a toaster or a coffee maker (Lin et al, 2012: 18). For them, the robot requires 
the ability to sense, think, and act. Lin et al. write: 
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‘Thus a robot must have sensors, processing ability that emulates some 
aspects of cognition, and actuators. Sensors are needed to obtain 
information from the environment. Reactive behaviors (like the stretch 
reflex in humans) do not require any deep cognitive ability, but on-board 
intelligence is necessary if the robot is to perform significant tasks 
autonomously, and actuation is needed to enable the robot to exert forces 
upon the environment’ (943). 
They emphasise the position of the robot as an interactive, autonomous, and responsive 
technology. Royakkers & van Est (2016) confirm this view by quoting the International 
Federation of Robotics (IFR), and add that robots are, in fact, a conglomerate of 
machinic networks that own a certain degree of autonomy (and input sensors) while also 
being a social practice. They describe robots as: 
‘[I]ntelligent (usually networked) machines that perform physical actions 
with a certain degree of autonomy within a complex and, to a greater or 
lesser extent, unstructured environment and a dynamic social practice. 
This implies, among other things, that the interaction between 
environment and machine, and man and machine, plays an increasingly 
important role. To make this interaction possible, the robot employs 
sensors with which it can perceive the environment and human beings’ 
(10). 
Robotics as a research field stretches back to early cybernetics and associates Robotics 
with Computer Studies rather than with Communication and Information Studies.76 
Contemporary research on social robots often derives from, or builds upon, concepts of 
human-like agenthood and autonomy, inspired by 20th century science-fiction films such 
as Lang’s Metropolis (1927), or books such as Asimov’s I, Robot (1950) or Philip K. 
                                                
76 These disciplines later split into further sub-divisions, such as Media Studies, Humanoid Robotics, 
Computer Studies/Cybernetics, AI, etc. All of them have early cybernetics as a common background (not 
the only one) from which these areas grew into different ways. Research foci divert by having different 
views on the understandings technology, human agency, or intelligence. 
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Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep (1968).77 Such influences are apparent in 
various publications in HR including Lin et al. (2012), Breazeal (2003)78, and Wallach 
& Allen (2009). I noticed that literature in HR often exhibits a huge and contingent 
fascination for, and fear of, robots becoming truly autonomous agents, as Dumouchel & 
Damiano (2017) also point out, because of the science fiction background upon which 
many ambitions are built. 
Before being included into the Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI), the figure of the social 
robot was initially mentioned in research on multi-robot or distributed robotic systems 
to negotiate an interaction between robots. The intention of this area was to study and 
simulate the collective behaviours of insects and other social animals (Breazeal, 2003; 
Brooks, 2002; Fong et al., 2002). The HRI research explores ‘the sociality between 
robots and humans’ (Tseng, 2016: 188) and refers to the social robot as a ‘socially 
interactive’ (Breazeal 2002, 2004) or ‘Emotional Cognitive Agent’ (ECA) (Ford, 2014: 
27, 30). In this thesis, I exclusively refer to humanoid social robots, and not to those 
without a humanoid shape. However, to complicate things slightly, not every humanoid 
body can be understood as being a social device, according to HR research or automata 
                                                
77 For more on the history of robotics as shaped and mediated through Science Fiction films, see Telotte 
(1995). 
78 Breazeal takes the influence of science fiction to the point that she begins her book Designing Sociable 
Robots (2003) with this quote: ‘What is a sociable robot? It is a difficult concept to define, but science 
fiction offers many examples. There are the mechanical droids R2-D2 and C-3PO from the movie Star 
Wars and the android Lt. Commander Data from the television series Star Trek: The Next Generation. 
Many wonderful examples exist in the short stories of Isaac Asimov and Brian Aldiss, such as the robot 
Robbie’ (1). 
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history. For instance, early 18th century automata79 would not qualify as a social robot, 
according to HR standards.  
Despite this historical background overlapping in anthropomorphic tendencies, I was 
surprised to notice that early automata history is rarely referenced or known to HR 
research. I assume that the reason for this neglect relates to HR, in its roots, being 
fixated in Cybernetics and Computer Science. Therefore, it is not concerned at all with 
its clear contingency to other humanoid design discourses, which reach back to origins 
in Ancient Greece (in the context of European history) and then blossomed again 
throughout the 18th century with the design of ‘life-like’ automata (Reilly, 2011).  
Automata were, in themselves, discourses on animation, agency, and autonomy of their 
time, and were understood as much more than an empty shell, puppet, or doll in a 
human-like body. According to Reilly (2011), automata are the ‘precursors to our 
contemporary digital culture and the ancestors of the robot, the cyborg, and the avatar, 
demonstrating that our spectacular culture of machine-based entertainments has many 
historical precedents’ (1). While contemporary humanoids share their appearance with 
their predecessors - for instance, the chess-playing Turk80 - automata had a ‘symbolic 
                                                
79 ‘The word automaton comes from the Greek automatos, meaning ‘acting of itself’, referring to 
automated moving figures of animals or human beings. While automata look like dolls or toys, it is their 
animation that signifies life. This life-like movement means that automata are often perceived as if 
they’re alive. As a result, automata are central to debates about mimesis or the representation of reality in 
the historical period in which they exist’ (Reilly, 2011: 1). 
80 Reilly points to the multiple political and symbolic discourse that manifested in this automaton. ‘While 
the Turk appears as a deceptively simple mechanical trifle constructed for the pleasures of the aristocracy, 
it is actually a theatrical object upon which the historical and discursive practices of Orientalism are 
staged. The automaton Turk was a bagatelle or playful illusion composed of working clockwork 
machinery: the left hand that held his pipe, the right hand that moved the chess pieces, and the noisy 
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and political value’ (1), not a role as a companion or worker. Early automata were 
supposed to attract human engagement through a mix of fascination with the similar 
humanoid features and also by exhibiting a lifelike behaviour. I find Reilly’s concept of 
the ‘onto-epistemic mimesis’ (7) interesting to point out. It outlines one approach 
through which to understand the role of perception and visual human alikeness, to 
comprehend how automata were understood, but this thesis argues that it can be applied 
to social robots as well, due to them also being humanoids. Reilly argues that the 
mimetic mirroring of humans in the automata’s appearance… 
‘[…]or representation directly shapes ideas about reality through ways of 
being (ontology), or ways of knowing (epistemology). In this form of 
mimesis, the immediacy of a way of knowing (epistemology) – or 
information experienced through spectacle – seemingly changes one’s 
way of being (ontology)’ (2011: 7). 
If I would apply her concept to social robots, it immediately becomes problematic, since 
the apparent similarity leads to a neglect of the technological capacities of robots. 
Researchers such as Coeckelbergh (2010) critiqued this approach previously through 
the ‘psychopathic’ robot, and Johnson & Noorman (2014) urged to be mindful on what 
metaphoric level the similarity between technology and human agency focusses on. The 
reason why Reilly’s concept (2011) is interesting to mention, as I see it, is that it would 
allow situating the use of humanoid design in a contingency to automata history, which 
is not a view that HR supports, but one possible if automata and social robots are 
                                                                                                                                          
clockworks whirring inside his spine all provided concealment, keeping audiences from realizing that the 
ghost in the machine was no ghost at all’ (2011: 4). 
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discussed in Performance Studies. What would be central in such a perspective, I think, 
would be the mimetic experience and anthropomorphic design that plays a huge part in 
the design of social robots, but ends up fully disconnected from automata history.  
Despite this historical link, the contemporary humanoid social robot is the direct 
continuation of an automaton, so Reilly (2011) believes. She draws a clear line between 
robots in a wider sense: being ‘workers’ (6) compared to the automaton as an 
‘entertainer’ (6).81 Her research does not discuss the ambitions in HR to position social 
robots as companions, which is pushing the worker one into the background. In their 
new role, robots are assigned a new purpose; one of ‘human companions’ (Menezes et 
al., 2007: 367; Leite et al., 2012: 250). The new perspectives on robots as social 
partners have emerged because these ‘can autonomously interact with humans in a 
socially meaningful way’ (Lee et al., 2005: 538). According to Broadbent, ‘an 
autonomous robot is a machine that can operate and perform tasks by itself without a 
continuous human guidance’ (628).  
According to research in HR, being social comes easy for the human, but it must be 
artificially programmed into the robot.82 HR follows a constructivist approach on 
                                                
81 The shift from automata to robot is much more complex than can be explained here, as is the fear that 
comes with the focus on robots. Reilly writes: ‘The automaton plays the man of the court, the socialite, it 
takes part in the social and theatrical drama of pre-Revolutionary France. As for the robot, as its name 
implies, it works; end of the theatre, beginning of human mechanics’ (2011: 166). 
82 Since I support a media theoretical angle on technology and media, I would argue that the attribute 
social, which is added to the ‘social robot’ as a quality, is, in fact, a useless emphasis. In my view, every 
technology is inherently social (Pias, 2011; Zielinski, 2013), but this position is not common in HR, nor 
in POT. It is therefore important to trace what this emphasis implies for their fields, independent from my 
disagreeing. 
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making the robot a social agent, corresponding to an instrumental view on technology 
as neutral in the first instance and as opposed to the social human. In most robotic 
discourses, the human, as a vague concept, provides a social model from which to 
copy.83 There is a tendency in HR papers to use the human agenthood concepts as 
undefined social backdrops upon which to build the social robot agency upon. This is 
concerning but evident, even if there are also researchers like Nehaniv et al. (2005), 
who critically point out that a robot is not a human, nor a computer, and researchers 
must therefore be careful in applying the same principles. They write: 
‘Due to the situated embodied nature of such interactions and the non-
human nature of robots, it is not possible to directly carry over methods 
from human-computer-interaction (HCI) or rely entirely on insights from 
the psychology of human-human interaction’ (371). 
The social attribute attached to robots by roboticists can mean different things; from the 
humanoid appearance, to interactivity, and to the use in a human environment (HR does 
not always specify these environments, but Lin et al. (2012) and Royakkers & van Est 
(2016) point to professional elderly care as an important context). Hence, the social 
robot is distinguished, for instance, from an assembly line or war robot (Royakkers & 
van Est, 2016) because of a different use or appearance. Consequently, this leads to a 
different ethical debate around their use. I will argue in Chapter Seven that this is a 
                                                
83 ‘Social interaction with others is a capability of humans that comes effortlessly. From birth until the 
end of their life, humans are constantly exposed to and engaged in social behaviour and interactions with 
their parents, peers and offspring. The ability to interact with groups of other human beings in a seamless 
and coherent manner is arguably deeply intertwined with our general development, and as a result, it has 
been suggested that social interaction and collaboration has also helped shaped how the human 
intelligence has evolved and developed over the centuries. This is known as the Social Intelligence 
Hypothesis’ (Read, 2014: 1,2). 
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problem, since what a robot is used for does not relate to what computational autonomy 
these devices have or what ethical consequences their use could lead to. For a roboticist 
to decide that war robots are ethically more problematic is also correct, but only because 
the context of war is as such; it is not because the robot is more immorally acting than a 
social robot in elderly care. 
Royakkers & van Est (2016) continue by pointing out that the physical appearance of 
the robot depends largely on its function (10). For them, three important features are 
fused into a social robot, which are: 
‘[T]he physical appearance, physical handling, and observation 
capabilities of the robot. These characteristics are often interrelated. A 
certain appearance, for example, two legs, makes a particular action, 
such as walking, possible and other actions impossible or very difficult, 
such as flying’ (10,11). 
For the robot to act in a human environment is, for them, the minimum requirement and 
a straightforward argument to understand the robot as social through its placement.84 
For instance, Kanda & Ishiguro (2013) discuss the shift from industry robots into robots 
within ‘daily environments’ (2), which requires them to be interactive as another 
necessity. Whereby, Lin et al. (2012) expand this angle by amplifying the specific 
placement into private homes. They propose that ‘robots will become increasingly “co-
inhabitants” of humans’ (Lin et al., 2012: 26), assisting in private homes, in cleaning, 
                                                
84	The situational view is excluded from this debate (Tseng et al, 2016), which also reflects on the 
specificity within the context of application (i.e. specifics in interactions with groups).		
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housekeeping, child care, secretarial duties, and so on. Still, these co-habitants are not 
like vacuum cleaners, since these do interact with people in a significant way.  
For Scheutz (2012), social robots are about to become as important in society as 
computers already are in private homes. However, this will take time, since social 
robots are still a ‘recent invention’ (206). These will, nonetheless, become part of 
people’s daily routines, according to Scheutz. For him, social robots are very much 
related to computer and industrial robots, since social robots ‘contain computers (for 
their behaviour control) and share with industrial robots the properties of being robots 
(in the sense of being machines with motion or manipulation capabilities, or both)’ 
(206). Like industrial robots, social robots have the capability to initiate motion, of 
others or themselves, and thus to exhibit behaviour (compared to stationary objects like 
computers). By comparison to industrial robots, which are mostly used and positioned 
in factories, ‘social robots are directly targeted at consumers for service purposes’ (206) 
and for entertainment, but the bonding will be different, since social robots will be able 
to imitate and interact with their ‘owners’ (206). This brings up my point in not having 
to distinguish between the social robot as companion and as tracking device, but due to 
whatever reason, it is not aligned in this way within Robot Ethics. 
At no point do I suggest that there is a practical or possible separation in viewing the 
robot as either companion or computer. It is both, at any time. The concerns I have are 
on why the ethical robot camps do not make a clear cut on what to build the ethical 
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agency upon. However, this cut is not that easy to make, as Chapter Four showed and 
Chapter Seven will too, since it stems from different foci on agency and morality. 
One trend is additionally concerning, which I want to stress, since it enhances the 
humanoid design towards a total resemblance with a human body, yet these new models 
of robots, called geminoids, have almost no decisive autonomy in their interaction. This 
implies that a human-like appearance (of the robot) is hugely favoured instead of its 
technological autonomy. In practice, this means that these robots are always fully 
remotely controlled, instead of making use of their input channels (cameras, for 
instance). Good examples for this development are the popular geminoids, Erika or 
Sophia, which are more so Public Relations (PR) stunts than functional robots. 
Nonetheless, the PR element cannot be underestimated in this discussion. 
Problematically, I would align this to what Kahn et al. (2012) were presumably 
exploring in their study on moral appearance in Chapter Five; one I dismissed as 
ontologically accurate. 
Within the next section, I will explore how robot appearance, interaction, and perceived 
interactivity come together in social robots, and how this complicates their position as 
either perceived human-like agents or as computational interactive systems, which I 
claim are two camps of research. 
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On Perceived Interactivity and Anthropomorphism 
Summary: In this section, I emphasise the importance of human perception and 
anthropomorphism in the context of HR, as I continue to show that this dynamic in HR 
consequently influences Robot Ethics. I provide an overview of the literature around 
social robots and how anthropomorphism supports their position as companions and 
friends. I make use of Duffy (2003), Breazeal (2003), and Lemaignan et al. (2014) to 
support the exploration of anthropomorphism as an important dynamic for the social 
interaction between robot and humans; one that is ‘managing expectations’ (Duffy, 
2003: 178) of the human perceiver to then allow for social robots to be introduced into 
more environments, such as elderly care.  
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Making or designing technology to adapt to human-centred behaviour or interactivity 
might not be a new tendency, but HR positions itself within a paradigm change in the 
sciences. Nitsch & Popp (2014) write: 
‘With advances in psychology, neuroscience, computer science, and 
engineering, machine capacities continuously increase and expand. In 
addition, a paradigm shift is taking place from machine-centered to 
increasingly human-centered approaches to technological development. 
The field of robotics is currently particularly affected by this paradigm 
change’ (621). 
It is no surprise, in this sense, that HR aims towards making nicer robots or better 
integrating them into our daily lives. This involves the interaction with robots perceived 
as positive, believable (Pelachaud & Poggi, 2002: 182), meaningful, or natural 
(Menezes et al., 2007; Breazeal, 2002, 2003). However, this interaction (or HRI, as 
mentioned previously) is not always grounded on more than perceptive qualities and 
anthropomorphic clues. Hence, the side in HR that aims to improve the HRI is heavily 
invested in encouraging a perceived agenthood or companion position. One step would 
be the humanoid design of the robot, which encourages the human agent to perceive the 
social robot as a human-like (not as actually human, but neither as machine only) agent 
by evoking a meaningful, believable, and natural interaction between human and robot.  
Anthropomorphism (not to confuse with anthropocentrism; see key terms) derives from 
the Greek anthopos and morphe, meaning ‘the tendency to attribute human 
characteristics to inanimate objects, animals, or others with a view to helping us 
rationalise their actions’ (Duffy, 2003: 180). As Duffy argues, anthropomorphism 
favours the observer’s perspective in the interaction, thus the anthropomorphic view on 
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interaction. It can be understood as an ‘induction’ or encouragement, but not as a 
‘solution’ towards a successful HRI (181).  
The apparent human tendency to anthropomorphise human-like gestures, and therefore 
to treat human-like robots like humans (Breazeal, 2003: 169; 2004: xii; Broadbent, 
2017), is central to debates about social robots. Duffy (2003) accentuates the 
importance of anthropomorphism in robotic systems to allow interaction between the 
robot and the human to unfold. ‘A robot’s capacity to be able to engage in meaningful 
social interaction with people inherently requires the employment of a degree of 
anthropomorphic, or human-like, qualities whether in form of behaviour or both’ 
(Duffy, 2013: 178).  
According to Lemaignan et al. (2014), the reason why this induction works that well is 
because ‘people reason about an unknown stimulus based on a better-known 
representation of a related stimulus’ and this reasoning about a non-human agent is 
‘based on representation of the self or other humans’ (3). Hence, anthropomorphism can 
be understood as an interactive process between the humanoid sign (body, features, or 
humanoid limbs) and the human imagination to mistake such as representative for the 
recognised qualities. They refer to Lee et al. (2005) by pointing out two reasons why 
humans are tempted to anthropomorphise. One theory is that humans have an effect-
driven, biological tendency to respond to life-like behaviour or social cues they identify 
in an artefact that appears human-like. This means that aliveness and humanness are 
conflated purposefully, because they are related in the human organism. Lemaignan et 
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al. (2014) add a second perspective to this dynamic from a cognitive point of view by 
stating: 
[A]nthropomorphism is described through people’s specific mental 
model they construct about how an artefact works the way it does. We 
then anthropomorphize because it allows us to explain things we do not 
understand in terms that we do understand, and what we understand best 
is ourselves as human beings. This is consistent with the familiarity 
thesis. (…) people tend to thoughtfully develop a mental model of agents 
in their environment and make inferences about it based on what is 
familiar to them’ (3). 
There is a fine line between anthropomorphism and uncanniness, as the roboticist Mori 
(1970/2017) already argued 50 years ago. What Mori illustrated through the ‘uncanny 
valley’ graph is a likely negative human response to a humanoid and socially appearing 
robot under certain conditions. His research has influenced, and still influences, the 
design of humanoids (Royakkers & van Est, 2016: 10-16), even if its relevance is 
questioned by contemporary theories that take familiarity into account (Lemaignan et 
al., 2014). According to Royakkers & van Est (2016), Mori discovered that the…  
‘[…]more a robot looks like a person or an animal, the more positive and 
empathetic feelings it will evoke in people. If robots resemble people 
very strongly, but their behavior is not human enough, then Mori 
predicts a strong sense of unease. In this case, the appearance is 
humanlike, but there is very little familiarity. This is what Mori calls the 
uncanny valley’ (11).  
The potential uncanniness – a graphical valley in Mori’s statistic curve – leads to a 
‘sudden shift in our affinity’ (Lin et al., 2012: 26) that immediately stops the will to 
interact or trust the robot. For Lin et al. (2012), the humanoid alikeness does not need to 
be ‘completely human-like in order to be trusted by people’ (26) or to form an 
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emotional bond. They state that a positive response from humans can be evoked by 
dolls and puppets, even though they do not look exactly like humans. Mori’s work still 
explains, in a simple way, how alikeness and aliveness must correlate but not be 
identical, so that the robot is not seen as uncanny by the human (Ravetto-Biagioli, 2016; 
Duffy, 2003; Royakkers & Van Est, 2016).85 The reluctance to respond positively to 
humanoid robots stems, according to Mori, from a misbalance between alikeness and 
aliveness.  
Duffy (2003) elaborates on this by indicating that this requires finding the as-close-as-
possible proximity in humanoid design. Hence, anthropomorphism does not require that 
humanoid features in robots are identical to those of human bodies or faces in order for 
human qualities to be projected into them. Furthermore, it seems that the very humanoid 
features were not that essential in the early research on this process. What this early 
research on anthropomorphism by Reeves & Nass (1996) shows is that when humans 
interact with technology, they have a tendency to anthropomorphise even computers 
and other technology that exhibit human-like behaviour, such as speech or gestures 
(more the inference of empathy in Paiva et al., 2017). However, this projection process, 
as they describe it, evolves from the very interaction with a technology that is 
responsive, and not because the computer has humanoid features by design. They create 
a model called CSA (short for ‘computers as social actors’), a research paradigm that 
                                                
85 The paper on ‘The digital uncanny and the ghost effects’ by Ravetto-Biagioli (2016) offers an 
interesting exploration of uncanniness as a shifting concept, from an aesthetic experience facing a human-
like machine, to the technological capacity of digital interfaces to position the human simultaneously as 
an agent, data, and object. I will pick this up in the section on tracking in Chapter Six to contextualise it. 
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‘suggests that human interaction with a computer is fundamentally social and that 
humans apply wide sets of social characteristics to a computer when the computer 
manifests human-like characteristics such as language, social roles, gender, ethnicity, 
and personality’ (Lee et al., 2005: 540).  
Reeves & Nass (1996) observe that when ‘it comes to being social, people are built to 
make the conservative error: When in doubt, treat it as human’ (22). It is interesting that 
Reeves & Nass never specifically argued that the anthropomorphised device must 
necessarily exhibit a humanoid shape, but it seems such an essential factor for HR. 
Reeves & Nass’ wider research on the ‘media equation’ theory86 only ever pointed to 
the projection process as being essential, not the human alikeness also being such. 
Somehow, HR research accentuates the importance of humanoid features, which 
probably are meant to increase the anthropomorphic tendencies. Ultimately, the line 
between how human alikeness a shape can have before being perceived as uncanny, or 
how much it must be visually alike to guarantee an anthropomorphic projection, is still 
an undecided factor.  
For Scheutz (2012), the reason why humans anthropomorphise is grounded in human 
biology and emotion. For him, an anthropomorphic design also links to being able to 
                                                
86 Gunkel (2016) refers to Reeves & Nass’ work (1996) and makes a similar point, but without 
mentioning anthropomorphism. For him, what the CSA model brought out was that human subjects will 
‘irrespective of the actual intelligence possessed (or not) by the machine, tend to respond to technology as 
another socially aware and interactive subject. In other words, even when experienced users know quite 
well that they are engaged with a machine, they make the “conservative error” (…)’ (242) to 
anthropomorphise. 
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create an emotional bond with an artefact, as with a humanoid robot, despite knowing 
that a robot cannot feel the same emotionality as humans might have for it or even see 
in its actions. He writes: 
‘Social robots are clearly able to push our “Darwinian buttons,” those 
mechanisms that evolution produced in our social brains to cope with the 
dynamics and complexities of social groups, mechanisms 
that automatically trigger inferences about other agents’ mental states, 
beliefs, desires, and intentions’ (216). 
Having acknowledged that anthropomorphic responses are important, it must be 
outlined how these are established. For him, anthropomorphism relies heavily on clues, 
which are ideally leading to a natural, meaningful, or moral perception of the robot, 
even if it is only based on a projective process; something upon which Scheutz is not 
fully willing to build his model agency. 
Looking at the human expectations or projections of robots and Scheutz’s ‘perceived 
autonomy’ offers a good way to illustrate my concerns with an anthropomorphised 
robotic agency in the HRI. What a perceived autonomy does is never allow for the 
human interactor to know how interactive or responsive a robot is. The robot appears to 
be spontaneously and autonomously interactive, even if it does not respond to any input 
or is aware of its environment, but this interaction originates either from a developer 
operating it remotely or because it is fulfilling a pre-determined program. This reduces 
the agenthood of the robot drastically, but it is not seen as a significant problem that 
needs clarification.  
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In this case, the robot agent position relies on what Scheutz calls critically the ‘false 
pretence’ (2012: 215) agenthood, whereby he means that a human who engages with a 
robot is made to believe that the robot is a present and social agent, and while it might 
be a present functional technology, it is far from necessarily being interactive or 
accurate. What this creates, exclusively, is a threefold doubt in: the robot acting on its 
own through its response-driven abilities (to some degree, autonomous), or what a robot 
can act out as it is remote controlled (to a smaller degree, operationally autonomous), 
and to what degree this means the robot is an actual companion or agent only because it 
can move its limbs.  
Nonetheless, attributes such as natural, believable, and meaningful are used metaphors 
to increase the trust and engagement coming from human agents. However, on what 
grounds should this trust be built? I examine next why the rhetoric around these 
concepts is highly problematic and does not clarify what autonomy or interactivity 
means. Naturality, for instance, is important since it refers to familiarity, and this 
supports the dynamics of anthropomorphism (Lemaignan et al. 2014). Nonetheless, it 
remains unclear to me what research means by natural behaviour for a humanoid robot 
- a man-made, bulky machine. Mostly, what natural behaviour and expression in HRI 
means is that the design and behaviour of a robot must give the impression as if it 
emerges naturally within the HRI, which I think is almost an oxymoron, considering 
that the robot does not exhibit anything natural, per se. I suppose that naturality has a 
difficult role to play, because when it comes to Mori’s and Duffy’s work, the robot only 
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behaves/looks natural enough while as natural as possible, but must keep this balance 
by not becoming too close in its humanness.  
The idea of natural behaviour in the robot is not a new concept, as Menezes et al. (2007) 
argue. In 1989, it was Engelberger (1989) who introduced the idea of robots serving 
humans in everyday environments. Since then, a considerable number of mature robotic 
systems have been implemented, which claim to be servants or personal assistants (see 
survey in Fong et al., 2002). The argument behind this is often that the behaviour/design 
of the robot must appear as natural as possible, so as to allow the human to trust the 
social robot as an agent (Lin et al., 2005). Clearly, after what I have being pointing out, 
the idea of trusting robots should not be grounded on the illusion of them judging or 
acting consciously.  
For Kirby et al. (2010), the question of natural and easy-to-operate are bound together. 
To be able to understand robots means to be able to use them easily, especially in 
health-care environments in which non-roboticists must be able to interact with them 
without much training. To do this, robots are ideally responsive and display emotions 
such as moods, just like humans do (322), and do not require much operational 
knowledge. 
Further, natural also aligns to meaningful behaviour, so the robot is able to manage 
people’s expectations (Duffy, 2003: 178) while being believable – from being friendly 
to authoritative in conduct (Pelachaud & Poggi, 2002: 182). While there is lots of 
agreement on these factors being important in the HRI, De Greeff & Belpaeme (2015) 
 
 
 
161 
are rare exceptions in this research field. They point out that the HRI should not only be 
natural, ‘but preferably also desirable’ (26) by the human agent. What meaningful 
gestures are, for instance, appears to be a question of projection and expectation instead 
of ability to interpret (Flusser 2014), since to establish meaning in the robotic system is 
not only difficult, but requires clear signification. I stress that the making of meaning 
between two forms of judgement systems, human and robot, cannot be achieved simply 
by following an aesthetic similarity alone.  
For Menezes et al. (2007), two more aspects define what natural interaction is supposed 
to be like: physical presence and predictability. He states: 
‘The first is to facilitate tasks, which involve direct physical cooperation 
between humans and robots. Hence, physical presence is important. (…) The 
second issue is that robot independent movements must appear familiar and 
predictable to humans. Furthermore, in order to be more effective towards a 
seeming interaction, a similar appearance to humans is an important 
requirement’ (367). 
According to Royakkers & van Est (2016), naturality also relates to performing the 
same actions as humans would. For instance, a flying robot might be strange to relate to 
(11), just as a robot in which behaviour and appearance do not synchronise (Mori, 
1970/2017) would also be considered uncanny. This is a reason why, for instance, 
assembly line robots, ‘Roombas’ (vacuum cleaning robots), or utility robots are neither 
social nor humanoid, even if they fit Kanda & Ishiguro’s interactive context (Lee et al, 
2005: 539).  
What the quote (above) by Menezes et al. (2007) quickly brushes over is the mix-up 
between what a human and a robot each need to perform or live up to when they 
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interact, since both sides have completely different starting points on what a social 
interaction is (the robot has none prior to being programmed). Natural behaviour also 
requires the agent position to be believable, as Pelachaud and Poggi (2002) explain in 
their research. They unpack this angle through what they have labelled as the ‘BIEA’ 
(Believable Interactive Embodied Agent).  
Believable, for them, means that the BIEA must be able to ‘manage’ (181) certain 
aspects, such as owning information on their area of application, on the user’s mental 
state and emotions, and on the user’s intentions and beliefs, but also be capable of 
deciding when to provide or withhold information, since ‘humans sometimes do not 
display their emotions’ (181). The BIEA must also be able to communicate, providing 
the agent wants them to, and is able to express gazes, gestures, and body movements. 
Further, Pelachaud & Poggi emphasise the importance of the context. Their concept 
investigates specific personality traits of the robot. They ask critically in their research: 
‘Do we want a friendly agent or an authoritative agent? Using too simple models 
of communicative behaviour might produce a poor agent with which the user 
will rapidly feel bored. Again, some applications require caricature and over-
expressive behaviours, while others need very accurate and realistic behaviours’ 
(182).  
As I already mentioned, to decide on what extent of human alikeness in design makes 
an ‘optimal anthropomorphism’ (Duffy, 2003: 182) is difficult to decide, considering 
that this interaction, grounded on anthropomorphisms, is a dynamic process according 
to Lemaignan et al. (2014: 2). Nonetheless, the relationship between anthropomorphism 
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and interaction is more complex and not equally positioned in terms of qualities or 
capacities.  
There are also important voices in HR who are critical of the anthropomorphic 
induction as a social standard. Ford (2014), for instance, claims that humans place as 
much trust in automated systems as they place in humans (34) by referring to the 
‘automation bias’ (Mosier et al., 1998). This briefly advocates that humans trust 
automated systems just as much as other humans, even when they are not humanoids, 
but it also states that when these fail, the trust cannot be easily restored again.  
Breazeal (in Lee et al., 2005) reflects on how a perception-based interaction model leads 
to a lower expectation of sociability in the robot. Breazeal, one of the major figures in 
Social Robotics, is, in fact, very critical of anthropomorphism as a legitimate 
ontological argument in social robot design.87 For her, the focus on such a visible design 
level is insufficient to tackle the question on sociability88 and agency of robots as social 
agents. Breazeal considers that anthropomorphism remains the lowest form of 
sociability in a social robot, since it is only appearance-driven and superficial. Instead, 
for her, social interactivity must be the highest form of sociability, since this reflects the 
robot’s abilities to be truly interactive, overcoming the divide of appearance/essence. 
                                                
87 It is hence not surprising that Breazeal’s research has moved away from humanoid social robots. She is 
considered a pioneer in Social Robotics with developing one of the first social robots, KISMET. Her new 
creation, Jibo, resembles a human body only minimally. It is, rather, an advanced and autonomous home 
assistance system she still calls a social robot nonetheless. More on Jibo at 
https://www.jibo.com/technology/ (Accessed: 20.04.2018), and in Guizzo (2015). 
88 For Breazeal, as for most roboticists, the social aspect is added to the robot as an instrument; sociability 
is not inherent to technology.  
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Breazeal pushes for the capacities of social robots to become much more interactive. 
She justifies this with: 
‘As the most primitive social robots, socially evocative robots utilize the 
human tendency to anthropomorphize objects and rely heavily on users’ 
affective responses, (…). If robots can recognize and manifest natural 
human-interaction modalities such as speech and gestures, they become 
social interface robots. (…) receptive robots have at least a modest level 
of social cognition, which enables them—through a simple mechanism 
such as imitation— to learn things (or modify their internal 
representation of the world) from social interaction. Nevertheless, they 
are not as fully socially functional as human beings. With sophisticated 
models of social cognition, some robots can even proactively seek social 
interaction to satisfy their internal states replicating human goals and 
desires. (…) these are sociable robots’ (Breazeal in Lee et. al 2005: 538).  
Damiano & Dumouchel (2018) agree that anthropomorphism and interaction are related 
and must support each other. Relying solely on realist humanoid design is not enough as 
they point out: 
‘The basic hypothesis is that strong realism in either of these two factors 
allows a robot to reach the “social threshold” where humans experience 
its presence as that of another social agent and are disposed to socially 
interact with the machine. This implies that a highly anthropomorphic 
robot can produce that social effect even when behavioral realism is low, 
and, vice versa, that behavioral realism will lead to anthropomorphic 
projection even in the absence of a human-like appearance. Things, 
however, are not quite that simple, in particular, the relation between the 
two factors appears to be asymmetrical’ (2).  
As Breazeal (2003), Lee et al. (2005), and Read (2014) also argue in their work, the 
interactive ability of the robot to respond to the human cannot be perceived; it must be 
built on the robot’s ability to socially interact. Therefore, the introduction of 
anthropomorphic projection might be important, but, according to Menezes et al. 
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(2007), Duffy (2003), Royakkers & van Est (2016), and Breazeal (2002, 2003), it is not 
the only aspect necessary for a social interaction. From an HR perspective, it remains 
the visible, design-driven explanation of the social interaction. 
After I surveyed and reflected upon why anthropomorphism is an important aspect for 
the HRI – but, as such, it remains problematic for a perception-based concept of 
agenthood – I also discussed attributes given to the social robot such as naturality, 
believability, and uncanniness. What I focussed on with the anthropomorphic agenthood 
debate was that social robots are understood through their visible humanness in HR, as 
the design aims to balance and compromise between aliveness and alikeness in looks 
and behaviour. As I already mentioned, reaching an ‘optimal anthropomorphism’ 
(Duffy, 2003: 182) in this dynamic process proves difficult. Still, the perceptive 
alikeness often dominates and drives the constitution of robot agency, as I conclude 
critically. Therefore, the perceptive and projected qualities do not only complicate the 
positioning of any agenthood in social robots, as I illustrated through Coeckelbergh’s 
work and Chapter Two, but I laid out that this view is manifested in HR research 
without much reflection on what it might mean for ethical accountability questions.  
Next, I review the complementing side to the anthropomorphised companion position, 
as I move on to explaining the computational capacities of robots ethically, which links 
to my concerns in Chapter Three on data and tracking. I shift to explaining the role of 
the computational interaction and architecture of the HRI; a view that, I think, is 
underdeveloped in Robot Ethics, but that is highly consequential for the ethical 
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dimension. However, before beginning this new exploration, I expand on two interlude 
sections. The first offers a different perspective on anthropomorphism, and the second 
reflects on the theoretical imprecision around HR terminology and ambitions, which I 
see leading to problematic conflations of ontological epistemes, projected expectations, 
and capacities around robot agenthood or agency. 
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On Anthropomorphism, Social Robots and Synthetic Ethics  
Summary: At this point, I incorporate a brief interlude section on anthropomorphism 
seen in a new ethical light, as Damiano & Dumouchel (2018) suggested. Their 
philosophical perspective positions social robots as a new ‘social species’ (xii) instead 
of only comparing them to the human agent, which is a view not necessarily found in 
the major robot ethical discussions, nor in HR. As they embrace anthropomorphism and 
try to incorporate it into an affective and relational view on robots and humans, I 
consider this a valuable discussion, but struggle with fully incorporating it into my 
ethical discussion, since it grounds too much on how robots are perceived and 
responded to. 
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Damiano & Dumouchel (2018) offer a more progressive, philosophical angle on the 
social robot and its affective relationship to the human. They suggest seeing the social 
robot as a ‘new social species’ (xii), as a different kind of social agent, instead of as a 
human-like pseudo-agent or humanoid copy, which is either critiqued as a bad replica 
simulating human attributes or as deceiving human agents because of this. 
Ontologically seen, I agree that their view is more considered than the humanoid 
appearance/computational qualities, or real/fake dichotomies when simulating human 
attributed in robots. However, their work is purely theoretical and does not address 
issues beyond the agenthood discussion, as in practical accountability questions. Even if 
they suggest a much more fluid idea of agencies between human and robot, the ethical 
issues beyond anthropomorphism are not addressed, in my view.  
They provide a challenging angle on HR and Robot Ethics with their suggestion of an 
‘Internal Robotics’ research area (Dumouchel & Damiano, 2017: 121). Such a research 
area works against the duality of the traditional dichotomy dividing ‘strong AI’ or 
‘weak AI’ (Duffy, 2003). What they suggest is that anthropomorphism should not be 
thought of as a deception, because this angle still reinforces dichotomies on real/fake 
agents, intelligence, or emotions, which is not useful for an in-depth discussion. They 
respond to Turkle’s work critically by arguing that the human response to a robot can be 
genuinely emotional and the human’s bond does not have to be any less genuine or 
emotional just because the robots are not feeling anything in return (Damiano & 
Dumouchel, 2018: 5). 
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The difference between Dumouchel & Damiano’s (2017) view as philosophers who 
think about the social robot, compared to views from Robot Ethics or HR, is that they 
suggest looking at the fluidity between the two entities and not at the alikeness between 
human and non-human bodies. This is apparent through their interest in studying the 
affective relationship, rather that arguing about what any agent, be it human or robot, 
really feels. The ‘affect loop’ (Höök, 2009) is one important concept they specifically 
point out as useful in this debate, despite it coming from a robotics background. Yet, it 
suits the idea of Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) to think of emotions away from 
‘intraindividual’ spaces (xi) and to see ‘emotions ‘“interindividual”, and not hidden 
from public view’ (xi).  
They suggest revisiting Höök’s (2009) model of the ‘affect loop’. In this model, the 
‘emotional’ robot is described as owning the capacity to engage users in a dynamic 
interaction, which includes affective expressions and appropriate responses that trigger 
further reactions on the part of both the human and its artificial partner. The Höök 
(2009) model of the affect loop is supposed to make the user respond affectively to the 
robot, and involve it step-by-step towards bonding and feeling more and more involved 
with the system. This is ‘a way that enhances the robot’s social presence and favours 
human–robot social interaction’ (Paiva et al., 2015: 1). 
For Damiano & Dumouchel (2018), anthropomorphism is a dynamic that is symbolic 
for a ‘social threshold’ in the social robot. This view comes back to the required balance 
between human alikeness and human aliveness in the robot that Duffy and Mori refer to 
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in their research. This balance must be achieved so the robot is not perceived as 
uncanny (Mori, 1970; Duffy, 2003). For them, this balance is situated between the 
autonomy of a lifelike behaviour of the robot and its features of human alikeness. 
However, although uncanniness is a problem for them as well, Damiano & Dumouchel 
(2018) do not mind that the robot is being anthropomorphised by the human perceiver, 
since they place greater importance upon the difference between ascribing and inferring, 
which must be kept clearly differentiated. They argue that anthropomorphism must 
always refer to ascribing qualities, not to inferring ones. Hence, the idea of a perceived 
morality in a ‘psychopathic’ robot (Coeckelbergh, 2010), as morality inferred from the 
actions it performs, is as flawed in this view. I assume that Robot Ethics and HR are 
blurring the line between these two approaches purposefully. 
Damiano & Dumouchel (2018) offer a discussion about ‘Synthetic Ethics’ (7) as a 
contingency of Internal Robotics, which aims to overcome questions on real or fake 
robotic qualities or emotions, because, as they argue, the ‘simple equation between 
‘simulation’ and ‘imposture’ is not only unable to account for fundamental ethical 
differences, but also tends to misrepresent them’ (7). However, the question on how to 
overcome a perceived morality or other qualities remains open, as I see it. Even if they 
suggest distinguishing between inferred and ascribed qualities for the robot, how are 
these distinguished and can this be done at all?  
These unanswered questions trouble my investigation. Their work does not address how 
the visually reinforced human alikeness of social robots will stop the human from 
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mistaking their apparent agenthood for an actual one. Since humans know that robots 
are not human agents rationally, there seems to be a fine line between why 
anthropomorphism allows to project human qualities onto non-human entities. To 
address issues arising with anthropomorphism and social robots, they promote a 
research area on Synthetic Ethics, since, as they say, anthropomorphism and robots will 
continue to occupy HR research. Therefore, anthropomorphism must be discussed 
further within the ethical discourse, because social robots will be increasingly used and 
made. They state: 
‘What SR needs are meta-level ethical analyses leading to guidelines that 
help it maximize the benefits and minimize the dangers of the 
construction and integration of artificial social agents in our social 
ecologies. That is why it is urgent to develop a different form of ethical 
reflection for SR [Social Robotics]. An ethics that shares SR’s 
interactionist embodied approach, and, while recognizing the irreducible 
(epistemological, phenomenological, operational, etc.) differences that 
distinguish human–robot from human– human interactions, grants to our 
exchanges with social robots the status of a new, specific, certainly 
limited, but genuine, form of social relationships’ (8). 
While I do support their challenging of agencies or dichotomies in SR/HR, as much as 
real/fake humanness or what social bodies are, I do not identify sufficient answers to the 
questions raised about ethical issues concerning social robots as tracking devices and as 
dataveillance structures. My problem remains that, for this context, Damiano & 
Dumouchel (2018) encourage anthropomorphic tendencies and shift the ethical 
discussion onto how humans bond with robots. This is a legitimate way to argue, but 
not one that helps me to resolve the questions on moral agency or the accountability of 
robots.  
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The Influence of HR Rhetorics for Agency Epistemes  
Summary: In the second interlude section, I reflect on my concerns with the rhetorical 
strategies in HR (and partially AI) research. I assume that the wider rhetorical 
imprecision I observed encourages an inconsistency in how agency models of robots are 
formed. I consider the discussion on agency, appearance, and capacities to be 
foundational for every theoretical exploration on social robots and equally influential 
for ethical research. What I find problematic is that the anthropomorphic ambitions in 
HR – to position social robots as agents and companions – are amplified by the 
rhetorical blurriness of projected qualities and actual computational qualities. 
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What I identified early on were multiple rhetorical inconsistencies within the research in 
HR, and their influence on conceptual views on agency. These often originate from a 
strategic imprecision when talking about social robots as perceived agents (taking the 
angle of visible interaction and perception), or their robotic/technological agency, as in 
their computational autonomy (taking the invisible computational angle not perceived 
by a human). As I showed already, the association of human values or attributes is used 
to upgrade robots from machines to agents. Next, I want to discuss the blurring between 
rhetorics and epistemes and why such does not help in understanding what agency or 
ethical view to study robots with. 
What I notice is that wider epistemological foundations around concepts such as 
morality, emotions, human, or agenthood are rarely reflected upon specifically. 
However, these are conceptually implied within the theoretical framework in HR and 
Robot Ethics (Wallach & Allen try contextualising moral philosophical traditions in 
their work, as much as Floridi does). Most of these terms used in HR or Robot Ethics 
are borrowed from the Humanities, from moral philosophies, or from Psychology, and 
used as a supportive theoretical backbone to understand robots with. Unfortunately, this 
leads to new, unchallenged concerns. I believe this to be just one worrisome tendency in 
the discussions around wider robotic ethics. 
The lack of clarity continues into the research on emotional robots. As I also spent 
substantial time surveying AE (artificial emotion) research, I struggle with certain 
simplifications in interdisciplinary models, such as emotion or intelligence. For 
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instance, in Picard’s work in Affective Programming (2000) or in Ekman’s concept 
(2003), FACS (Facial Action Coding System),89 I could find a problematic 
appropriation of what constitutes emotions. The FACS allows for the creation of a 
detection mechanism to understand how ‘people (...) express their inner states’ (Read, 
2014: 4), and is at the core of a simulation and detection mechanism that maps 
predefined human emotional expression to the corresponding emotional state. This then 
tempts researchers in HR to speak about ‘emotional’ robots (Parisi & Petrosino, 2010), 
despite this being an association and projection that comes from the robot being able to 
detect/track human expressions and de/codify these.  
The problem I see here is that using a term like emotion (often used synonymously to 
affect in HRI) is not always unpacked fully and it is easy to lose track in regards to 
which kind of emotion concept robotics literature refers, and which models are used to 
code emotion - to be able to detect it. Scheutz (2012) identifies the same blurriness as 
problematic and writes: 
‘For example, researchers who work on emotions often say loosely that 
their robots have emotions, implement emotions, use emotions, and so 
on. This kind of suggestive language (e.g., during research presentations 
or even in published research papers) makes it easy for nonexpert 
readers to conflate the control processes in these artifacts with similarly 
labelled, yet substantively very different control processes in natural 
organisms, particularly humans’ (215). 
To some extent, this imprecision and the blurriness between the projection and the 
qualities might be the reasons why Dumouchel & Damiano (2017, 2018), in the 
                                                
89 The FASC will be unpacked in further detail in the section on An Ethical View on Tracking. 
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previous section, do suggest moving beyond this contradictory ‘real/fake emotion’ 
thinking in social robots. By doing so, this would enable researchers to avoid becoming 
trapped in ontologically problematic debates, which either consider robots as not having 
any emotions and as being deceptive companions, or, wrongly, as them being emotional 
companions (as a reminder, this is Turkle’s major critique on the companionship 
position, but it might be too dualistic as well).  
Even if emotions are considered as exclusively human traits linked to survival and 
mortality (Hay, 2014), there could be compromise found in arguing that robots are not 
emotional, neither are they expressing emotions to deceive, but the engagement of the 
human interactor in the HRI might still evoke very real emotions towards the robot 
without labelling the human agent as deceived or delusional. The fine line will be, in my 
view, decided by what can be expected of the robot, on the grounds of this bond. 
On a wider scale, I assess that HR research tends not to pay much attention to 
contemporary debates in fields such as, Critical (Feminist) Theory, Posthumanism, or in 
New Materialism either, which negotiate links between the complexity of emotions and 
affects (Ahmed, 2004; Blackman, 2012; Massumi, 2002) and other concepts, such as 
gender, agential hierarchies, material discourse on technology (Braidotti, 2006; Barad, 
2003; Parikka, 2015), and data (Pötzsch, 2017). Instead, HR research retreats often to 
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the Cartesian dichotomy of human/technology, cognitive/emotional, and inside/outside, 
and supports a conflation between affect/emotion (Gawne, 2012).90  
However, many begin to share my concerns on this matter of the rhetorical blurriness or 
the aligned theoretical conflation (Hall, 2017),91 although these voices come mainly 
from outside of HR research. Common critique is pointed at the imprecision 
(encouraged as much by the robotic industry) and the promotional and prolific rhetoric 
on the robotic capacities that are too easily associated with humanlike agenthood. 
Lipton (2017) writes in the Technology Review on the popular research robot, Pepper, 
that: 
‘Other robot makers skirt the issue of their machines’ emotional 
intelligence. SoftBank Robotics, for instance, which sells Pepper—a 
“pleasant and likeable” humanoid robot built to serve as a human 
companion—claims that Pepper can “perceive human emotion,” adding 
that “Pepper loves to interact with you, Pepper wants to learn more about 
your tastes, your habits, and quite simply who you are.” But though 
Pepper might have the ability to recognize human emotions, and though 
Pepper might be capable of responding with happy smiles or expressions 
of sadness, no one’s claiming that Pepper actually feels such emotions.’ 
(Lipton, 2017). 
I urge not to underestimate the deceptive element of a robot’s abilities, which is drawn 
from various statements that are too easily made, since a non-expert user or customer 
                                                
90 Gawne (2012) points to the influence of Picard in HRI (Human-Robot-Interaction) and HCI (Human-
Computer-Interaction) research. According to Gawne, Picard applies a ‘quantifiable’ view on affect 
considered problematic (106).  
91 The article on the geminoid Erika is very critical towards her qualities and capacities. It points to the 
issues in the robotic industry to be promotional and often to sound patronising and even sexist. Available 
at http://approximatelycorrect.com/2017/04/17/press-failure-guardian-meet-erica/ (Accessed 25.04.2018). 
I have no opportunity in this thesis to discuss, even if being critical of, the wider concerns that social 
robots raise in gender research. Especially, the work on geminoids promotes a problematic image and 
status of women in society that is worrisome. 
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could increasingly live, work, or be taken care of by those devices, yet does not 
understand or misunderstands their functionality or operations (Singh, 2015). The 
promotion of futuristic expectations grounded in nostalgic science fiction ideas of social 
robots creates ethical problems, which cannot be underestimated. 
I think, at this point, some concerns return to the problem of media literacy, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, in which I pointed out that people, especially in elderly care, 
must be fully informed about the technology to which they are exposed. Hence, much of 
the advertised behaviours or functions of social robots that HR publicises through 
research reports are not clearly differentiated. NAO and Pepper, the most popular social 
robots used in research at this point, are not sufficiently autonomous in their interactive 
abilities. (This does not mean that they are not operationally functional; these devices 
can track movement, for instance, but might not move responsively.) Although they can 
undertake a responsive conversation with a human, they have trouble reacting to 
unexpected input. The roboticist Toni Belpaeme states their limitations very openly by 
writing that: ‘We are still a number of years away from robots being able to interact 
with people on a deep level, but we’re making progress all of the time.’92 This might be 
his way of saying; responsive autonomy and visible interaction – and agential 
accountability – are far from being the robotic reality.  
                                                
92 More on Belpaeme’s previous work at the University of Plymouth and the challenges in Robotics can 
be found at https://www.plymouth.ac.uk/news/connect/winter16/robot-home-brings-together-family-of-
research (Accessed on 10.02.18). 
 
 
 
178 
Some terminology confusion in HR Robotics research stems from what I perceive as a 
dichotomous view on technology as being either neutral or intelligent (which follows a 
persistent anthropocentric approach). Gunkel (2016) responds to this by writing that the 
two sides in AI research complicate the discussion, even if there is not one consistent 
discussion on AI with which to begin. In this thesis, I outline an absurd distinction 
between apparent, as if, and actual morality in technological systems. This conflict is 
situated in AI research but impacts upon HR. In this context, there is a differentiation 
between ‘weak AI’ versus ‘strong AI’ (Duffy, 2003).  
On the one hand, the research has not progressed as far as expected in terms of 
creativity or the ability of the robot to make judgments as an intelligent machine, which 
are qualities still lacking in machines (defining the deficits depends on how intelligence 
is conceptualised). Nonetheless, on the other hand, AI has created learning systems that 
can ‘make decisions and take real-world actions with little or no human direction or 
oversight’ (239). Gunkel quotes what Winograd (1990) wrote almost 30 years ago by 
writing:  
‘[A]rtificial intelligence has not achieved creativity, insight, and 
judgment. But its shortcomings are far more mundane: we have not yet 
been able to construct a machine with even a modicum of common sense 
or one that can converse on everyday topics in ordinary language’ 
(Winograd, 1990, quoted in Gunkel, 2016: 239).  
This returns to one fact: making a difference between an intelligent system and an 
apparently intelligent system is not an unsubstantiated one, since what is apparent 
intelligence is measured up with human intelligence, not algorithmic intelligence. I 
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notice further that, from the human perceptive on the perceived level of technology, it is 
hard to distinguish between a robot being intelligent or one only appearing intelligent, 
since the human perceiver never really knows who or what controls the robot and 
whether it is interactive.93 And yet, some levels are totally invisible. The problems I see 
here are, therefore, not only on the anthropomorphic induction being deceptive, as 
Turkle (2005) argued, but also in statements like Duffy’s (2003) on the robot being able 
to ‘pretend to be intelligent’ and to ‘cheat’ (180), since both mistake inferring intent 
with having intent.  
I would like to explain this implication in more detail. I would say that cheating requires 
an immoral intention and the ability to distinguish between morally good and bad 
behaviour. However, it is still not technically possible to reproduce or simulate human 
reasoning in a robotic system, so that these devices can perform such a sophisticated 
reflection process. The question instead always comes back to: Can the robot execute 
man-made implemented rules or not? This might imply that terms such as intelligence, 
morality, and other discursive concepts are reduced to a set of rules, (which might be 
reductionist, but at least possible) and nonetheless, these rules must be executable in 
their very reduction.94 Hence, to correlate the questions on intelligence or morality to 
appearance means to correlate these to human alikeness. Aiming for this will always 
                                                
93 It is impossible to distinguish between these two terms, as illustrated in Bruce’s et al. (2000: 4002) 
work on robots used in drama. Here, they first argue about an importance of AI for a believable, 
autonomous personality of a robot with emotional responsiveness. They then conclude that, due to the 
complexity of emotions, the representation of ‘emotional behavior informed by biology and psychology 
is an important goal in agent research, [but] it remains a distant one at best’ (4002).  
94 More on this debate is well documented in Ward (2015), who explains the conflict between ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ AI, relating to how intelligence evolves into morality. 
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raise the critique of the robot being a worse copy of a human agent, but ignoring its own 
agency. 
Dumouchel & Damiano’s (2017, 2018) philosophical re-figuration towards ‘Internal 
Robotics’ and ‘Synthetic Ethics’ offers a new angle from a techno-philosophical camp 
that tries to overcome the appearance/essence dichotomy in social robotics - the as if 
trap - as much as the already established research path towards ’strong AI’ (Duffy, 
2003) or ‘new AI’ (Cañamero & Lewis, 2016). As I already stressed, I am doubtful of 
the practical realisation of their theoretical concept, since it remains problematic to align 
such to the HR mindset. As pointed out several times, I strongly advocate for thinking 
beyond an anthropomorphic ethics exclusively.  
I now move to the complementary discussion on social robots as companions; the 
computational interactivity within the robot’s inner shell and beneath apparent or 
perception-based discussions. I will examine the computational agency and tracking 
interactivity of social robots in the next section and state how this capacity contributes 
to their agency and morality discussions essentially. 
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On Computational Interaction of Robots and Tracking  
Summary: Within this section, I focus on explaining the computational structure and 
architecture of social robots, as discussed in HR and in wider Robotics and mainly 
supported by Rossini’s work (2012) on gesture recognition. The assigning of agenthood 
to social robots requires a wider understanding of computational autonomy, one I 
continue to debate in Chapter Seven, when the moral agency of algorithms re-enters the 
discussion in more depth. I increasingly link data ethical concerns (Chapter Three) to 
the computational sociability (Chapter Six) to algorithmic morality (Chapter Seven), so 
as to illustrate that each of these themes operates with its own agency model, and that 
none of them are connected ethically yet, while all of them circle around the social 
robot’s ability to track, collect data, and to interact, in my view.  
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Almost twenty years ago, Billard & Dautenhahn (1999) predicted that social robots as 
embodied agents in society will be accepted when they learn to recognise one another, 
engage in social interaction, and explicitly communicate with and learn from one 
another. If this were to be possible today, then social robots would deserve the status of 
agents, but, for now, this remains a fantasy. As I reflected on in Chapter Four, artefacts 
have inherent agency, but not necessarily a moral one (Johnson & Noorman, 2014), and 
as such agency may increase, so could their computational autonomy (Wallach & Allen, 
2009).  
As I moved on in this thesis, I contextualised my critical perspective on the 
anthropomorphic agenthood position of social robots and increasingly shift from an 
anthropomorphic critique towards an anthropocentric model, which will prove 
problematic as well. As I showed, HR is a field that addresses social robots from their 
perceptive dimensions, but does not ignore their computational qualities either. The 
discussions are fragmented, instead, into sub-research, such as HRI or gesture 
recognition research, which I will explore next. 
I stress that building expectations for social robots to be accountable agents is even 
more worrisome, considering their increased use in elderly care and their practical 
ethical consequences that I highlighted in Chapters Two and Three. There, I was 
concerned with the perspective on robots’ human alikeness or human sociability. 
However, as I pointed out, looking at robots only as humanoid bodies does not support 
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an understanding of their interactive abilities, which extend beyond their visible 
features.  
Lee et al. (2005) support my critique by consequently stating that a social robot needs 
computational ‘capabilities of conducting a wide range of social functions [e.g., speech 
recognition, speech generation, visual recognition, affective responses, turn-taking 
(interactivity), and artificial intelligence]’ (540). Hence, laying out the processes 
involved in and required for the computational interaction in the HRI are, in my view, 
enormously important to understand robot agency ethically. The reason is an obvious 
one: Computational autonomy of robots allows for robots to navigate through a human 
environment and with a human subject or other objects (Menezes et al., 2007: 367).  
The concept of the natural interaction, which I previously discussed, does not only need 
to be perceived, but it also links to a system running in the background that encourages 
a real-time responsiveness. According to Ziafati: ‘Robots that are supposed to interact 
with humans have to process a great deal of information very quickly and adapt their 
behaviours according to the interaction’ (2016). 
Royakkers & van Est (2016) emphasise the technological complexity of robots as 
interactive systems, and encourage looking at their complexity as computational 
systems and not just at their perceived humanlike agenthood. They point to the 
multiplicity of networks and systems at work in what is understood to be an entity and 
state:  
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‘[T]he modern robot is not usually a self-sufficient system. In order to 
understand the possibilities and impossibilities of the new robotics, it is 
important to realize that the service robot is usually supported by a 
network of information technologies, as is, for example, the Internet. 
Thus, this implies, in particular, networked robots’ (11).  
In this quote, they point to two important aspects. First, robots are part of a ‘dynamic 
social practice’ in which the human and robot must learn to communicate. Second, the 
robots contain a microcosm of networks of information technologies, programmes such 
as Python or C++ (Read, 2014), and, often, at least one sensory (visual) detection 
system, such as a camera (Brèthes et al., 2004; Fong et al., 2002; Royakkers & van Est, 
2016). It makes sense to diverge into a computer scientific discourse to understand how 
computational interaction works, in terms of how the computational architecture 
understands interaction between modules.  
I will focus on Rossini’s (2012) work in this section, so as to provide an overview on 
how gesture recognition modules function within the wider robotic system. Gesture 
recognition is a good example, in my view, through which to illustrate tracking and 
social interaction on a computational level. What Rossini (2012) introduces is, in fact, 
an illustration of tracking as a process, but he does this on a wider level, as 
computational architecture. He compares the robot with other Embodied Conversational 
Agents, so-called ECAs, which do not face the same difficulties in engineering as robots 
do. Rossini focusses on the understanding of gesture simulation as essential for the 
sociable engagement between human and robot, the so called HRI. Both Read (2014) 
and Rossini (2012) mention the use of C/C++ programming language, which operates in 
two main sub-systems. They mention the necessity of ‘the parser’ that allows for the 
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recognition of the users’ speech, gestures, and sometimes facial expressions, and ‘the 
planner’ that allows for a response by the robotic agent (152). The parser is based on a 
model of the user - in this case, a human input, in the form of gestures and expressions. 
This requires the robot to have a social model of interaction embedded in it, before it is 
able to recognise or interact with a human. This is possible because of the parser being 
fed with an embedded ‘cognitive and behavioural model’ or ‘some sort of emotional 
intelligence to allow for emotional recognition’ (152).  
However, programmers must first agree on what constitutes a human, a gesture, or 
emotion, to then translate norms and specific parameters into code, which is a complex 
computational process in itself that, ultimately, leads to the design of detection and 
tracking modules. What is additionally important is the synchronisation of modules with 
the locomotive system, and the coordinating of the robotic limbs is extremely difficult 
to execute. Hence, even if a tracking or detection module is functional and able to 
gather and decipher input, it still requires an operational connection and synchronisation 
to other modules. Only if this works can a corresponding, physical behaviour from the 
robot follow.  
One major challenge is, therefore, to synchronise the input that the robot receives from 
its environment with the already embedded modules. The ECA model requires, 
according to Rossini (2012), a perfect linkage between its knowledge base, which is a 
set of models and pre-determined information about what is to be detected, and the 
information derived from sensory input. The robot’s biggest challenge is, therefore, to 
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process ‘the information from the outer world by means of its sensors, to analyse them 
through the Knowledge Base module, plan a response, and execute it’ (Rossini, 
2012:153). Computational architectures of robots can be distinguished as function-
based (Nilsson, 1984) and behaviour-based (Brooks, 1991) architectures. According to 
Rossini, function-based architectures operate in a linear path of rules of execution, 
while behaviour-based architectures are composed of response modules that react to the 
environment without requiring a planning stage.  
Next, I would like to particularly focus on how to understand tracking modules, which 
can be represented as one module in the computational architecture. Tracking is not an 
exclusively robotic or computational capacity, but a process to detect and decipher 
information broadly speaking. To track means to locate, to trace, to contextualise a 
position of oneself or oneself within the environment and in nature (Bray, 2014), as 
much as it relates to the regulation of infants’ attention (Tomkins, 2008). At the 
beginning of systemic tracking through mechanic tools, different civilisational steps 
were passed through to enhance the personal orientation and the ability to ‘read nature’ 
as, for instance, ancient Polynesian cultures did (Bray, 2014: 3). However, in this thesis, 
I am only concerned with the complexity of digitally-based tracking systems, even if 
tracking systems are used as much in personal computers or other devices, such as 
CCTV cameras.95  
                                                
95 Contemporary popular tracking applications often relate to web browsers and applications such as 
cookies (Acar et al., 2014; Raley in Gitelman, 2012). These are explored in depth in HCI/surveillance 
research, due to conflicting interests of companies gaining user data and the users’ privacy protection. 
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For the social robot to interact with a human or the environment, it needs to, at least, be 
in the position to detect, recognise, and to respond to human input; to recognise human 
shape; to process data of the embedded emotion or gesture concepts96; and to create 
meaning holistically. Hence, to be interactive or social, beyond anthropomorphic 
designs and human response, the social robot needs to track its environment and to 
process the data. To be able to track, computer vision is an essential quality, according 
to Royakkers & van Est (2016). For them: 
‘Robot technology progressively masters more and more complex 
operations. This is made possible by improved visibility (via 3D vision 
systems), better navigation and mobility, better voice recognition, and 
smarter interaction with people’ (3). 
In A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots by Fong et al. (2002), as one of the early and 
still relevant papers on social robots, they point out how important it is for social robots 
to be able to track people, gaze, and speak. They specifically use the term ‘tracking’ 
(154) as a robotic ability to locate and detect human bodies in a space in front of the 
robot.97 HR and Robot Ethics limit the view on tracking to its functional and operational 
role in the framework of HRI, as I briefly outlined in Chapter Two, but it also allows for 
dataveillance to be an ethically problematic consequence, as I reiterated in Chapter 
                                                
96 From a media philosophical tradition, gestures and emotions are concepts which are more than 
anthropomorphic sign pattern. In some philosophical debates, which I cannot fully explore here, gestures 
are much more than visually coded and anthropomorphic actions, because the idea of gesture does not 
align simply and causally to a signified expression, but emerges from a bodily mediality and movement 
(Ruprecht, 2017; Agamben, 2000; Flusser & Roth, 2014).  
97 Tracking systems focus on capturing different human features. For instance, on the face in ‘face-
recognition systems’ (Moubayed, 2012), the eye or gaze in eye/gaze-tracking systems (Prakash et al., 
2016; Jokinen, 2009; Admoni & Scassellati, 2017; Moubayed, 2012), or on hand and eye tracking 
systems (Brèthes et al., 2004, 2005), while noticing tendencies in HR towards an increasing focus on the 
design of iris recognition systems (Jain et al., 2012).  
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Three. 
Durantin et al. (2017) write about tracking as being the robot’s social skill: ‘The social 
skills required for a social robot include detecting, creating, and learning the meanings 
of social moments’ (1). Equally, Breazeal et al. (2000) emphasise the importance of 
common perceptual abilities between human and robot, less as identical traits but more 
as common nominators. They state: 
‘One of the most basic is that robot and human should have at least some 
overlapping perceptual abilities. Otherwise, they can have little idea of 
what the other is sensing and responding to. Vision is one important 
sensory modality for human interaction, and the one we focus on in this 
paper. We endow our robots with visual perception that is human-like in 
its physical implementation’ (1). 
Tracking software or programs is therefore implemented into robots and becomes part 
of their ‘network’, as Royakkers & van Est (2016) would say, but this does not mean 
that they are necessarily discussed as exclusively robotic applications. To understand 
tracking fully and as an ethical network, I suggest discussing it through an ethical lens, 
after having established a basic understanding of computational architecture and 
modules in this section. 
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An Ethical View on Tracking 
Summary: As Chapter Three pointed out, an ethical understanding of social robots 
includes taking data concerns seriously and understanding tracking as an essential 
component of social robots. I suggested grasping social robots amorally and without 
evaluations of good or bad agents or intentions and, instead, perceiving them as 
relational networks of intentions and capacities. In this section, I expand on an 
alternative ethical view on tracking, from the perspective of its non-hierarchical 
unfolding. I then revisit Agamben’s (2000) concept on the ethical gesture to highlight 
that the unfolding of tracking modules (Haritaoglu et al., 2000) and the problematic but 
influential FACS model by Ekman (2003) are ethical networks as well. I undertake this 
speculative exploration to offer an alternative path to Part Two’s morality-bound focus 
and the anthropomorphic view on robots, since these are not aligned with data-related 
issues. I emphasise, again, that this compromises the view on tracking, data, and robots 
as ethically challenging technology.  
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To understand the technological and ethical entanglements within tracking as a 
reciprocal and ethical process, the computational architecture previously unpacked 
presents only one way; looking at the conceptualisation of tracking modules and the 
concepts that fuse into it would be another. 
I propose looking at the ‘W4’ (809) model by Haritaoglu et al. (2000) to reflect on the 
unfolding of tracking modules as a synchronisation between behaviour-based or 
knowledge-based information. I only illustrate a few steps – from when an input signal 
is captured to how is it decoded, classified, traced, processed, and stored – through the 
W4 model, which provides a simple explanation for understanding how multiple steps 
fuse into tracking as a summative term of this simultaneous unfolding. Haritaoglu et al. 
(2000) amplify the importance of visual input and its processing, and write: 
‘Visual tracking is one of the most important fields of dynamic computer 
vision and it provides fundamental technologies to develop real world 
computer vision applications: human tracking and identification, 
intelligent transportation, traffic flow measurement and object tracking 
in smart rooms’ (809).  
The detection process is the first step according to Haritaoglu et al. (2000). The W4 
model includes a statistical-background model with a collection of ‘foreground blobs’ 
(809) that first detects such blobs in order to then be able to put them into 
predetermined classes by undergoing a ‘silhouette analysis’ (809). These silhouettes 
would be defined broadly as human, group of humans, or other objects. They continue 
with: 
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‘If a blob is classified as single-person, then a silhouette based posture 
analysis is applied to the blob to estimate the posture of the detected 
person. If a person is in the upright standing posture, then a further 
dynamic periodic motion analysis and symmetry analysis are applied to 
determine whether the person is carrying an object. (…) If a blob is 
classified as an object other than a person, W4 does not do any further 
silhouette analysis; it simply attempts to track the object through the 
video’ (809).  
After the silhouette-based analysis of the blob is completed, a tracker calculates the 
correspondence between previously tracked blobs and currently detected blobs. This is 
how the tracking function constructs or calculates an ‘appearance and motion model 
which enable to code and recover the trajectories of the tracked blob’ (809). According 
to Haritaoglu et al., there are more steps that follow, but these, for now, are enough for 
my intention to outline the intersection of different steps merging in this process, which 
then fuses into what I refer to as tracking.  
These various steps and different classifying patterns and models are man-made 
concepts of how a human is distinguished from a blob or an object. One could argue 
that these algorithmic collaborations between the human input are what constitute the 
computational autonomy of the robot, as discussed later with Wallach & Allen’s work 
(2009) on computational decisions and moral agency. The synchronisation of 
instructions requires the architectural preconditions, which align the instructions with 
the processing abilities to then allow for a functioning tracking process.98 I summarise 
the concept of computational autonomy only partially to highlight the mediality and 
                                                
98 I will not expand on the material dimension of algorithms, but I consider the algorithmic architecture as 
a progressive discussion on new agencies and aesthetics (Parisi, 2013). 
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unfolding of tracking in the tradition of Agamben (2000). This should allow exploration 
of the question: How does a tracking module know what to track, ethically?  
As Wallach & Allen (2009) will point out in Chapter Seven, the engineer (or developer) 
has the responsibility of implementing values and norms, but also makes use of 
disciplinary models in this process. The formation of modules is not a linear or causal 
process, neither is it a neutral one. Even before considering the engineer’s moral values 
that influence the module’s rules, according to Wallach & Allen (2009), the 
conceptualisation of emotion or gestures must be seen as an already ethically charged 
process that is strongly influenced by disciplinary frameworks.  
In the context of gesture recognition, Rossini does not unravel what kinds of models are 
used to program the modules, but he mentions the relevance of modules that process 
‘Emotional Intelligence’ (EI or AE). An EI module is for Rossini (2012):  
‘[R]esponsible for the internal state of the robot: this module can be 
either juxtaposed to other modules in the architecture in the creation of a 
social robot, or be included in the decision making module of a 
deliberative-reactive system’ (154).  
According to Menezes et al. (2007), the tracking module needs a concept of what a 
gesture or emotion is, but, as Haritaoglu et al. (2000) already mentioned, it takes certain 
steps from blob to human and therefore from movement detection to emotional 
expression. When researchers such Adascalitei & Doroftei (2012) argue for the 
‘emotional expressions’ of robots, they often refer to Ekman’s Facial Action Coding 
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System or FACS99, which is a detection scheme used to code and decipher emotional 
expression in humans. The FACS is used for robots and the HRI, but also for Human-
Computer-Interaction (HCI) equally, and is applied by social roboticists such as 
Breazeal (2002, 2003), Paiva et al. (2017), Leite et al. (2012) and Kanda et al. (2013: 
304).  
I debate the ethical role of the FACS in the wider framework of tracking processes next. 
Unpacking its conceptual constitution and intersections should highlight the importance 
of the epistemological context, out of which algorithmic modules are designed and 
concepts are embedded into robots, as much as it amplifies disciplinary goals in 
Robotics or Affect Sciences. This means, when I talk about gesture or emotion tracking 
modules in social robots, I also acknowledge that what a gesture or an emotion exists as 
is not a given concept, nor a stable one. In some cases, the conceptual models, which 
are embedded in the computational modules, draw upon earlier psychological or 
communicative models (as in gesture recognition) in wider communication studies 
research (Kendon, 2004; Knapp, 2014, Ekman, 2003). 
Similarly, so does the FACS; a scheme is implemented into robots/computers to detect 
and decipher (around forty schematised) human emotional expressions, and these are 
aligned to the emotional internal, as Ekman would claim. This system is still incredibly 
                                                
99 ‘Ekman is best known for his work on deception detection, the influence of which has extended beyond 
the academic field of psychology to the development of police and military interrogation techniques. In 
the 1970s, Ekman and his colleague Wallace Friesen undertook an eight-year-long study of facial 
expressions, creating a scheme of forty-four discrete facial “action units”—individual muscle movements 
combinable to form many different facial displays’ (Gates, 2011: 22). 
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influential in the development of facial recognition software, because it allows for the 
standardising and causality/inference steps in detecting the so-called basic emotional 
expressions in peoples’ faces.100 As Gates (2011) argues, the FACS is still the ‘gold 
standard’ system (22) for the detection and coding of facial expressions for the HCI 
(Human-Computer-Interaction) and the HRI (Human-Robot-Interaction). What the 
FACS has conceptualised to being an emotion relates to the purposeful reduction of 
emotional expression to forty different facial expressions, which feeds back into what is 
trackable as emotion and what is not.  
Even if Ekman has created this system from the perspective of a psychologist, the 
FACS was not designed to understand human emotions as I see it, but to make human 
emotion more readable for a visual recognition system. Hence, it aims for the 
signification and conceptualisation of emotions into tracking modules or units by 
programming systems, and must be understood under the premise of increasing the 
readability of emotions for technical systems, not as an attempt to understand human 
emotions. I want to clarify that the robot does not, in fact, track the actual or expressed 
human emotion, but that the given model manoeuvres in an outside world, 
corresponding to the knowledge base given to the robot that, in turn, looks out for a 
visual input on what emotion must look like. If I relate this dynamic to Agamben’s 
(2000) suggestion that cinema is gestural because it remediates the visual input through 
its own technical sophistication, then robotic tracking does the same as cinema 
                                                
100 Breazeal also used the FACS in her pioneering social robot, KISMET (Breazeal, 2003). 
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montage; it intertwines various agencies, creating a new reciprocal bond between 
technological and human into an intertwined ethical structure. 
Knapp et al. (2014) and Gates (2011) raise their critique on the FACS and the wider 
issue of standardising emotions and affective responses that I share. The FACS is a 
model that is culturally negligent to the differences between cultural norms and facial 
features that go beyond the Western (White) face. Its standardisation of emotions 
further excludes less expressive faces and people, by implying that a less gesticulating 
or less expressive person is less emotional, which is not only a dangerous assumption, 
but one with a biopolitical weight. Knapp et al. (2014) argue that: 
‘Although the same potential for showing a particular facial expression 
of emotion may exist in all humans, such as with anger, cultural 
upbringing influences when and how it is shown (…). Another example 
concerns grief. In one society, people may weep and moan at a funeral, 
whereas in another they may celebrate with feast and dance’ (258). 
This aspect illustrates to me that not only is the FACS a limited and reductionist 
scheme, but its reductionist modelling mostly suits the robot’s processing capacities, 
while not allowing for any subtlety or ambiguity of human emotional expressions to be 
captured. Even if designed from an anthropomorphic and psychological point of view 
(Ekman, 2003), it represents much more than a technological understanding or pattern 
making of emotions as opposed to emotional expression or human emotion.  
Furthermore, I stress that the cultural standardisation of emotion is a biopolitical process 
that aligns tracking to the biopolitical value that early cinema had, according to 
Agamben. The on-going standardisation and schematising of emotions and care cannot 
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be underestimated biopolitically. According to Gawne (2012) and myself, that aligns 
tracking in a wider biopolitical dispositif of emotion detection software and data 
gathering ambitions (and their commodification).  
The further alignment to interdisciplinary scientific objectives confirms the importance 
of digital signification of gestures or emotions. Just how consequential and far-reaching 
the FACS is shows in disciplines such as Affective Programming/Computing (AP) 
(Picard, 2000), a field heavily influenced by the groundwork of Ekman and his FACS 
(Angerer & Bösel, 2015: 52) that extends the biopolitical consequences of tracking to 
the quantification and growth of affective technologies (Angerer & Bösel; 2015; 
Gawne, 2012). For many years, AP has found great resonance within the research of the 
HRI, but especially in aligning robotics research with the HCI. Picard, who pioneered 
this field (and worked with Breazeal, the Social Robotics pioneer at this MIT), explains 
her research aims in her book, Affecting Computing (2000):  
‘By coupling affective pattern recognition with wearable sensing, we 
have a new opportunity to teach a computer to recognize the basic 
affective responses of its user—for example, if the user likes or dislikes 
something, or is confused, or frustrated—without the user having to 
explicitly explain this to the computer’ (250). 
These models, patterns, and concepts are never neutral or universal, but become 
problematic when they drift into a reductionism, or align increasingly with 
quantification schemes and reduce the dynamic and reflexive structure of terms such as 
emotion or affect. This reduction can be illustrated by looking at the influence of 
epistemological models on affect or emotions as being intertwined and reciprocal 
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concepts for tracking.  
In my ethical exploration, I also consider another interesting aspect. Not only are the 
decisions on which models to embed within tracking systems significant, but, 
furthermore, which concepts and frameworks are not used to define emotion or 
tracking, which might also be important.  
For now, I did not look at the implications of tracking, but only to its formation. For 
instance, there are many more ethical strings that exceed the process but attach to 
disciplinary goals. In the wider picture of using tracking and social robots, none of the 
decisions made towards the design of tracking modules is neutral, causal, or non-ethical, 
since the various intertwined considerations influence relationships, concepts, and 
disciplines, resulting in far-reaching biopolitical consequences. Looking closer at the 
FACS highlighted to me that not only does tracking influence the coding of emotions, 
but that this process has allowed for emotions to become a data-based currency in the 
wider context of ‘affect economies’ (Angerer & Bösel, 2015). This is not to be 
underestimated if applying this realisation to elderly care and social robots. 
What the research on tracking and emotion detection also displays is a theoretical 
dispute between disciplines. There seems to be an increasing gap forming between 
Affect Studies101 – associated with the Humanities/Cultural Studies/Posthumanism and 
                                                
101 Affect Studies as aligned to the Humanities (Massumi, 2002; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Angerer et 
al., 2014) should not be mistaken for Affect Sciences as aligned to the cognitive sciences and cybernetics 
(Davidson et al., 2003). 
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Affect Sciences – associated with HR/AI/AP. The research in Affect Studies on emotion 
and affect, even if appraised in its own framework, is mostly disregarded in Robotics, 
HR and AP, which are affiliated to the theoretical concepts of emotion in the Affect 
Sciences. Research from Affect Studies does (mostly) not provide any quantifiable 
theory on emotions and affect, and seems irrelevant for HR or AP to be able to 
appropriate concepts from. However, it is the Humanities-led discussions on affect and 
emotion that allows for a holistic ethical discussion on tracking as aligned with 
Posthumanism or Agamben’s work, not the one in HR or AP. 
Affect Studies are overlooked in wider scientific and robotic discussions and research 
on artificial emotions; on the contrary, Affect Studies are very much aware of AP 
discussions and their relevance on shaping emotion research, as Gawne’s (2012) work 
already showed. Gawne formulates a critique on Picard’s work conflating emotion and 
affect as a strategical approach of the Affects Sciences, one that is not neutral, nor 
innocent. Such an overlap in terminology allows to conceptualise the ‘one-to-one 
affective relationship’ (106), which is Picard’s intention. The problem would not be that 
these terms cannot be interchanged, but that this strategic ‘slippage’ (106), as Gawne 
sees it, opens the door to the appropriation… 
‘[…]of affect as a quantifiable substance, which can be measured, 
interpreted, learnt and directed. (…) Thus the potential for opening a 
deeper affective engagement within the confines of this informational 
model is limited by this reduction of affect to a quantifiable unit. This, in 
fact, has reproduced some of the very problems that advocates of 
affective computing had identified and critiqued in the cognitivist 
approaches to artificial intelligence’ (106). 
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I resume from my exploration that deciding on the concepts within tracking modules is 
deciding on the standardisation of emotions to specific physical expressions, and not 
only on robotic behaviour or gesture recognition, but also on human physicality equally. 
Trackable emotions are the result of various decisions and choices in the 
epistemological framework that fabricated their parameters. Therefore, I do not see a 
possibility to have a discussion on moral agency out of these realisations, since the 
embedding of these various agencies involved in tracking can be seen as a reciprocal 
and relational, hence ethical process, as Agamben would have argued.  
However, the decision to evaluate these steps (even as outcomes), or the attempt to 
assign accountable agenthood or agencies, would not be possible, since where should 
one start in the chain? Can Ekman be held accountable for social robots? Or the 
programmer implementing the tracking module? And what if the modules are designed 
with a bad intention; are the robots then the bad agents? 
If I revisit Agamben’s analysis on cinema, then tracking systems would not simply be 
the linear result of Picard’s or Ekman’s concepts, but would be built out of the 
alignment and co-shaping of constant input and remediation. Tracking would be, in his 
sense, always gestural, just as cinema is a remediation of a representational crisis of 
gesture and its transformation through a new technology. I think that this analysis 
justifies recognising the wider spectrum in which tracking operates, beyond being a 
gesture or emotion recognition software, but as, in itself, a gestural process.  
What emerges from this discussion is, in my view, that these points enable me to have 
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an informed and contingent understanding of the agencies involved in the complexity of 
processes such as tracking and, on a wider scale, of robots. This does not allow for 
finding moral agenthood in robots, modules, or computer systems. I see a problem 
however, in how expanding such a network could go too far in tracing, but without 
reflecting on the constructivist terminology, which then would hinder a better 
understanding of robots - especially if these are labelled as emotional or moral without 
much criticality.  
I will try linking this ethical view to a better understanding of dataveillance as an ethical 
problem of robots. What can be drawn from an ethical discussion on tracking for the 
ethical consequences of dataveillance? I might not have resolved the ethical concerns, 
but I advocate that such an ethical discussion on tracking allows for seeing the bigger 
picture on socio-technological agencies in this process, and how this is suited for a 
theoretical understanding of how tracking works.  
However, I am aware that this does not fix or conclude the accountability question on 
social robots. It should allow us to see more concerns and create an uneasiness 
nonetheless, and allow for second-questioning their infiltrating use in elderly care. What 
emerged is that, without any doubt, there is a lot at stake when considering the robot as 
a bad companion. The wider ethical consequences, to me, seem to increasingly emerge 
as pressing and unresolved. What I consider insufficiently stressed in these debates is 
that the ethical dimension in using social robots must look at the deliberate decisions of 
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a human agent (be it a programmer or robotics as a field) to apply tracking technology 
into sensitive environments. 
I state that continuing a discussion on dataveillance as part of a mediatisation process of 
elderly care could, consequently, take two paths. One would be to perceive 
dataveillance as a way of distributing and accumulating the agencies that tracking 
supports. This view would not reflect on accountability of robots as dataveillance and 
informational structure, neither would it blame the human agent, or the developer, to 
exploit people’s data, since what this perspective offers is to look at the width of and 
intersections of relations and the horizontal alignment of agencies. This would be what 
Posthumanist theorists and Agamben pursue with their ethical approach.  
If I look at dataveillance as a problematic process due to the data-related magnitudes, 
which it raises as an informational structure, it is not an unproblematic tracking process, 
since it raises the question as to why there is not more reflection on the human agent 
who is deciding on the implementation and expansion of technology into more 
environments, and on the possibility to use and reuse data for other purposes than those 
for whom it was collected (Püschel, 2014). I would emphasise that to understand 
dataveillance as being ethically problematic, the human agents’ (programmers, 
developers, roboticists, etc.) decisions to gather data, and the contexts of gathering such 
data, as much as the topic or context on which data is gathered, must be focused on 
much more.  
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Therefore, what the ethical discussion in Robot Ethics and POT must highlight 
vehemently is the importance of the human agent (developer or roboticist) as a crucial 
threshold that elevates data tracking to dataveillance as being the agent who manages 
the agencies involved in this process. Agamben’s ethical work does not offer enough to 
do this, due to his focus on the entanglement of reciprocal agencies and the dissolving 
of boundaries, as well as the remediation of private human expression through 
technology not allowing to address any accountability questions, even though he labels 
this process as biopolitical. Neither are the Posthumanist theories discussing (practical) 
accountability fully, which would allow addressing questions on the consequences of 
dataveillance for elderly care.  
I acknowledge some deficits in the exclusively ethical discussion nonetheless, as I 
realised that dataveillance is more complicated and comes with a negative connotation, 
since it implies the negative consequences already in its ethical structure. The 
Posthumanist ethical view might be limited in reflecting on dataveillance, since the 
moment in which an ethical conflict emerges, such as data infringement, the possible 
and practical consequences of tracking are not graspable and accountability is not a key 
concern. A mixed framework of moral-ethical questions, as Brey (2014) suggests in 
Chapter Seven, might be more suitable to tackle these.  
The concern around the potential of dataveillance stems, for me, not only from its 
ethical unfolding, but from its negotiation of agencies and its sophisticated 
computational autonomy, which appears to be increasingly uncontrollable and 
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intransparent. Its problematic ethical consequences are not immoral decisions of the 
robot, or immoral intentions per se, but are, in fact, decisions leading back to human 
interest, human ignorance/negligence, or intentions of commercial and research 
independent drivers. 
Dataveillance needs this extra decision that only a human agent can make; to extend 
tracking structures systematically into further environments. This second perspective 
allows us to understand dataveillance as both ethical and ethically problematic at once. 
The difference between this perspective and the moral discussions would be that this 
view does not diminish the complexity and agencies manifested in dataveillance as 
being still ethical; neither does it consider anything in this structure to be good, bad, 
neutral, or morally accountable. Considering the impossibility to demand any remorse, 
responsibility, or accountability from technology, practically speaking, these moments 
and decisions in which human intention is key must be recognised and questioned with 
a greater scrutiny.  
Ultimately, the ethical exploration has enabled me to create a bridge between the 
biopolitical consequences of tracking as a process, which not only shapes the definition 
of emotion, but also the value from its quantification through data gathering 
technologies. The application of social robots has even more ethical and biopolitical 
consequences considering their use in elderly care. However, aligning this process to 
social robots seems an underexplored connection.  
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I claim that it is important to look at social robots beyond the reciprocal elements of 
tracking modules to grasp the decisions and moments required to enable 
dataveillance.102 To do this, social robots cannot be limited to their perceived 
companion position that HR and Robot Ethics gives them, but must be discussed as a 
digital device that affords affective relationships from the human subjects with which it 
interacts. The increasing use of digital technologies in elderly care does not only 
support a mediatisation of care (Lundby, 2014) by reinforcing a ubiquitous 
technological structure, as Andrejevic (2012) mentioned, but also reconfigures the 
meanings on social interaction, professional care, the value of elderly people in/for 
society, the interest a society (roboticists, computer scientists) has of elderly people, or 
the interest companies have on the elderly. As it seems, these devices will additionally 
change the view on human caretakers (a perspective I had to, unfortunately, neglect due 
to the focus of this thesis) and on how they are trained, valued, and also paid, in that the 
use of robots will transform the care profession completely.  
Beside the influences on professional care, I identify that the robotisation of labour103, 
aligned with the biometric calibration of emotion, is not only relevant for AP as a 
research field, but is also relevant to various affect economies (Angerer & Bösel, 
                                                
102 To remind the reader on the requirements of dataveillance: One is the shift from top-down strategic 
surveillance towards ubiquitous and increasingly autonomous technology environments, then the shift 
from requiring an apriori intention on what data to gather, and third, the ability to appropriate the 
gathered data sets posteriori and to re-use them in new contexts. 
103 This refers to the increasing use of robots for labour environments in which human labour is 
dominating for now. Banking and postal services are already affected by this process in which the human 
labour is increasingly less required, due to the automatisation of standardised work processes. The care 
industry, however, struggles to implement more robots, due to the important role the human caretaker 
takes in the interpersonal relationship with the patient or client, which still does not allow for a 
standardising of most tasks without increasing the potential for harm (Hepp & Krotz, 2014). 
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2015)104, which not only instrumentalise the affordance of anthropomorphism as an 
affect-driven induction to encourage human engagement, but encourage more 
persuasive bonds between humans and technologies. Social robots are consequently 
shaping elderly care in two ways: In allowing more data to be gathered on the elderly 
through the affect- or emotion-recording tracking systems with which they are 
equipped, and by encouraging the affect-driven bonds between human subjects and a 
humanoid technology that might reshape care as much as tracking will.  
Next, with Chapter Seven, I begin a new discussion on machine morality streams in 
POT, which I see as continuous from the critical tonality on apparent moral agenthood 
in Chapter Five. 
  
                                                
104 The term ‘affect economy’ refers to the economical exploitation that results from fields such as 
Affective Programming, which do not only have an intention to understand emotions, but to transfer this 
knowledge into a commercial outlet. Angerer & Bösel (2015) speak of affect and psycho-technologies (in 
the original German text: Affekt- und Psychotechnologien), which are needed to detect, track, categorise, 
and operationalise affective states.  
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7. Moral Agenthood and Moral Agencies in Robots and Algorithms  
Chapter summary: With Chapter Seven, I move deeper into the framework of (iii) 
Machine and Computer Ethics with a focus on machine morality research. I trace 
discussions shifting from anthropocentric agenthood to distributed agency, and from 
machines to algorithms equally. This chapter moves away from the projected 
anthropomorphised agenthood, as debated in Chapter Two, Five, and Six. Instead, I 
enter into new discussions on morality of algorithmic structures, which come close to 
my ethical and Posthumanist unfolding of tracking, but differ in the attachment to moral 
considerations. The concerns surfacing from this chapter, and leading to the conclusion 
of this thesis, are on how moral agency and accountability have become devalued and 
operational concepts as the operational autonomy and the distribution of agencies begin 
to dominate technological views on morality. The growing problem I see here is around 
a depreciation of human agents and decisions in the context of digital autonomy, 
leading to unresolved accountability questions. 
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On Artificial Moral Agenthood and Reductionist Morality 
Summary: Wallach & Allen (2009) dominate the first section of Chapter Seven, 
positioning robots as ‘Artificial Moral Agents’ (AMAs), which points to the next 
defined limitation in POT research: the (2) Reductionist Morality as a limited model on 
the complexity of ethics as a dynamic discourse. Wallach & Allen’s (2009) AMA 
model in robots suggests two things, in my view: Firstly, exceeding the 
anthropomorphic focus on perception, while pointing to the importance of the engineer 
and human values embedded into the algorithmic structure; and secondly, it holds onto 
a single agenthood position of robots and computers, while suggesting a correlation of 
computational autonomy and morality, which I see as problematic and reductionist to 
the discursive nature of morality. The second discussion in this chapter looks at Arkin’s 
work (2009) and allows for reflection on the randomness of how morality is normed in 
unethical contexts of using robots. 
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Chapters Five and Six outlined the importance of appearance and anthropomorphism in 
HR and Robot Ethics and that this perspective is not seen as sufficient for a holistic 
ethical debate. What Chapter Six concluded with was an ethical perspective on tracking 
that aligns with the hypothesis of my thesis, which is that morality-led discussions in 
Robot Ethics are not sufficient (since too anthropomorphic) to grasp the ethical 
concerns around tracking or data (which require more complex agency models).  
However, as I established, the ethical (Posthumanist view) on algorithmic structures 
might be enormously important to understand the distribution and entangled network of 
relations that go into code or programming, but it leaves the practical accountability 
questions unaddressed and does not reflect on human agent intention to sufficiently use 
or apply technology. As I aim to outline morality research in POT research, I 
increasingly establish and reflect on shifts, which I am keen to discuss in regard to their 
positive and negative consequences. While initially critical with the moralisation of 
technology, I acknowledge that the value of various morality discussions cannot be 
simply denied, but must be rethought, as my limitations point out. 
The reason to include Wallach & Allen’s (2009) work, which is situated in the machine 
morality camp as part of Philosophy of Technology, is that their work clearly 
overcomes the (1) Apparent Morality and Agenthood limitations that have occupied a 
substantial part of this thesis already, beginning with the anthropomorphic fallacy to 
examining how the companion view on robots influences the moral discussion, making 
it superficial and perception-based.  
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The focus shifts in this chapter, as I move away from social robots as bodies to zoom 
into their algorithmic structures (which they share with other digital systems). This is 
less my choice so much as a reflection on the discussions on computational morality, 
which simply do not pay attention to social robots. What surfaced as one interesting but 
confusing tendency from my literature review is that, while Robot Ethics discusses 
more than social robots ethically, machine morality research does not discuss social 
robots at all. 
Social robots are partially disconnected from machine morality research; at least, they 
are not specifically addressed as being moral machines. In the wider research on ethical 
issues of robots, the issues are addressed as context-dependent studies of robots or 
machines, which focus on what robots are used for. In this sense, this leads to the idea 
that different models of robots have different kinds of moral agency concerns, even if 
some robot capacities are embedded in all sorts of robots throughout. Morality as a 
concept is hereby adapted to the aims and applications of these devices – supporting an 
anthropocentric view on technology. 
My remark would be that social robots are somewhat treated as step-children in debates 
on moral autonomy and the morality of robots in both camps. In Robot, Machine, and 
Computer Ethics, as theoretically intersected fields – the dominant focus is on morality-
led (less in Posthumanist) concerns and questions. The streams within differ on where 
and how moral agency is allocated, but it always remains an important factor. For 
instance, as I’ve already demonstrated, the moral appearance debate links to social 
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robots predominantly, while questions on computational capacities that might align to 
moral agency (assuming robots can ever have one) fit to various kinds of robots. 
Reflecting on the tracking and computational sophistication of social robots, I do not 
see any reason to exclude social robots from the wider debate on computational 
morality and autonomy as undertaken in POT, since their computational autonomy to 
monitor and to track exhibits a sufficient degree of autonomy and interaction, which 
allows for these to be aligned to morality research that reaches beyond moral 
appearances.  
When it comes to (potentially) moral decisions and abilities, discussions on 
machine/robot morality tend to align the morally good or bad (these terms mostly 
remain undefined) contexts of using technology to the moral agenthood of the robot. 
Even if the social robot is just a robot, able to perform the same computational 
autonomy as other robots, Wallach & Allen (2009) do not consider these devices as 
relevant, due to their morally unproblematic context of use and the assumption that they 
do not have to morally judge. It could be that they indirectly always include social 
robots in their debates, but do not highlight them as remarkably different, or they do not 
consider social robots as a distinct type of robot worth reflecting upon in questions of 
machinic moral agency. 
What this illustrates for me is a tendency in the literature of Robot Ethics and machine 
morality research that suggests social robots are not considered as morally problematic 
as, for instance, military robots (Lin et al., 2008). Since their agenthood is 
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predominantly associated with appearance, their capacities to have or develop bad or 
immoral intentions is neglected. I could not find any inherently technical or 
computational reason for the exclusion of social robots from machine morality research, 
since they must be able to interact, track, and behave as morally appropriate as other 
robots (assuming morality is a legitimate category). Hence, they are built on the same 
requirement as other tracking or interactive robots or computers, which are discussed as 
artificial moral agents, even if the levels of autonomy might vary between each type of 
robot. 
For now, the focus that machine morality research has is on robots that are placed in 
morally conflicting situations, such as war or surveillance contexts, in which their agent 
position is crucial for making moral decisions. In current machine morality research, the 
focus is put on military robots or drones, in which the question is how and if robots are 
able to negotiate or decide on the extent of their actions or harm (Lin, 2008). Assembly 
robots, for example, are not morally interesting for this research, because they operate 
in controllable environments and do not necessarily interact autonomously with human 
beings, so as to give them that moral agenthood position. Whereas in environments such 
as elderly care and military operations, which are not inherently controllable but require 
‘response readiness’ (Rossini, 2012) and interaction, robots could possibly harm 
someone.  
Neglecting social robots in this sense is short-sighted, because elderly care is as much a 
sensitive context as military conflict, even if less obviously dangerous. What is 
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subsequently argued is that robots are worth being discussed beyond their specific 
applications, but in terms of their potential accountability and abilities. 
Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) highlight the human fear and fascination of losing 
control in discussions on robot morality and autonomy. Human developers, they argue, 
want robots to be more autonomous, but simultaneously also fear that this autonomy 
will become dangerous and get out of control. Hence, roboticists are frightened to make 
them ‘truly autonomous machines’ (5). Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) refer to the 
struggle in which roboticists are caught up between wanting, but also not wanting, 
robots to be truly autonomous (4,5). As previously mentioned, the fear and motivation 
from science fiction movies and books could be influential in this debate, as much as it 
keeps reappearing as a driver for HR and machine morality research.  
Not only are we, as humans, scared of autonomous robots, but we also aim towards 
changing their position in society. Robots were initially supposed to be ‘workers’ 
(Reilly, 2011: 4), which is what the word ‘robot’ means etymologically. The reason 
being that, by employing robots, these machines provide cheap labour over a long term 
and are not affected by human weaknesses, such as tiredness or sickness (Dumouchel & 
Damiano, 2017: 4). This makes robots popular in industries that need specific task-
driven workers (the military, assembly lines). However, in elderly care and other 
increasingly growing industries where human contact is key, a robot needs to be more 
than a cheap and tireless worker; it must be nice and reliable as well. This is another 
reason why the moral appearance discussion cannot give any depth or substantial 
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ground on which to discuss morality. 
While techno-philosophical researchers, such as Coeckelbergh (2009, 2010), review the 
moral appearance in robots as insufficient to account for moral responsibility, Wallach 
& Allen argue on a different level from the very beginning. They are more concerned 
with the machinic side of robots and not at all concerned with social robots as 
companions. Morality, for them, must become a machinic decision-making capacity that 
has no superficial affiliation at first. It must, at least, not be a question of 
anthropomorphic behaviour or perception, but of decision-making. Hence, they do not 
engage with concepts such as the ‘psychopathic’ robot (Coeckelbergh, 2010) and leave 
questions about appearance behind. In fact, anthropomorphising technology raises huge 
ethical problems for them, on the grounds that machines are given projected faculties 
they do not have, which could have harming consequences (45).  
They point to two things, which I consider as valuable remarks in this discussion: The 
importance of the engineer and the values he or she embeds into the computational 
program and, further, the algorithmic decisions related to moral autonomy. They argue 
that the computational autonomy of robots enables them to evolve into ‘Artificial Moral 
Agents’ (AMAs) (Wallach & Allen, 2009; Wallach, 2010). In this sense, computers (as 
robots and machines) face two issues: The precise implementation of human values, and 
the technical sophistication to improve and adopt these values into a computational 
moral agenthood. Computational autonomy is the major step for them to justify why 
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AMAs are able to have moral ‘considerations’. Wallach & Allen (2009) define morality 
in technology as… 
‘[…]an interaction between increased autonomy and increasing 
sensitivity (…). With increasing autonomy comes the need for engineers 
to address broader safety and reliability issues. Some of those needs may 
involve explicit representation of ethical categories and principles, and 
some may not. Our guess is that engineers will add these capacities in a 
piecemeal fashion. Increased autonomy for (ro)bots is a process that is 
already well under way. The challenge for the discipline of artificial 
morality is how to move in the direction specified by the other axis: 
sensitivity to moral considerations’ (34). 
Their move towards the concept of moral sensitivity remains blurry, in my view, but this 
is difficult to implement artificially due to the ‘immense technical difficulties [that] 
remain to be overcome before the robot will be able to determine, for example, which 
rule applies in a given situation’ (189).  
Wallach & Allen point out that, in their view, computers cannot yet embody or have a 
‘full moral agency’ (26), since this is not technically possible for now. On these 
grounds, they further debate why and how human morality could be translated into an 
‘operational’ or ‘functional’ morality that then evolves to a ‘full moral agency’ of the 
computer (2009: 26). For Wallach & Allen, there is a spectrum ‘from systems that 
merely act within acceptable standards of behaviour to intelligent systems capable of 
assessing some of the morally significant aspects of their own actions’ (25, 26). They 
continue discussing the human influence in the very making of moral rules, or ‘ethical 
modules’, which allow for the machine to establish its own set of rules in a Utilitarian 
ethical manner, upon which to build their moral actions (Dumouchel & Damiano, 2017: 
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175).105 This requires that these devices must be autonomous enough to execute and 
judge within the restrictions given to them by the developer (Dumouchel & Damiano, 
2017: 175), while the moral and universal rules must be clearly defined as precise 
instructions. 
The engineer is crucial in this process, according to Wallach (2010) who asks; ‘Whose 
morality or what kind of morality should be implemented in ro(bots)?’ (243). Because 
of the importance of the human developer in implementing moral judgement into the 
machine’s programming, Wallach & Allen suggest and urge for the development of 
‘Engineer Ethics’ (Wallach & Allen, 2009: 25). The difference between what they 
highlight and what Chapter Six discussed with tracking being an ethical process is that 
they understand the values and concepts are being implemented in a linear and stable 
causality into a neutral technology. The embedding process of the human values into 
the computational is not questioned by them as being, in itself, a mediating or ethically 
entangled process, but is described as a linear path between the human instructions and 
the algorithmic structure executing the rules.  
Wallach & Allen state that, therefore, the developer must be able to set the rules clearly 
and precisely. For me, this not only implies that morality is a rule-based system that can 
be implemented, but that it also requires the engineer to have great overview in being 
able to anticipate the consequences emerging from the implementation of these rules 
                                                
105 Dumouchel & Damiano (2017) write on the Utilitarian ethical tradition: ‘Since it has long been 
common practice in various versions of utilitarian doctrine to quantify the moral value of different 
options for the purpose of comparing them, utilitarianism plainly recommends itself to anyone seeking to 
thoroughly “mechanise” moral reasoning’ (231). 
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and on the possible behaviours of the AMA that, by executing these rules, becomes 
‘ethical’ (16). They consider that this new position to which machines are elevated 
requires their moral accountability for the outcomes, as much as for the actions that 
these machines do not yet have. Hence, for them, machines still lack the sufficient 
computational autonomy necessary to reach this state of an AMA, but it does not mean 
that they always will. Wallach & Allen suggest that developers can support the 
development of the machine’s moral considerations by establishing an… 
‘[…]open-ended system that gathers information, attempts to predict the 
consequences of its actions, and customizes a response to the challenge. 
Such a system may even have the potential to surprise its programmers 
with apparently novel or creative solutions to ethical challenges. Perhaps 
even the most sophisticated AMAs will never really be moral agents in 
the same sense that human beings are moral agents’ (16).  
The first concern I identify in this AMA concept is that Wallach & Allen consider the 
embedding of human moral values as a neutral and linear process into a neutral 
technology. This position originates from an instrumental view on the computer as an 
extension of the human developer’s values, and has only one positive aspect in this 
case: it allows for moral accountability to be positioned clearly with the human agent. 
Gunkel (2016), however, points to the limitations of thinking in an instrumental 
perspective by saying that: 
‘[T]he instrumental theory of technology, which had effectively tethered 
machine action to human agency, no longer adequately applies to 
mechanisms that have been deliberately designed to operate and exhibit 
some form, no matter how rudimentary, of independent action or 
autonomous decision-making (241). 
 
 
 
217 
But, as they have argued themselves, machines are increasingly complicated devices 
and systems that, on the one hand, are supposed to judge morally but, on the other hand, 
are considered tools. This creates an oxymoron in their model of the AMA, which is not 
that uncommon in this research camp and follows a cybernetic perspective on 
technology in which attributes can be simply added or extended, where the dynamic in 
this process is insufficiently reflected upon (compared to media theoretical or 
Posthumanist research).  
On the one hand, the machine is only a neutral instrument; on the other, it should be an 
artificial moral agent. The two angles – between machines being neutral instruments or 
highly developed systems – creates a conflict that the philosopher Zylinska (2014) 
addresses. She writes that the ‘anthropocentric moralism (where values are being laid 
out without questioning the process of their fabrication and the conflict in which they 
always exist with some other values)’ (72) is joined by us encountering ‘the danger of 
falling prey either to anthropocentric moralism or to delegating authority to technology 
which remains underpinned by instrumentalist assumptions’ (72).  
Beside supporting this conflicting view on technology, another issue that Wallach & 
Allen’s (2009) concept raises is the view of the robot as an ‘individual actor’ (190) and 
not as ‘moments of complex technological system’ (191), which, according to 
Dumouchel & Damiano (2017), is a problem. This will be picked up in the next section 
of Chapter Seven on Floridi’s (2014) work, which overcomes this ‘anthropocentric 
conception of agenthood’ (187) and suggests a different conceptuality towards 
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distributed moral agencies. A further issue I have with Wallach & Allen’s work is that 
they see the values of the engineer as universal, agreeable, and stable norms. Even if 
they urge for an ethical acknowledgement of these having to be considered, they do not 
unpack who decides on the making of these norms and on what grounds.  
Arkin’s (2009) research on military robots shows how the norming of machine rules 
becomes a dilemma if there is no clarity on what capacities robots need to be able to 
judge and understand the context of their application. His work amplifies why the 
process of morality conceptualisation is more than finding agreement on universal 
moral rules to be executed by a machine. The expectation to assign clearly defined 
universal values on good and bad action has already been mentioned as one major 
concern, which the Posthumanist Braidotti (2006) declares as a ‘hindrance’ (15) of 
moral philosophies.  
It shows that Arkin struggles at this very point, but he resolves the struggle differently, 
by appropriating what moral goodness means to the context in which it must be applied. 
Arkin’s research amplifies how computational autonomy gets increasingly and 
problematically synchronised with moral autonomy, while making it gradually 
impossible to allocate agenthood or accountability within these abstract moral decision 
processes. The definitions of good and bad behaving robots are not only flawed when 
expecting the universality of these terms, but becomes even more flawed if these terms 
get adapted to the context of use and do not provide any stable norming framework.  
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Arkin’s (2009) research addresses the dilemma around military robots as autonomous 
and, therefore, morally responsible agents. The major issue being; what is considered to 
be a good robot in the context of having to do bad things is highly debateable. This 
shows that morality is, in the end, adapted to the context of needs and tasks, which 
makes the idea of a universal norming problematic. It asks if the adaptation of morality 
to the need of a context has not simply become the making of random rules and 
labelling them as moral. The moral reference point beyond, for instance, aiming for 
more efficiency or accuracy in rule-based decisions seems to disappear if morality has 
adapted that flexibly. This thesis argues that by adjusting morality to a context and 
need, as to war or conflict situations in which good and bad depend on what side the 
robot fights, it becomes absurd.  
Arkin is aware of this trap, but suggests a creative and, in my view, unrealistic 
repurposing of robots to keep their moral value nonetheless. The robot could take over 
the position as the moral guide in stressful and conflicting contexts to prevent humans 
from becoming immoral agents. According to Arkin (2009), the moral intention 
programmed into military robots is not meant for them to be morally good agents, per 
se, but for robots to be able to minimise the risk of civilian death or to avoid 
exaggerating a conflict beyond what is strategically necessary (according to the 
developer) (30). What Arkin concludes from his research into U.S. Army robots is ‘that 
robots not only can be better than soldiers in conducting warfare in certain 
circumstances, but they also can be more humane in the battlefield than humans’ (30). 
He claims that in an ideal (moral developer’s) world, the robot would basically prevent 
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the human from becoming immorally carried away to do more harm. What he wishes 
for in this context is that if ‘weaponized autonomous systems appear on the battlefield, 
they should help to ensure (...) humanity, proportionality, responsibility, and relative 
safety’ (33). 106  
In the research on morality in military robots and their moral accountability, 
unanswered questions reappear such as: What is moral? Who is the agent? And, can 
computational autonomy be held morally accountable for the execution of rules? Since 
what the robot is faced with, in this position, is a conflict between its autonomy to 
execute precise algorithmic rules, and having to regulate the immoral human agent.  
Ideally, Wallach & Allen (2009) are correct in arguing that machines are going to add 
‘novel or creative solutions to ethical challenges’ (16), but this thesis struggles at this 
point to agree with the linearity and instrumental view on machines, the reduction of 
morality to algorithmic rules, and the creative adaptation of moral norms to contexts. As 
such, the guidance that morality gives in being a purposeful and reflective concept 
appears much more flexible and adaptive than might be useful when answering for 
uncomfortable moral questions. 
                                                
106 Sharkey (2012) critiques Arkin’s conclusions by arguing that ‘Arkin’s anthropomorphism in saying, 
for example, that robots would be more humane than humans does not serve his cause well. To be 
humane is, by definition, to be characterized by kindness, mercy, and sympathy, or to be marked by an 
emphasis on humanistic values and concerns. These are all human attributes that are not appropriate in a 
discussion of software for controlling mechanical devices’ (219). I am critical with both assumptions; on 
the robot being able to be humane, as much as with saying that human individuals are, per se, kind or 
merciful. 
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Debating morality, moral agenthood, and moral accountability has not only created 
multiple conflicts of interests between the warring parties, but also aligns research to 
ethical boundaries beyond doing good. What moral goodness means, then, is only 
bound to context-specific requirements that allow for robots to evolve into moral agents 
if their behaviour conforms to what is programmed into their complex (man-made) set 
of computational rules (Dumouchel & Damiano, 2017: 187). This leads to a reductionist 
morality being simplified to a practice of accuracy and algorithmic rules, and leads to a 
conceptual framing problem that Wallach (2010) noticed as well. He claims that: 
‘Maximizing goodness or achieving justice can be rather vague ends 
when the agent needs to discover what the goal means rather than having 
the end accompanied by a top-down definition’ (247). 
Hence, what the work of Wallach & Allen and Arkin showed was that questions on 
moral universalism or reductionism have complicated their own discourses in which 
these were supposed to assign moral goodness.  
On the one hand, the autonomy of computational algorithms complicated the 
accountability question, because robots or machines must be able to interpret and 
execute non-neutral human instructions, but are not yet accountable agents. On the other 
hand, as this thesis highlights critically, the precise execution of specific rules cannot be 
taken as sufficient to become morally accountable or to regulate human accountability, 
as Arkin would suggest, due to the lack of technical sophistication and moral reasoning 
of machines or algorithms. 
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This section has allowed for two main things to emerge. It successfully overcame the 
perceptive companionship angle of robots by deepening the agenthood discussion as 
one situated in the machinic and computational dimensions of robots. Furthermore, 
while the AMA concept of Wallach & Allen (2009) goes beyond the perceptive level of 
agenthood and morality, it does not go beyond moral reductionism and a stable and 
singular agent position in the machine. They have further limited the conceptualising of 
morality to a rule-based view on computational moral decisions, which are operational 
algorithmic decisions. This leads to an additional challenge in which the human 
engineer is responsible for embedding moral values into the AMA, but then must also 
assume that this ‘system may even have the potential to surprise its programmers with 
apparently novel or creative solutions to ethical challenges’ (16) and present its own 
moral decisions one day.  
If the AMA gains sufficient autonomy (it is not clear when and if this will happen 
according to Wallach & Allen), it might then be used to support the human agent to 
regulate the scope of immoral behaviour in moments of stress or conflict, as Arkin 
(2009) suggests. However, in none of these scenarios can the computer, as a device, be 
held accountable for any of its behaviour or consequences. Nor has it been clarified on 
what requirements or parameters an artificial computer agent is to be identified as an 
agent. What appears also problematic is that the scenarios outlined are prolific and 
supportive of highly reductionist and rules-based models of morality, orientating 
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themselves around a mixture of Utilitarian and Kantian ethics107, by aligning 
algorithmic decisions with moral actions to project moral agenthood. 
  
                                                
107 Wallach (2010) addresses the still unresolved intersection of will and autonomy in Kantian ethics. 
‘Kant’s contention that will and autonomy are necessary for an entity to be a moral agent. The ability to 
function as an autonomous being, or the capacity to will, suggest faculties beyond pure reason. However, 
little is understood regarding the manner in which Kantian will and autonomy are supported by and 
emerge from the capacity to reason and other cognitive mechanisms’ (246). Wallach also points to the 
importance of unconscious or emotional decisions in human morality, which cannot be translated into 
computational code, but still influence moral decisions. Hence, the research on AMAs must look beyond 
cognitive mechanisms of moral decision-making (245). 
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Towards Distributed and ‘Mindless’ Morality 
Summary: The second section in Chapter Seven reflects on two further models with 
which to discuss moral agency, which represent a shift in POT, from understanding 
machines as single agents to understanding machines as digital system agencies. I 
continue the already elaborated aspects from Chapter Six on tracking, where I pointed 
out why the computational autonomy of robotic machines is an important level on 
which to discuss moral autonomy and agency. Brey (2014) proposes thinking in terms 
of ‘ethical structures’, while Floridi (2014) suggests reconsidering the ‘anthropocentric 
agenthood’ (187). In contrast to Wallach & Allen, Brey and Floridi overcome the 
singular agenthood and distribute moral actions and moral outcomes into the 
algorithmic structure. This section will conclude with two examples of algorithmic 
autonomy, which illustrate that, practically, the question on how to allocate moral 
actions and factors within semi-autonomous algorithms is not only difficult, but it is 
impossible to allocate any moral accountability to such complex technology.  
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So far, I have moved beyond the appearance-based model of technological agency and 
will, next, shift the view on digital technology as a single agent, which proved to be a 
tempting, yet superficial, way to view robots (because of their humanoid bodies). Even 
if robots are not their research focus, I examine Brey’s and Floridi’s morality and ethics 
research in detail to examine this shift. They suggest distributing moral agency into 
algorithmic agencies and discussing the wider network of agencies around moral 
outcomes and moral actions; not to assign moral agenthood to machines, as Wallach & 
Allen suggested. The shift they suggest in distributing morality favours a better 
computational understanding of algorithms by adapting morality to an algorithmic 
understanding. The issue that emerges from their work is that a distributed model of 
morality diminishes the accountable agent and removes the question on any practical 
accountability of technology. While this allows for a better understanding of algorithms, 
it devalues morality as a concept that might be able to address the consequences and 
responsibilities of agent behaviour.  
These two concepts are already highly complex attempts to understand ethical 
discussions aligned with computational autonomy. Both consider the increasing 
computational autonomy as influential in the context of moral accountability. They 
reflect on why a moral accountability cannot be stabilised or attributed to algorithmic 
structures after all; even if morality increasingly dissolves into a theoretical and abstract 
model, accountability is removed from these discussions by being assigned to the 
human agent only. Brey and Floridi are interested in a flattened, almost Posthumanist 
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view on morality, as a horizontally laid out relationship and less as a hierarchical 
evaluation of anthropocentric agenthood. 
Brey (2014) suggests thinking of ‘ethical structures’ (135), which at first sounds as if he 
has liberated this view from a limiting intention to moralise technology 
anthropocentrically into good and bad behaviour. For him (2014), structural ethics ‘are 
social and material arrangements as well as components of such arrangements, such as 
artefacts and human agents’ (135). His model… 
‘[…]has three aims: (1) to analyze the production of moral outcomes or 
consequences in existing arrangements and the role of different elements 
in this process; (2) to evaluate the moral goodness or appropriateness of 
existing arrangements and elements in them, and (3) to normatively 
prescribe morally desirable arrangements or restructurings of existing 
arrangements’ (135). 
Discussing technology ethically instead of morally was already raised as an alternative 
view in Chapter Three when reflecting on the limits of moral philosophy. But even if 
the ethical perspective on socio-technological agencies allowed to understand the 
entanglement of agencies and, later, allowed for an ethical unpacking of tracking as a 
network, this view has similar limitations on accountability questions.  
However, the ethical framework does not intend to advocate for a stable or accountable 
agenthood in technology, neither in the human agent, since it is positioning its 
exploration differently to moral discussions, trying to overcome the hierarchy of 
agenthood. Brey seems to have found a middle ground in thinking technology ethically 
without fully removing the agent. He discusses morality as a distributed system of 
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social and material networks and arrangements, not only as a ‘residing’ (137) concept in 
one agent. This seems very appropriate to grasp computational structures as well, even 
if his work speaks more broadly about technology and artefacts (but also about CCTV 
cameras).  
The important shift in Brey’s research, compared to the previous work of Wallach & 
Allen, is that he is interested in a structural and not an agent-focussed conceptuality of 
morality; what he describes as a shift from individual ethics to structural ethics. He, 
therefore, returns to the terminology of ethics as aligned to what Chapter Three 
suggested, to be able to look at the structural unfolding rather than the moral evaluation. 
Within this approach, Brey argues, morality can be reflected upon in different ways; for 
instance, by looking at the ‘moral factors’ (138) influencing it, which can be assigned as 
moral outcomes or moral behaviour. For Brey, this ethical focus allows us to reflect on 
various factors that arise in thinking about technology ethically. He points, for instance, 
to norms in society that shape our way of thinking and behaviour, but also the roles that 
artefacts have in society (139). 
However, Brey’s focus on ‘moral outcomes’ in thinking technology becomes 
problematic, because of his suggestion that these networks own a ‘moral goodness’ 
attached to them, which, again, moralises technology as good or bad while not saying 
why this is useful. Yet, what can be agreed is that Brey is aware of and defends the view 
that technology is neither morally neutral nor can it be made responsible. He sees 
structural ethics as a network of moral factors, which are outcome-oriented or 
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behaviour-oriented and, therefore, allow for an understanding of technology in a moral 
way, but in relation to behaviours or outcomes, not in being an accountable agent (138). 
In Brey’s work, the process of trying to include moral accountability into this scheme 
becomes slightly abstract, in my view. For him, moral accountability could theoretically 
be given to different agents in this ethical network (independent of these being human 
or robot entities), but, in case none of these agents can be made accountable, only 
‘human agents bear responsibility’ (138). This is one way of saying that practically, 
only human agents bear accountability. However, the ethical structure is his way of 
suggesting that technology or machines can have moral agency as an ethical structure, 
but no moral agenthood as agents.  
Yet, what would this mean in reference to a tracking algorithm and its ‘moral 
goodness’? Such could be reviewed by looking for the moral outcome, but not 
expecting any moral accountable position within its digital system. Brey continues to 
debate digital systems in anthropocentric terms of having good or bad moral outcomes, 
which I consider problematic and challenging to some extent, since I question the 
ability to pinpoint any goodness or badness within the algorithmic system. Nonetheless, 
I do acknowledge that, in the wider context of how these systems effect human lives, his 
approach is important, despite the moralising tendencies. 
Floridi (2014), on the other hand, joins this discussion with the concept of a ‘mindless 
morality’ as a strategy to overcome the fixation on a single agenthood discussion. 
Despite proposing an interesting and complex perspective on algorithmic morality, his 
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model only reinforces the concern with (2) Distributed Morality and distributed moral 
agency, as I will explain next. His suggestion of thinking through a ‘distributed moral 
responsibility’ (DMR) or ‘mindless morality’ (188) within algorithms considers the 
moral consequences of technologies beyond agent intentionality. Floridi comes into the 
discussion on machine morality with a clear intention to shift the focus of ethical 
questions in computer technologies (and robots) by forming Data Ethics (Information) 
Ethics, as a new, challenging field in which ethical consequences of computational 
technologies are debated (Floridi & Taddeo, 2016). Floridi is as interested as Brey in an 
ethical and structural view, as his critique on the anthropocentric agenthood implies. His 
first suggestion is to overcome the anthropocentric agenthood. He states that:  
‘An entity is still considered a moral agent if (i) it is an individual agent, 
(ii) it is human-based, in the sense that it is either human or at least 
reducible to an identifiable aggregation of human beings, who remain 
responsible as the only morally responsible source of action, like ghosts 
in a legal machine’ (Floridi, 2014: 187).  
This partially aligns with Posthumanist ethics, even if their focus would not approve the 
leftovers of moral evaluations that Floridi embeds in his thinking. While Floridi claims 
that there is no ethical thinking beyond intentionality, for him, the agent is not required 
to exhibit such exclusively. This indicates that Floridi and the Posthumanist debates 
might even share a similar ambition to leave the anthropocentric agenthood angle 
behind, but Floridi continues to moralise technological actions by not being clear what 
moral concept he applies to their evaluation (while he is very clear in critiquing 
individualist moral philosophy as inappropriate to understand digital information 
structures). 
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Floridi critiques the anthropocentric agenthood focus by arguing that the traditional 
angle on moral agents demands that the agent is morally good within what is defined as 
the ‘moral threshold’ (188). He outlines a different path to acknowledge that the 
computational autonomy in machines has complicated moral agencies. Floridi is 
primarily interested in software and algorithms in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs), compared to Brey, who refers to technology in a wider sense and, 
particularly, to CCTV cameras. Floridi suggests to redefine the limits in thinking of 
‘moral agents’ in technology by liberating this position from the focus on an 
anthropocentric agenthood. This has a huge advantage, since, by overcoming the 
‘anthropocentric conception of agenthood’ (187), the complexity of algorithms can be 
understood much better. However, by doing this, the disadvantage is that the 
distribution of agenthood into agencies makes an allocation of an accountable agent 
impossible.  
Floridi goes even further and detaches accountability from moral responsibility, which 
is a most problematic point for me, considering the operationality of moral 
responsibility seems to devalue any reason for keeping moral questions attached to 
technological systems. This formulates my major limitation on the (2) Distributed 
Morality model, besides it having removed single agent thinking. Floridi’s model for 
thinking morality is built on an abstract and complicated scheme, in which he discusses 
different ‘Levels of Abstraction’ (LoA) of informational structures.108 The LoA model 
                                                
108 ‘The Method of Abstraction comes from modelling in science, where the variables in the model 
correspond to observables in reality, all others being abstracted. The terminology has been influenced by 
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is, according to Floridi (2014; Floridi & Taddeo, 2016), a way to look at moral agents 
beyond intentionality, moral states, or the moral nature of the agent, and to think of 
‘mindless’ morality. Floridi hereby closes the circle between moral autonomy and 
computational autonomy.  
For Floridi, the allocation of moral responsibility is possible within technology, since 
responsibility can be looked at in an operational way. This means finding the source of 
the action, like an error in the algorithm, and assigning the responsibility to the position 
in the algorithm that creates the error. Consequently, the source of error becomes 
‘morally answerable’ (2016: 6). The important thing for Floridi is that this model can 
address erring agents, which can learn from their wrong behaviour. What is required is 
for them to be autonomous enough to learn and to be able to change the rules in the 
system to improve their behaviour (7).  
The major reason for him moving responsibility away from accountability is to 
highlight that computational systems are never fully accountable for their actions, but 
that, within their structure, there is a responsible agent whose behaviour and action can 
be adjusted (7). Even though Floridi denies and critiques the anthropocentric fallacy 
himself, he strangely continues to call these ‘responsible agents’ owning ‘good’ or ‘evil’ 
(7) intentions.  
                                                                                                                                          
an area of Computer Science, called Formal Methods, in which discrete mathematics is used to specify 
and analyse the behaviour of information systems. Despite that heritage, the idea is not at all technical 
and, for the purposes of this chapter, no mathematics is required’ (Floridi, 2014: 190). 
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His model illustrates a few problematic points for me, not only because somehow 
Floridi seems to again return to single agents despite his very critique of these, but 
because he has detached responsibility from accountability, while also detaching 
accountability from agenthood. I consider this step highly problematic, due to the 
transformation of moral responsibility to an agent-less operational causality. According 
to Eshleman’s (2014) and Noorman’s (2018) description of moral responsibility, this 
means removing the direct association between moral responsibility and a potential 
punishment or blame as a consequence of immoral or harmful irresponsibility. 
Interestingly, a critique on Floridi’s approach comes exactly from Brey (2014), who 
reviews Floridi’s solution as ‘unsatisfactory because moral agency has traditionally 
been identified strongly with moral responsibility’ (140).  
Miller (2010), one of the few who emphasises the role of the human agent in POT 
discussions, points to the relevance of human moral responsibility and outcomes in 
saying that: 
‘The relevant human players, systems designers, and software engineers, 
for example, and not the computers, have collective moral responsibility 
for any epistemic outcomes’ (Miller in van den Hoven, 2010: 5). 
I aim to highlight the practical issues in assigning accountability to algorithms in a next 
step, to illustrate why Floridi’s approach might be conceptually interesting, but is 
practically distancing POT views on technology from the practicalities of applied ethics. 
To do this, I look at two algorithmic examples that illustrate how complicated it has 
become to understand moral intention on the one hand, and agenthood on the other. 
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Also, how dangerous it might be to think of morality only in operational terms. The 
examples will also show that the distributed thinking of morality is useful to understand 
computational agencies, but is not very favourable to address any accountability beyond 
the human agent developing or programming software, even if such an agent seems to 
have lost full agency on the ethical consequences. 
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On Amoral Algorithms  
Summary: The next discussion circles around two examples of algorithms, which 
exhibit new autonomies, since the increasing computational autonomy has complicated 
the discussion on algorithmic morality. Even if the shift towards agency distribution is 
argued as a valid and enriching step previously, it has complicated the practical 
confrontation with, and the consequences of, algorithms. This is especially problematic 
and potentially unethical, when algorithmic systems lead to unintentional but severe 
harm of human users, exhibiting how neither has their autonomy, nor has their 
accountability been sufficiently understood.  
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The first example of algorithmic complexity that escapes a moral agenthood and clear 
moral intentions is drawn from Wallach & Allen’s (2009) work. I do not hereby return 
to their work or views, but just make use of one example in which they have identified 
concerns with computational autonomy; one I find appropriate to make my point. What 
they illustrate is how the increasing computational autonomy in algorithms has 
complicated the search for morally accountable agents, while they were still taking 
about single agents. Even if I considered this approach flawed and reductionist to fully 
understand computers or algorithms as networks, it offers a simply way to allocate 
moral action/decision to one point/device/moment, even if this remains a theoretical 
allocation only.  
Wallach & Allen (2009) indirectly anticipate that considering computers as agents is 
insufficient (even if this goes against their AMA model), as they unpack an ethical 
dilemma concerned with the lack of accountability emerging from malfunctioning 
algorithms in medical machines. Them quoting the research director at Google, Peter 
Norvig, shows the severe consequences for human lives from, in my view, amoral but 
highly ethically influential medical software errors. Norvig highlights: 
‘These are errors like giving the wrong drug, computing the wrong 
doseage, 100 to 200 deaths per day. I’m not sure exactly how many of 
those you want to attribute to computer error, but it’s some proportion of 
them. It’s safe to say that every two or three months we have the 
equivalent of a 9/11 in numbers of deaths due to computer error and 
medical processes’ (Norvig, quoted in Wallach & Allen, 2010: 22). 
Wallach & Allen do not bring this example up to question their AMAs, unfortunately, 
but do advocate that ‘the harms caused by today’s (ro)bots can be attributed to faulty 
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components or bad design’ (Wallach & Allen, 2010: 22). Their quote reads as if design 
faults emerge from the technology having a bad intention to malfunction or the engineer 
having an immoral intention. They do not discuss what it means practically if harmful 
and ethically severe consequences occur despite there being no intention to do harm 
without any identifiable malfunction, which is what the second example will illustrate.  
Further questions arise: Who/what is accountable for a bad design? Could the ‘Artificial 
Moral Agent’ (AMA) ever be held accountable? What would be the threshold between 
an artificial computational agent not being able to execute the rules implemented into its 
systems, and the human developer not providing it with the correct parameters to do so? 
Machine and Computer Ethics continues to look for the moral moments in these 
systems, but does not resolve any moral concerns or outcomes sufficiently. Further, the 
gap between the theoretical complexity and the practical insolvability seems to grow. 
As Brey and Floridi suggested, shifting the discussion from agents to agency, in order 
to negotiate accountability and autonomy as an ethical network between the human and 
the machine, does acknowledge the complexity of algorithmic agencies, but does not 
address questions on practical agent accountability, which only amplifies the gap I see 
between theory and application, between meta ethics and applied ethics. If looking at 
the medical algorithm malfunction through Floridi’s morality model, I cannot find or 
allocate what Floridi calls the ‘evil’ error in the algorithms that could be held even 
operationally responsible, despite never being accountable. With Brey’s ethical model, I 
might be able to identify the bad ‘moral outcome’ that the algorithmic ethical structure 
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brings with its application, but what if it was programmed to lead to this outcome? With 
both, the question on the system’s inherent moral judgement and on moral decisions 
seems unresolvable.  
In my view, the medical algorithm has no intention to lead to negative consequences, 
which are only negative for the humans, not for the algorithm, since the algorithm 
executes what it is made to do, even if this includes an error in the system. Such an error 
is seen as bad or immoral only according to what it leads to; not because it can be 
understood as an immoral decision, as Wallach & Allen would suggest, but, instead, it 
proves to be a moral factor influencing an ethically problematic outcome of the ethical 
structure, as Brey would argue. This implies that the ethical outcomes could be the most 
important factors from which moral questions must be addressed when discussing 
morality in technology. Therefore, the only way to think of the ethical consequences is 
when allowing for the algorithmic structure to unfold such autonomy and complexity, 
and not when harms happens, and to then retrospectively untangle the network of 
agencies and search for the one accountable agent or to assign blame by projecting 
expectations into ‘mindless’ systems. Assigning a moral intention retrospectively or 
anthropocentrically into these systems seems absurd, and practically useless, in my 
opinion.  
Gunkel (2016) displays a different case of an, in my view, amoral, but equally 
consequential, autonomous algorithm. Instead of looking at a specific programming 
error in the system, he looks at banking or financial algorithms and amplifies how 
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autonomous learning machines have become morally uncontrollable. Gunkel holds on 
to Winner’s points from his book on Autonomous Technology (1977), published more 
than 40 years ago, to reinforce that: 
‘“To be autonomous,” Winner (1977) argues, “is to be self-governing, 
independent, not ruled by an external law of force” (16). The phrase 
“autonomous technology,” therefore, refers to technical devices that 
directly contravene the instrumental theory by deliberately contesting 
and relocating the assignment of agency. Such mechanisms are not mere 
tools to be directed and used by human users according to their will but 
occupy, in one way or another, the place of an independent and self-
governing agent’ (2007: 239). 
However, the operational autonomy has drastically improved, even if what self-
governed means should be rethought. According to Gunkel, financial algorithms can be 
understood as learning systems, which become autonomous to some extent. This does 
complicate the question on their increased agency and decision-making, in suggesting 
that, despite this, they cannot be held accountable. These mechanisms are ‘designed not 
only to make decisions and take real-world actions with little or no human direction or 
oversight but also programmed to be able to modify their own rules of behaviour based 
on results from such operations’ (239).  
Gunkel refers to the problem of allocating intention and accountability by looking back 
at the worldwide financial market crash that originated in the U.S. in 2010 (see next 
quote). He reflects on the time when human traders used to control stock markets 
completely, but that from the 1990s onwards, this agency was increasingly transferred 
into intransparent algorithmic agencies. These new models of regulation were faster in 
trading and comprehension, learning from and adapting to unexpected opportunities 
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more quickly than humans. Gunkel (2016) cites Patterson (2012) to point out that this 
led to 70 per cent of international trade being generated by ‘autonomous’ machines 
beyond the influence of human agency. These machines organised exchanges from 
mortgage payments to retirement savings (239). Gunkel (2016) then points out to where 
this shift in agencies and power dynamics ultimately led. He writes: 
‘[T]he unanticipated social consequences of this can be seen in a 
remarkable event called the Flash Crash. At about 2:45 p.m. on May 6, 
2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost over 1,000 points in a 
matter of seconds and then rebounded almost as quickly. The drop, 
which amounted to about 9% of the market’s total value or $ 1 trillion, 
was caused by a couple of trading algorithms interacting with and 
responding to each other (241). 
In this scenario, no single human agent nor any ‘bad design’ can be held accountable for 
the kinds of consequences that emerge from the complex autonomy of banking 
algorithms (which are nonetheless managed my human agents). The question in this 
case is less; if human agents could have stepped in to stop a financial crisis, but what 
financial systems and capital groups prevented this from happening. It is unlikely that 
an algorithmic system is that powerful (technically speaking) so that human agents have 
no way of controlling it, and yet, the autonomy these information structures, which are 
embedded in other power structures, operate vast amounts of information in real time, 
by also managing endless decisions. This cannot be underestimated in ethical terms.109  
                                                
109 The influence of algorithms on our lives should not be underestimated, as Gunkel (2009) warns. These 
systems do have agency that shows, for instance, in recommendations from services such as Amazon, 
Netflix, and Google search results. These might be mistaken as information providers or suggestions at 
first, but they do influence the relationships to knowledge, culture, information, and what kind of people 
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The examples emphasised that, while the increasing algorithmic autonomy of digital 
system is encouraged despite having severe consequences on human lives, the human 
agents are weakened in their accountable position, but are the only accountable agents. 
Further, the complexity and lack of transparency in algorithmic actions simply escapes 
the allocation of any moral intention or error, because of its distributed structure. I have 
already suggested that the ethical negotiation of power structures and discourses around 
robots, as a technology of algorithmic structures, must be understood more holistically, 
instead of supporting anthropocentric or anthropomorphic models of moral 
reductionism. However, I must point out as well that the position of the accountable 
agent, as found in simpler and instrumental technology models, has been devalued or 
remains undebated because of this. Again, the previous POT streams (including their 
limitations) are not totally dismissed here, since they exhibit valid theoretical insights, 
but they seem unable to suggest practical solutions to the concerns they address. It 
seems to me that these start off as discussions in applied ethics, but increasingly 
transform into meta-ethical streams.  
What algorithmic structures have illustrated to me is how complex it has become to 
negotiate the human input in relation to the technological capacities and processing 
power. However, I stressed that the algorithm is not an entity and does hold an 
accountable fixation point for its technological capacities and processing abilities, even 
if these lead to ethical consequences. Defining what these are and who is in charge must 
                                                                                                                                          
we will meet or know about, consequently. (241) For me, this is a good example on computational 
technology being inherently ethical when negotiating power structures and relationships. 
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be put up for further discussion since, for now, only human agents can be held 
accountable dealing with any outcomes, as they are the only agents affected by these 
and able to evaluate their outcomes.110  
To conclude Chapter Seven, I pointed out that certain limitations of the (2) Reductionist 
Morality and the (3) Distributed Morality models only reinforce a reductionist or a 
distributed model of technological agencies, while aiming increasingly towards a 
Posthumanist ethics without addressing these shifts and their consequences sufficiently. 
In my view, these consequences ground in the uncritical and positivist tendency in (iii) 
Machine and Computer Ethics and wider morality research, which is critical towards the 
anthropomorphic fallacy in (i) Robot Ethics, but creates new concerns as morality is 
reduced and simplified to numeric and algorithmic rules. In a wider sense, these views 
have transformed morality research from understanding technology morally towards 
transforming the concept of morality algorithmically, and they have increasingly (but 
more subtly) undercut questions on accountable agents.  
I am concluding this thesis by reflecting on my findings and by suggesting further 
research. 
 
                                                
110 At this point, the question of legal accountability should not be underestimated and might even reflect 
on how much the machine is considered accountable for a negative outcome, or the user, developer, buyer 
etc. These questions have huge practical implications that could affect elderly care as well. Hence, 
debating agency and accountability of machines is not a theoretical endeavour - as I highlight multiple 
times, but cannot unpack in detail. 
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Conclusion  
Dumouchel & Damiano may be right by saying that we are, in fact, afraid and equally 
fascinated by robots. This could be one reason why roboticists or programmers try to 
equip robots with morality buttons as they seek to make these devices more autonomous 
but, also, nicer. As robots gain autonomy, many expectations are projected onto them 
and some distort the role of the developer’s responsibility and agency as much as the 
norming of the (imaginary) morality buttons. Simultaneously, the fear that robotic 
autonomy will become dangerous, get out of control, and become an evil machine is 
countered by views of the caring companion; the good companion robot.  
Before concluding, I want to revisit my introduction briefly and the two identified 
conflicts, which I saw around the ethics of social robots used in elderly care. The first 
conflict was considered to be on hybrid and conflicting agency models of social robots, 
which I saw as either being anthropomorphised companions or as data tracking devices. 
My intention was to find out why the latter perspective is neglected in Robot Ethics and 
what supports or rejects this neglect. I saw the second conflict situated in the conflation 
between having either moral views or ethical views on robots, which relate to how we 
project values into them as a digital technology. Analysing these conflicts – between 
agency models and ethical perspectives – enabled me to form certain themes around 
agency, ethics, and morality and discuss these in three wider frameworks. Next, I 
unpack my findings less chronologically, but, rather, as thematically clustered. 
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On the Companion Position and Anthropomorphic Morality  
I addressed the anthropomorphic view on robots by critiquing its superficial perspective 
on agency and its limiting status as anthropomorphic ethics. I identified that Robot 
Ethics discusses moral agency of social robots through an (1) appearance-driven 
morality model, which originates in HR. There, social robots are intensely positioned 
and promoted as companions and not as machines, so that implementing these 
technologies into new care or heath contexts, such as elderly care, becomes easier. This 
view is mistaking the robot to be two things it is not; a single entity and a human-like 
moral agent. I showed that the superficial resemblance to human bodies is insufficient 
as a base to discuss actual agency models.  
New and progressive agency models on technology are better understood from an 
‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ agency model, as Barad would suggest, but not from a 
perceptive or moralising view on technology as a separate entity. What I specified was 
that the ethical agency of robots must not be grounded (only) on its humanoid shaped 
design, nor on its simulation or the extension of human values or agency, since these 
inference aims are instrumental and underestimate technological agencies in their 
holistic unfolding or becoming. A robot is a non-human agency entangled with human 
agencies, leading to new ethical concerns, such as being a possible dataveillance 
structure. The Posthumanist view pointed to the practical entanglements and allowed 
me to understand data collection as a holistic process. Yet, at the same time, this 
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perspective did not enable me to reflect on applied concerns around the practical use of 
robots.  
However, I do not conclude that the research on the psychology or the perception of 
robots should be underestimated or left out from ethical canons, even if this angle is 
important for Robot Ethics, because the human affectedness through anthropomorphism 
does influence the Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI) immensely. However, the 
acceptance and interaction with technologies such as robots does occupy various 
disciplines, and I view these canons as rhetorically imprecise when discussing 
expectations or capacities of robots. I highlighted this by repeating how terms such as 
good, natural, social, bad, or even evil are attributed as mostly rhetorical to project 
qualities onto robots, but do not capture their actual capacities.  
I stated that Robot Ethics must rethink its mind-set on what it is aiming for when trying 
to simulate humans through robots, especially because morality is not made; it is 
debated as a reflexive concept. Robot Ethics operates with a limited framework on 
thinking ethics, one that conflates ethical concerns with moral implications and 
deliberates on morality with an anthropomorphic and appearance-based approach to 
agency. This confirmed my assumptions on how the agency position of robots depends 
closely on the moral or ethical model it supports and vice versa. 
On Moral Concerns around (Social) Robots and their Limitations 
As I struggled with the superficial view around robot agenthood, I further highlighted 
ambiguous tendencies in POT discussions, which move beyond anthropomorphic and 
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superficial agent models, but remain stuck in a moralisation of technology. I identified 
the difference between anthropomorphic and anthropocentric morality discussions, 
which are both morality driven and built on human expectations of robots. Since the 
anthropomorphic view was at first my central theme in the ethical discussion on social 
robots, I traced it back to its origins in Humanoid Robotics (HR), through which I 
showed that understanding social robot anthropomorphically conflates their humanoid 
appearance with their technological capacities as tracking devices. With this discussion, 
I drew attention to the importance of computational interaction in understanding the 
technological capacities of a robot, beyond anthropomorphic projections, and to expand 
the ethical discussion.  
As moved on, I identified tendencies of reductionism and expectations in the 
anthropocentric camp as well, which I will pick up in more detail towards the end of 
this conclusion. Overall, what I determine from both perspectives is that morality-
centred and human-centred focus on robot agency create a legitimate discussion to some 
degree, but can be limiting for a holistic ethics on robots in all their agency facets; 
especially since drawing norms on robot behaviour from human behaviour still proved 
to be a projective and schematic approach to grasp robotic agency. The danger I saw in 
this context is to mistake robots as neutral tools or to view their agency as an extension 
of human agency only. Hence, I urged to take robots much more seriously; not because 
these are deceptive humanoid agents or potentially bad ones, but because these are 
complex agencies, despite not being human agents. 
 
 
 
246 
On Robots being an Inherently Ethical Technology 
Social robots raised concerns from various ethical angles as I advocated to understand 
them – and digital technology in a wider sense – as inherently ethical relations and as an 
inherent ethical network of human and non-human agencies. By looking at these 
devices as ethically intertwined agencies made of, and influenced by, human 
expectations, agency models, values, data sets, privacy, and autonomy epistemologies, I 
argued that the production and use of robots is no one-way street. It is a process that 
reciprocally influences human relations, agencies, and values, and feeds back into new 
sociability models, which do not have to be deceptive, but are nonetheless not the 
holistic, ethical dimension worth unfolding. This conviction emerged as I suggested 
thinking of ethical networks and entanglements of norms, values, and relationships in 
technologies, which are influenced by the humans creating them, but which are not an 
extension only.  
I showed that a robotic device and technology expresses and embodies human values 
and thoughts that went into its making, but it is not simply an extension of these. My 
extensive analysis on tracking illustrated this entanglement in detail, highlighting that 
technological capacities and human values become more than the sum of their parts and 
complicate a reversed detangling of agent positions. By doing this, I also elaborated on 
why understanding tracking better requires looking at disciplinary values and goals, 
which led to the design of tracking modules (illustrated in the emotion recognition 
system, FACS) and its relation to affect economies. Ultimately, I noticed that the better 
 
 
 
247 
the wider entanglement of agencies is understood – be it of the tracking module or of 
computational systems – the unlikelier it becomes to pinpoint any intentional moment 
or an agent position within these. 
On Social Robots, Tracking, and Data Concerns as Ethically Entangled 
Beginning this thesis, I assumed that data-related concerns around social robots were 
underestimated in Robot Ethics. However, I am assertive now that this neglect is deeply 
rooted in how the agency of robots is constituted. HR discusses tracking and tracking 
modules in social robots in a functional and neutral context of the HRI (Human-Robot-
Interaction) only. Hence, I expanded this view ethically and aligned this process and 
interaction to Posthumanism and to Agamben’s view on ethical technology, to allow for 
an alternative view on technology to emerge. This amplified the deeper reflection on 
agencies in tracking, but also left the focus on practical accountability open, even if 
tracking is better understood through a non-hierarchical approach. What must be taken 
from this theme is that I see no way around including the social robot – being a tracking 
device – in a critical discussion on data as undertaken in MSS, which can be understood 
better ethically and not morally. 
On the Crucial Link between Robot Ethics and Dataveillance 
The lack of reflection on the growing ubiquity of robots as a digital technology into new 
and often sensitive environments, such as elderly care, formed a crucial finding of my 
thesis’ investigation, supported by the framework of (ii) Media and Surveillance Studies 
(MSS) and insights from Posthumanism. I anticipated that the theoretical negligence 
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around data in Robot Ethics would establish new ethical dilemmas on the sensitivity of 
patient and health data gathered by social robots, since social robots are underestimated 
in their potential position as dataveillance.  
This dilemma stemmed from the conflicts I raised; the hybrid agency position and the 
conflation of moral and ethical concerns. This potential must not be taken lightly, as 
various scandals around the misuse of user data from social media platforms have 
shown recently that privacy is not a matter of an intention of a programmer or the 
platform owner, but it is a question of Big Data, information structures, commercial 
interests, and citizen literacy. I urged for Robot Ethics to liberate itself from HR goals 
and epistemes to some degree, since these focus on insufficient anthropomorphic 
agency models and questions on patient harm or isolation, but not on how these become 
increasingly autonomous data collectors.  
If Robot Ethics remains unwilling to discuss the uncontrollable element in collection 
data, which is possible, then Media and Surveillance Studies must pick this up. These 
data concerns create crucial practical dilemmas, which sooner or later will endanger the 
safety of patient data and privacy, since the value of health and demographic data is 
growing for commercial industries. I stressed that, even if the concerns on social robots 
becoming potential dataveillance might be a future-led scenario, the technical 
possibility will be given soon and the implementation of robots into professional care 
will increase. Consequently, this will create new forms of dataveillance (or Big Data) 
structures. Therefore, I encouraged Robot Ethics to rethink their passive disciplinary 
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position around dataveillance and dismiss other views as disciplinary differences. The 
goal for which I advocate is to establish more clarity on data ownership, privacy, and 
agent literacy, and on the potential commodification of data when robots are applied. 
On the Posthumanist Ethical Views on Robots 
Reflecting on robots ethically was supported by Posthumanism and Agamben’s ethical 
view on early cinema as a dispositif, which allowed me to challenge the morality-led 
discussion from Robot Ethics as anthropomorphic. Despite the usefulness in 
understanding tracking and data ethically, I developed a new awareness on why 
Posthumanist views might not be included in Robot Ethics (even if such might equally 
relate to a disciplinary ignorance).  
First, certain progressive, ethical discussions – as sophisticated as these are – lacked 
practical applicability. However, their concerns were valid and essential to 
understanding that, as we debate agency models of technology and human, we cannot 
see emerging technology such as robots as being an entity or instrument, but must 
embrace their entanglement, fluidity, and performativity ethically. This view seemed 
impractical for the practical concerns of robots, since, by offering fluid and 
performative agency models, it did not allow to distinguish between agent positions 
practically. If everything is entangled, who or what is the moral agent?  
Nonetheless, the lack of a practical applicability of Posthumanist theories is not a reason 
to exclude these from Robot Ethics, since these allowed for a better understanding of 
technology in terms of agency and ethical relations. I went as far as stating that not fully 
 
 
 
250 
understanding data collection, as enabled by the Posthumanist context, not only 
compromises the elderly’s privacy and ownership concerns, but makes Robot Ethics an 
unethical practice. 
As I left the frameworks of Robot Ethics and MSS, I entered (iii) Machine and 
Computer Ethics and wider Philosophy of Technology discourses on robots and 
machines, which focused on questions of moral agency, autonomy, and responsibility of 
technology as practically applied in digital, computational systems. These canons 
aligned moral questions to emerging technology’s ability to judge, decide, or be 
autonomous as a responsible agency. The insights I gained from these discussions 
presented new advanced angles, but also offered limited translations of moral agency, 
which I labelled as leading to (2) Reductionist Morality and a (3) Distributed Morality 
views, with newly surfacing concerns on the revival of a moral positivism and on the 
lack of accountability questions in the use of robots, which I present next. 
On Algorithmic and Computational Modelling of Moral Agency  
The computational models of morality that I surveyed proved to be reductionist, context 
dependent, distributed, and/or operational. The concern I labelled as (2) Reductionist 
Morality is one on the aligning moral norms to a numeric, static, or universal set of 
rules. This process revealed various issues to me; for instance, a lacking critical 
reflection on how to reposition old concerns from moral philosophy into new POT 
contexts. As Robot Ethics and POT tended to choose specific thoughts and backdrops 
from traditional philosophical streams, such as Kantian, Utilitarian, or Humean ethics, 
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these incorporated the initial concerns these streams had not yet resolved (for instance, 
to differences between individual and collective ethics for a society, or on the sources or 
reasons for duty or moral virtues, etc.).  
Therefore, what seemed insufficiently acknowledged is that traditional moral canons 
have tackled reductionist views on morality for centuries and, until now, there is no 
general agreement on what morally universal virtues or rules are that human agents 
should follow. Further, in recent Critical Theory and Posthumanism, multiple new and 
progressive view points and debates have emerged against any agency reductionism and 
hierarchy, presenting clearly how backwards and unsustainable stable, singular or 
rational models of human agency are. 
However, POT streams are not always consistent or aligned in their reductionist 
morality and agency views; some have embedded certain affective or performative 
tendencies from Posthumanism to look at agency, but others are still very much 
dedicated to reinstating traditional and individual philosophy models of the agent, or the 
universal moral value (Floridi would align with the first, Wallach and Allen, with the 
second). By indirectly reviving Utilitarianism or Kantian ethics – both of which are 
concepts that allow for an action-led and rationally oriented moralism – reductionist 
POT views then support a mechanised view on human values, as much as on separated 
and compartmentalised agent entities.  
From this discussion, I resumed that algorithmic morality has created another form of 
moral positivism, reviving a new institutionalisation of morality that is reminiscent of 
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how religious or legal morality is framed. Furthermore, this development does not give 
any opportunity for a new dynamic ethics to emerge, unfortunately. Reducing morality 
to universal values appeared not only to be dogmatic and to be reproducing or 
simplifying old moral concerns, but also lacked agreement on the reference points of 
goodness or badness in the moral evaluation. By following morality-led agent models, 
both Robot Ethics and POT laid their own traps. What began as their attempt to develop 
a good robot (be it superficially or computationally) exposed an inherent oversight on 
how this very attempt is always morally corrupted by whoever decided on its norms. 
Ultimately, morality appeared to be a fascinating theoretical vessel since, on the one 
hand, its fluidity and hollowness allowed for an ambiguity in undefined reference 
points, but, on the other, it always suggested an inherently value-oriented and human-
made approval or judgement.  
On Discussing Moral Agency of Robots as a Context Issue 
The surfacing of morality concerns was, in many ways, limiting, but it is also only 
contextual. I noticed the tendency to debate moral concerns only in contexts with a 
likelihood for the robot to be exposed to an immoral or violent context. It emerged that 
robot morality research in POT concentrates on inherently morally conflicting contexts, 
such as military operations or drone applications, in which robots must ideally be able 
to judge and negotiate the level of creating or preventing harm. This is one reason why 
the social robot, when applied in elderly care, does not find much acknowledgment in 
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the (iii) Machine and Computer Ethics framework, but would find it if seen through (ii) 
MSS. 
On Distributed Morality Models and Ethical Algorithms 
Understanding computational and algorithmic structures in robots – less as individual or 
pseudo-agents, but as aligned with Posthumanist views as non-evaluative – enabled an 
enhanced and more complex ethical perspective on robots as digital technology. 
However, what I saw disappearing from this focus is the importance of the accountable 
agent in thinking of morality as a discourse of responsibility, consequence, and 
accountability. The second issue did not affect the theoretical value of the ethical 
complexity, but it proved insufficient for clarity on responsibility when using robots in 
elderly care, or in the use of digital technology. 
Hence, viewing morality algorithmically as distributed was not seen as theoretically 
imprecise or flawed, as such. However, I debated it as practically insufficient. My 
problem stemmed from how human moral responsibility is transformed into an 
operational responsibility of systems, and the latter systematically replaced questions on 
practical accountability. One of my major issues towards an algorithmic morality 
understanding became, therefore, the detachment of morality from moral accountability, 
resulting from the dissolving of agenthood into agencies. This evolved because as these 
discussions assign more autonomy to digital systems, each of the theoretical canons 
agreed (or did not deny) that moral accountability is exclusively located in human 
agents. This agreement that technology can never be accountable raised the questions on 
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the purpose of debating machine morality in general. Floridi, for instance, detaches 
moral accountability from moral responsibility in order to operationalise algorithmic 
responsibility, yet frees it from any morally accountable connotation.  
In socio-cultural human contexts, morality is not simply an action-based good/bad 
system; it has a purpose, because good and bad norms are installed for a reason so that 
agents will act according to them. The motivation to do so can stem from an individual 
fulfilment to be good (virtue) or from wanting to be good within a wider community. 
However, being morally good can also be understood as a process that only works 
because of facing the consequences of being punished and blamed for immorality. This 
moral responsibility, to bear consequences and to account for one’s behaviour, is only 
understood by agents (be it of individual or legal bodies). Therefore, what Floridi 
suggested by operationalising moral responsibility in this ‘mindless’ morality model 
would leave the blame and punishment question unresolved within algorithms. I 
demand for a critical reconsideration of the purpose of morality if accountability plays 
no role in its constitution. 
In my view, we (researchers, roboticists, philosophers, programmers, and industries) 
need to pay more attention on the implementation and conceptualisation of the term 
morality and its implied value as a regulatory system in society. It appeared to me as if 
most POT discussions avoided addressing accountability concerns critically, because 
accountability remains linked to practical responsibility and this aspect is very 
uncomfortable, since it raises various legal and policy conflicts around robots or 
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tracking systems. What these canons do, instead, is to focus on a segmentation of 
morality into attributes, which then are discussed metaphorically.  
I found that discussions on moral appearance, moral agents, moral decisions, or moral 
rules in robots or algorithmic systems remain metaphorical to most extend but are not 
framed as such. Their metaphorical and abstracted level makes these discussions on the 
one hand, into complex and meta-ethical conversations, but on the other, to non-
applicable equations for practical concerns, which is the opposite of what applied ethics 
around robotic and algorithmic agency should aim for. 
On Dissolving of Agenthood, Accountability; and on the Purpose of Robot Morality 
My investigation showed that algorithmic morality theories lacked any alignment to 
reward, punish, and blame discussions, especially after having abandoned views on an 
individual agenthood of digital systems. This way of thinking about technology always 
implies that the human agent is accountable, which is sensible in practical terms, but, 
considering the growth of operational autonomy in digital systems, complicates the 
human status enormously.  
The unresolved question is still: How does a human agent deal with this new and 
complex collaboration with digital technology? In the context of robotics being a 
network of individuals programming, developing, and deciding, we need discussions on 
practical accountability as soon as possible. Also, what we consider moral behaviour is 
not a self-sufficient rule system outside of a real-life context of application, but it affects 
real human beings, such as the elderly, which are a specifically vulnerable group. 
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It proved challenging to fully resolve the conflicts I raised in the introduction, but I see 
the value of this thesis in having identified and debated them. It was not possible to 
simply fuse the mentioned moral and ethical streams together or to align their agency 
models theoretically, since their epistemological frameworks aim for different goals. 
However, fusing these streams into one investigative context justified why social robots 
require a new transdisciplinary ethics to resolve present disjoints, and this thesis offered 
the first step towards this becoming possible.  
What I hopefully worked out throughout this thesis is that the use of digital technology 
has entangled complex questions of agenthood and superficial or ontological agency, of 
operational or moral intentions and actions, which have blurred any clear purpose of 
moral agency being necessary or possible in technologies such as robots. It has become 
difficult to pinpoint the value of a concept of morality and what the contemporary 
streams intend to achieve when conceptualising morality into digital systems. What my 
investigation illustrated was that the newly emerging socio-technological agencies in 
digital technology should not only be aligned to anthropocentric ways of searching for 
rational or locatable intentions, agents, or values in the technological system, but, as the 
segmentation of these discussion shows, the very use of robots must be challenged 
holistically.  
Ultimately, what I urge for is to shift away from only focusing on how to make robots 
more moral or ethical and to examine the developer and programmers’ ambitions in 
applying or designing robots. I did not imply to look for a stable and fixed human entity 
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or a rational subject who owns stable moral values, but I indicated that the human agent 
(as individual researcher or as collective industry) is (or must be) the decisive authority 
in the wider context of using robots. This is simply because robots do not actively care 
about their moral status or their practical consequences on the lives of people or society, 
but human agents are affected by this technology exclusively.  
A common denominator of research should be to aim for progress that supports human 
wellbeing, instead of pushing for a greater and faster advancement of technology, even 
if this is where the funding and innovation is seen to be. Robots can be very useful 
technologies nonetheless, as cases show in which robots are assisting people who are 
physically impaired. However, the robotisation of care professions evolves quicker than 
the questions around its disadvantages can be answered.  
Beyond the technological and commercial interests, placing more robots into 
professional care can, in my view, be used to mask another problematic tendency – the 
devaluation and exploitation of human caretakers. While the commercial interests are 
not as much scrutinised in ethical discussions as they should be, accusing roboticists, 
robot ethicists, or programmers of not having good intentions or not caring about what 
robots do would be unjust and one-dimensional. Likewise, I cannot expect that an 
individual researcher can change or account for a whole research stream. I do not speak 
from a technophobe point of view, but with a critical angle on hidden technocratic 
ambitions infiltrating (and the commodification of research on) human values. 
Consequentially, I also disapprove of new tendencies to debate robot rights before we 
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have agreed on how to protect human privacy rights and on how to sufficiently educate 
vulnerable and maybe less literate human groups, as they get exposed to robots and 
digital systems more frequently.  
As a transdisciplinary researcher, I have shown that the ethical dimensions and 
consequences of using robots are debated, but often from various and unconnected 
angles. However, social robots (as much as digital technologies widely) are already and 
increasingly applied and tested in new environments aligned to care environments 
without an awareness of wider concerns. Researchers, like myself, must be critical and 
persistent in demanding more and clearer answers from HR and the industry, on who 
and what is profiting from the use of robots, to avoid the application of robots to 
become unethical in itself, and to avoid for morality to become an instrumentalised 
label.  
The academic response to these challenges must not advocate for or against the 
developing of new technologies, such as robots, but must critique the commodification, 
the growing techno-dogmatism, and the renewal of moral positivism in this context. I 
am convinced that we have a choice to either allow for new research questions to be 
driven mainly by the industry and pushed through by technocratic visions of progress, 
or to decide on research goals driven by citizens’ needs and values, which might require 
robots to assist, but hopefully not to care for us. 
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Further Research  
I urge for further transdisciplinary research regarding data infringement and privacy 
issues around social robots and robotic technology in elderly care, on the connection 
between Robot Ethics to Data Ethics and on the limitations of integrating traditional 
moral philosophy into the research on Big Data (Herschel & Miori, 2017).  
Further research into elderly care and social robots must address privacy and data issues 
rather than circle around anthropocentric privacy intrusion issues, as undertaken 
momentarily in Robot Ethics. The similarities between tracking modules in robots and 
website cookies was not addressed in this thesis, but influenced this thesis’ trajectory, 
given it created my awareness around tracking and data infringement. Future research 
has to focus on an in-depth discussion of wider literature on website architectures and 
tracking applications such as ‘cookies’111 (Acar et al., 2014; Raley, 2012) to expand the 
critical knowledge on tracking applications. I was not able to fully explore this angle 
when reflecting on dataveillance in MSS. I highlight Sylvia’s (2016) view on privacy 
protection as a red herring debate that masks ‘a much larger argument about the 
changing character of the risks stemming from the power differential created by 
corporate control of information’ (20).  
                                                
111 Cookies can be understood as tracking algorithms that create an online fingerprint of the behaviour of 
the web user. Such are increasingly difficult to avoid or disable due to newer versions such as 
evercookies, which link multiple levels of data access and pattern making (Acar et al., 2014). More on 
cookies and the tracking of cookie applications at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/23/cookies-and-web-tracking-intro, 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129298003 (Accessed 26.02.2018). 
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Since robotics is an industry-driven research field (Rommetveit et al., 2012) with 
commercial interests, I stress again that every possible angle on data must be explored 
to understand its value as a commercialised commodity. Again, this problematic 
connection must consider wider ethics research as much as the shareholders and 
developers, in my view. For now, I showed that the concerns related to data are 
discussed in a limited way or are barely unpacked in Robot Ethics (exceptions in POT 
are Stahl & Coeckelbergh, 2016, and Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017). I advocated the 
association of Robot Ethics to Media and Surveillance Studies as a valued path, which 
enabled an association chain between social robots and potential data infringement 
through tracking, which can be picked up in the future.  
I further advise for future research to explore the linkage between Robot Ethics and 
Data Ethics in much more detail than this thesis could, and to consider this link as an 
essential theory and practice in health contexts. Through the association of data-related 
issues, tracking, and social robots, I indirectly pointed to the connection between Robot 
Ethics and data-related ethical issues around the protection of health data, which 
becomes an increasingly commercialised topic (Knoppers & Thorogood, 2017). Floridi 
& Taddeo (2016) are critiquing the disconnection between Robot Ethics and Data 
Ethics, but their work is neither interested in what role tracking modules play, nor in 
social robots. I could not supply an in-depth discussion on Data Ethics, but Floridi’s 
work was discussed in its scope of distributed morality.  
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I urge for further research on the linkage between machine morality and Big Data 
(synonymously used with dataveillance in this thesis) in newer POT streams, which try 
to move beyond traditional moral philosophy. The critique raised by Herschel & Miori 
(2017), for instance, shows why the alignment of traditional moral philosophies with 
Big Data structures is problematic. What I observed was that morality, as a concept, still 
dominates techno-philosophical discussions on machines and computers as autonomous 
technologies, while traditional moral philosophy is clearly considered to have a limited 
ability to grasp issues such as Big Data.  
However, I noticed as much that Big Data research from POT often bypasses 
conversation about robots or angles from MSS. Floridi’s work (2014) already undertook 
a first step in the right direction, in bringing down the view on computers as single 
agents, by offering the distributed model on moral agency. However, Floridi & Taddeo 
(2016) do not suggest or intend to overcome discussions on morality, as I pointed out, 
neither are they interested in social robots or elderly care – even if they do address the 
ethical consequences around robots and data by looking at different ‘levels of 
abstraction’ (LoA).112 Hence, what I advocate as necessary is the exploration of robots 
and data/dataveillance/Big Data through the analysis of social robots and tracking, via 
Media and Surveillance Studies (MSS), to address newer ethical concerns.  
 
                                                
112 Floridi & Taddeo (2016) are not interested in the social robot and design implications. They only refer 
to robots as information structures. 
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